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Since Finland joined the European Union in 1995 Finnish foreign and 
security policy has experienced drastic changes. Neutrality and traditional 
peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-
alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle 
groups. At the same time Finland has entered an era of “post-consensus” in 
national foreign and security policy – manifested for instance in a vigorous 
domestic debate on the EU’s security policy significance.
This book studies the impact of Finland’s EU membership on these changes. 
It explains how new, more European, meanings have been attached to the 
key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. For Finland, participation 
in the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool 
for responding to the changes in the international security environment but 
also a new means on self-identification. Consequently, “Finland” is not what 
it used to be. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview 
on Finland’s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.
Teemu Palosaari is a Research Fellow at TAPRI. His research interests include 
European security and integration, Arctic issues and the environmental 
dimensions of conflicts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
”The EU membership strengthens the foundations of Finnish security. (…) As a small 
country we have to adapt, but we also wish to influence. That is the key question in our 
security policy currently.”   
 
(Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government 
Report 1/1995 “Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland’s Security 
Policy.”) 
 
 
Let us imagine that a state A joins an international organization. The accession presents 
a change in the state’s foreign policy. Let us then assume that the member states of the 
international organization in question jointly decide to deepen their cooperation in the 
area of foreign policy, to the extent that the organization eventually can be considered to 
have its own foreign and security policy, which each member state is expected to follow. 
Thus the membership requires continuing change of national foreign policy – the state 
has to adapt to the common policy decided upon at the international level. In addition to 
mere adaptation, the member state can also try to influence the common policy – by 
participating in the common decision-making process. Let us then complicate the picture 
by assuming that a central feature of the organization is a continuing political process 
which aims to deeper integration in a number of policy areas, foreign, security and 
defence policy included. Furthermore, as time goes by the membership influences the 
interests of the state: once a member, the membership can help the state to fulfil its other 
interests. On the other hand, the membership can change the state’s perception as to 
what its interests actually should be. 
 
Now we have proceeded from the state’s autonomous decision to apply for membership 
to potential impacts of the membership to the state’s national policies, preferences and 
identities. Theory-wise we have entered a watershed: Political Science theories with a 
rationalist ontological orientation tend to take national interest as a constant factor, a 
given thing, that is exogenous to the above-explained interaction. On the other hand, 
theories that build on more constructivist starting points argue that preferences and 
identities of actors are subject to change as well and should thus be regarded as 
endogenous factors. By taking a step from metatheory towards theoretical level a 
consequential division between rationalist and sociological forms of institutionalism can 
be located. Here the divisive factor is the way the institutions under transformation are 
defined: rationalist institutionalism focuses on political and administrative structures, 
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”formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government” (Vink & 
Graziano 2007, 13) whereas sociological institutionalism broadens the scope into the 
underlying political values and identities by highlighting the organizational cultures, 
conventions and ways-of-doing-things. Institutions are seen as “collective 
understandings that constitute the self-images and preferences of actors” (ibid., 13). 
  
To lower the level of abstraction let us now replace the state A with Finland, and the 
organization with the European Union. In theoretical terms we can at the same token 
place our attention on European Studies and integration theory, which offer the tools 
most typically used for analysing such multifaceted processes between the European and 
domestic levels. A growing research literature on Europeanization focuses on the impact 
of European integration on the domestic level of the member states – and in many cases 
non-members as well. As will be pointed out in more detail in the following chapter, 
Europeanization as an approach is connected to both the “institutionalist turn” and 
“constructivist turn” in Political Science and International Relations. 
 
The research setting and questions to be asked in this study stem both from the empirical 
and theoretical starting points. Empirically there are certain distinctive characteristics 
that make Finland an intriguing case for studying the impact of European integration on 
national foreign and security policy.  A non-aligned Finland and common European 
security and defence policy does not look at the first glance the most obvious pair. From 
a Central European perspective Finland might indeed appear a geographically peripheral 
country with a foreign and security policy that diverges from the European mainstream 
(that is to say having no NATO membership). Somewhat surprisingly, however, when 
one looks a bit deeper and scratches the surface of European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) process, Finland keeps popping up, and often in connection to issues one 
would least expect. The connection of Finland (together with Sweden) and the so-called 
Petersberg tasks is well-known: a Finnish-Swedish joint initiative resulted in the 
Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force 
tasks in crisis management including peacemaking) being written into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union. Furthermore, there are a 
number of cases of Finnish activity, but perhaps on a lower level of political visibility: 
Finns played a role that cannot be underestimated for instance in the geographically 
most distant EU/ESDP overseas mission (Aceh Monitoring Mission, Martti Ahtisaari). 
In Africa, a Finn served as the special representative of the EU regarding the Darfur 
crisis (Pekka Haavisto). In the institutional side, one can note the first chairman of one 
of the three new ESDP institutions established after ESDP got its kick-start in St. Malo: 
EU Military Committee (Gustav Hägglund). One can also point to the debate on the so-
called structural cooperation in the context of the European Convention and the drafting 
of the Constitutional Treaty and find Finnish activity concerning the solidarity clause 
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and mutual defence article. Add to that the Helsinki Headline Goal and the promoting of 
civil crisis management and civilian-military cooperation and Finnish participation in 
two EU battle groups and one can certainly conclude that there is more than meets the 
eye. It can be safely argued that Finland’s relationship with the EU’s foreign and 
security policy – and particularly the security and defence policy dimension of it – is 
certainly a complex and many-sided one and thus worth closer studying. 
 
The Finnish national foreign and security policy has changed considerably since the 
early 1990s. In the official documentation the traditional neutrality policy has been 
replaced by “full political commitment to European integration” and “military non-
alignment”. In this light it has been argued by various scholars that the turn from East to 
West in Finland’s foreign and security policy orientation culminated with Finland’s EU 
application1, and that the Finnish foreign and security policy has in fact experienced a 
drastic change during the EU-membership. The EU membership has, for instance, 
challenged the Finnish concept of foreign policy by turning many previously central 
foreign policy issues into “internal” EU affairs, affected the division of foreign and 
security policy power between the President and the Prime Minister and added the 
political weight of the Parliament in foreign and security policy. Other impacts of the 
EU that the scholarly studies typically point to are that the relations with other European 
states have become closer, the bilateral relationship with Russia has turned into a 
multilateral one, and global policies are now made in the reference group that consists of 
EU-member states.2 
 
At the same time, however, there is a tendency in the Finnish official discourse to value 
and underline continuity, coherence, autonomy and logic of Finnish foreign and security 
policy. A typical feature in Finnish foreign and security policy has been that even 
substantial changes may be camouflaged by an emphasis on continuity and logic rather 
than change. This may well have its roots in the Cold War era: for a neutral country it 
was necessary to show that the policy has not changed as a result of external pressure, as 
a neutral country cannot by definition follow someone else’s policies (Ojanen et al. 
2000, 141; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003, 130-131; Ojanen 2002, 154). According to 
some scholars the national foreign and security decision-making elite has promoted and 
highlighted the continuity aspect purposefully in order to construct the Finnish state 
identity as being something in which European and Western features have always been 
                                                  
1 The first Government Report on Finnish security policy after the EU accession contains two particularly noteworthy 
passages in this respect. Firstly, it is noted that “The EU membership has become part of the Finland’s international 
identity” (Government Report 1/1995, 6). Secondly, the Report states that “Union membership will help Finland to repel 
any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure” (ibid., 40). Further analysis on the Report is presented 
in chapter 4 of this study. 
2 E.g. Tiilikainen 2006, 2007, Ojanen 2002, Ojanen et al. 2000, Browning 2002, Tiilikainen & Raunio 2003, Forsberg 
2000b, Forsberg 2001, Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 2001. 
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present, even if in an embryonic state during the Cold War (Browning 2002, Browning 
2008, Moisio 2003). This has in turn made it possible to argue that adapting to the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) presents no significant break from the 
traditional line of Finnish foreign and security policy. The construction of continuity 
actually presents a positive challenge that inspires the research in this study at hand: to 
unveil change where it is argued not to take place. Consequently, the theoretical 
framework and methodological solutions are in this study tailored so that they support 
this task. 
 
What also makes the Finnish case attractive is that security policy has traditionally 
played a crucial role in Finland. In the domestic cultural understandings it has been 
strongly linked to the survival of the country. Moreover, security policy has been 
perceived as sphere where national consensus should reign, particularly since Finland is 
a small state. According to Ojanen the centrality of security policy is a main factor 
shaping Finland’s position on ESDP, and even the EU has often been seen from a 
security policy standpoint (Ojanen 2007, 34). The research on Finnish foreign and 
security policy and EU-membership generally talks of “Westernization”, 
“communalization” or moving from Moscow to Brussels, from neutrality to full political 
commitment, implying that the EU has indeed influenced Finnish policies. In two major 
comparative studies, the term Europeanization has been used (Rieker 2006, Jokela 
2010). However, a deeper and more detailed analysis of the transformation process has 
not yet taken place. Especially the national level political processes related to the change 
remain largely uncovered – for instance, how the EU has found its way into the national 
political argumentation on security policy, and how the role given to the EU’s security 
policy arrangements has changed during the membership. This study focuses 
particularly on the changes concerning the key Finnish foreign and security policy 
concepts (such as non-alignment, peacekeeping and small stateness). Participation in the 
EU’s foreign, security and defence policies has resulted in the reconstruction of these 
concepts, and new, and in many ways more “European”, meanings have been attached to 
them. Additionally, the study at hand will serve as a comprehensive empirical overview 
on Finland’s reactions and contributions to the different stages of CFSP and ESDP 
development during the first 13 years of EU-membership. It looks at how the alleged 
key questions of Finnish security policy – “adaptation and wish to influence”3 – have 
been realised. 
 
To sum up, from the empirical view point the value of the Finnish case for the study of 
European integration’s impact stems firstly from the considerable change that has taken 
place in national foreign and security policy. Secondly, compared to the vast majority of 
                                                  
3 Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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the other cases, the Finnish starting points for the Europeanization process are quite 
exceptional. Issues such as the tradition of neutrality policy, the turn of attention from 
East to West, military non-alignment and non-NATO-membership draw Finland apart 
from the European mainstream. The vigorous national debate on security policy and the 
EU’s security policy significance – and the contrasting views in the debate – also 
increase the attractiveness of the Finnish case. For instance, questions concerning the 
defence dimension of CFSP have typically carried a totally different weight in the 
Finnish debate than in most of the other countries.4 Contradicting views can also be 
found in the domestic academic debate. Furthermore, a small state aspect can be added 
to the list: the question of small states’ vulnerability to the European integration’s 
impact as well the question of their ability to influence the European policies are topics 
that European Studies touch upon regularly (Hanf & Soedendorph, Antola 2002, 
Wallace 1999, Kelstrup 1993). Additionally, the studies on Finnish foreign and security 
policy Europeanization are very limited in number, but yet certain interesting 
contradictions between the conclusions drawn in the studies can be located. 
 
In addition to the topical debates referred to above the research question of this study 
stem from the research literature on Europeanization. Typical research topics in 
Europeanization studies include the EU’s impact on member states in various policy 
sectors as well as decision-making and administrative structures. In addition to national 
adaptation, the so-called bottom-up direction of Europeanization, that is to say national 
projection, has been taken into consideration and studied. This means analysing the 
impact of member states on the EU policies. Other actors than states have also been the 
topic of Europeanization studies: European integration has provided different domestic 
interests groups with new political arenas and a chance to challenge or bypass the state 
level by communicating directly with the European level. All in all, Europeanization has 
become an established research tradition in European Studies and the foreign and 
security policies of many EU member states have been studied with the conceptual tools 
of Europeanization theory. In this study Europeanization theory is complemented with 
Constructivist International Relations (IR) theory’s views on state identity. From a 
constructivist IR perspective European integration forms an interactive context that is 
favourable for state identity change. The study builds on the understanding of foreign 
and security policy as a practice that reproduces identity, and therefore the 
Europeanization of national foreign and security policy may eventually result in a more 
Europeanized state identity. A more detailed discussion on the formulation of the 
research questions, as well as on the applicability and limitations of the selected 
approach and on its metatheoretical background is presented in chapter 2. It also 
                                                  
4 Debated questions include, for instance, does a mutual defence article or solidarity clause make the EU a military alliance. 
See chapter 6.2.1. 
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includes a critique and reconstruction of those variants of Europeanization that are 
typically used for studying foreign and security policy.  
 
Although a main motivator in the background of this study is the fact that the number of 
previous studies on the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy has been 
limited, this is not to say that the topic has not been touched upon: a number of studies 
have dealt with Finland and CFSP (see chapter 3.2) but the framework of 
Europeanization has been utilized only rarely. Juha Jokela links his analysis explicitly to 
the Europeanization literature (Jokela 2010). He compares the Europeanization of 
British and Finnish foreign policies from a post-structural discourse analytical 
perspective. In addition to that, Norwegian researcher Pernille Rieker has studied the 
Europeanization of Nordic countries “security identities” and the Finnish case among 
these. In both these studies Finland is placed in a comparative research setting, which 
unavoidably decreases the depth of analysis concerning a single case. However, for the 
purposes of this study the works of Jokela and Rieker are highly useful in that they look 
at the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy from the perspective of 
identity. 
 
In addition to filling in the evident lack of Europeanization research on Finnish foreign 
and security policy, a central purpose of this study is to challenge and question some of 
the research results and consequent conclusions drawn in the previous studies. Therefore 
selected items of the previous research literature on Finland are in the following chapters 
linked to the three different conceptualizations of Europeanization (Wong 2005) and the 
metatheoretical orientations behind them. Analysis of the primary empirical material is 
thus complemented with the critical reading and assessment of the previous studies – 
which hence can be seen to serve as secondary material for the study at hand. In addition 
to the critical commenting the study argues that the previous studies give an incomplete 
picture of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy; it is question of a 
more profound process of change than the previous studies indicate. Finnish foreign and 
security policy has undergone significant change during the EU membership and the key 
conceptions of national foreign and security policy have increasingly been challenged 
and replaced by new ones. Consequently, as the central elements defining the Finnish 
state identity have changed, “Finland” is not what it used to be. This study looks at how 
this happened, and to what extent Europeanization can explain it.  
 
 17
 
Structure of the study 
 
Chapter 2 contains a theoretical discussion on Europeanization, foreign policy and state 
identity. It is discussed how the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and 
security policy can be conceptualized and studied. Additionally, based on the critical 
assessment of the theoretical aspects of Europeanization the study will also propose 
certain ways in which the Europeanization approach in studying national foreign and 
security policy can be further developed. Europeanization is first described as an 
analytical approach in European Studies from a broader perspective. After that the 
different definitions and variants of Europeanization as well as its relationship with 
integration theories are discussed. Finally, the scope is narrowed into the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy: how that particular policy area has 
usually been studied in Europeanization research and what sort of theoretical tools have 
been developed for that purpose. The relationship of Europeanization with 
constructivism and the different institutionalisms is then discussed. In the final part of 
the theoretical chapter the constructivist IR theories on state identity reproduction are 
linked to the theoretization on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy. At the 
same time the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the selected theoretical 
framework are explained. The purpose is to enrich the selected Europeanization 
approach with theoretical views on state identity reconstruction and the role of 
international interaction in the change of state identity. 
 
Chapter 3 prepares the ground for the empirical analysis and looks at both ends of the 
Europeanization process, that is to say CFSP and Finland and prepares the ground for 
the empirical analysis. On the basis of previous research it is presented how CFSP 
constitutes a misfit pressure resulting to Europeanization. It is also explained how the 
adaptational pressure caused by CFSP has gradually increased during the Finnish EU 
membership era because of the deepening of European integration in security and 
defence. Chapter 3 also discussed Finland’s proneness to Europeanization: there are 
certain characteristics in the state identity and cultural understandings related to foreign 
and security policy of Finland that function as facilitating factors in the Europeanization 
process and increase the potential vulnerability of Finland to adaptational pressures 
caused by the CFSP. A categorization of the key foreign and security policy concepts as 
vehicles of state identity production is presented in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain the empirical part of the study. The empirical analysis will 
proceed chronologically and is divided in three phases (1994-1996, 1997-2002; 2003-
2007). As will become evident in the empirical chapters, the division is based on the 
finding that the character of the Europeanization process differs significantly in each 
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phase. The final chapter 7 aggregates the main findings of the previous chapters and 
discusses their implications on the Finnish state identity. Chapter 7 links the empirical 
findings to the constructivist IR identity theory’s basic assumptions and draws 
conclusions on the European integration’s impact on Finnish state identity reproduction 
in which foreign and security policy plays an essential role. 
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2. Theoretical discussion on Europeanization, foreign policy, and state identity. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As this study deals with the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and 
security policy, the central question of the theoretical chapter is how this impact can be 
conceptualised and studied. The answer presented – that is to say the theoretical 
framework of the study – builds on the Europeanization research literature and 
constructivist IR theory. 
 
The study begins with the following broader question: “What is the impact of EU 
membership on  Finnish foreign and security policy?” As was explained in the previous 
chapter this question stems both from an empirical and theoretical background. 
Eventually, when the theoretical framework based on the Europeanization literature is 
applied to the Finnish case, an answer can be given to the following question, too: “To 
what extent can “Europeanization” explain the change of the Finnish foreign and 
security policy after the Cold War?” This latter formulation of the research question 
enables the critical assessment of the Europeanization approach, its pros and cons. Thus 
the theoretical contribution of this study will concern the ability of the Europeanization 
approach to come to grips with a process of change taking place in the national foreign 
and security policy of a member state of the European union.5 Based on the critical 
assessment of the theoretical aspects of Europeanization the study will also propose 
certain ways in which the Europeanization approach in studying national foreign and 
security policy can be further developed. Additionally, a full-length study on Finland 
can also be seen as a reply to the need for more studies conducted “to test the 
longitudinal impact of EU on national foreign policies” presented in the Europeanization 
literature (Wong 2007, 331).  
 
The following theoretical discussion looks first at Europeanization as an analytical 
approach in European Studies from a broader perspective and discusses the different 
definitions and variants of Europeanization as well as its relationship with integration 
theories. After that the scope is narrowed into the Europeanization of foreign and 
security policy: how that particular policy area has been usually studied in 
Europeanization research and what sort of theoretical tools have been developed for that 
                                                  
5 Europeanization as a conceptual approach has been also used to study European non-EU-members, as for instance 
Rieker’s study on Norway (Rieker 2004) proves. 
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purpose. The main topic here is the three-dimensional conceptualization of 
Europeanization of foreign policy by Reuben Wong which he calls “an operational 
theory of Europeanization” (Wong 2005, 135; Wong 2006, 7; Wong 2007). Particularly 
I focus on the sociological institutionalism-oriented variants of Europeanization 
typically used for studying foreign and security policy. 
 
Moving on to a more metatheoretical level, the chapter then arrives at the crossroads of 
European Studies, International Relations and Political Science and investigates the 
relationship of Europeanization with constructivism and the different institutionalisms. 
In the final part of the theoretical chapter the constructivist IR theories on state identity 
reproduction are linked to the theoretization on the Europeanization of foreign and 
security policy. At the same time the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
selected theoretical framework are explained. The purpose is to enrich the selected 
Europeanization approach with theoretical views on state identity reconstruction and the 
role of international interaction in the change of state identity. A related theoretical 
argument in the study is that so far much of the Europeanization literature on foreign 
and security policy has endorsed a too simplified and unproblematized view on the 
(causal) connection between individual level identity change and national level foreign 
and security policy change. Consequently, the IR theoretisation on state identity is here 
used as a way to move the attention from the identity reconstruction at the individual 
level (which is seen here more as a playground for disciplines like social psychology or 
anthropology; see below) into the level of state identity reconstruction that can be 
approached by analyzing the national foreign and security policy. 
 
The key theoretical assumptions and their connections 
 
The theoretical chapter deals first with the issue of Europeanization, and the theoretical 
discussion on state identity construction is presented after that in chapter 2.4. However, I 
start with a brief overview on the connections of state identity and Europeanization from 
the perspective of the general research design of the study. 
 
The  first  major  theoretical  assumption  that  this  study  builds  on  is  that  there  is  a  
significant connection between state identity and national foreign and security policy. 
The key concepts of national foreign and security policy serve as the vehicles of identity 
production6, which reflect juxtapositions between ‘selves’ and ‘others’ through which 
national and state identities are produced. The basic statements and concepts of identity 
theory (such as other/self, enemy/friend, threat pictures, identity reproduction, see e.g. 
                                                  
6 Wæver argues that since identity is a relational concept, that it is produced through juxtapositions between selves and 
others it is possible to identify “specific concepts which historically have come to take on particular importance as 
’vehicles’ of identity production” (Wæver 2002, 24). 
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Neumann 1996) can be applied to the analysis of national foreign and security policy. 
Consequently, foreign and security policy tells us how the state in question places itself 
– identifies – in the international system. Here the study connects to a theoretical 
tradition in IR which sees state identity as contained and reproduced through foreign 
policy. Foreign policy is thus seen as a practice that defines and manifests the difference 
between self and other by making certain objects ‘foreign’ (Campbell 1992, Wallace 
1991, Aggestam 2004; see chapter 2.4 below for further discussion on this). In the 
context of European Studies these vehicles of identity production can help us to 
understand how particular national and state identities are constructed, re-articulated and 
modified in the face of the evolving European integration (Wæver 2002, 21). 
 
The definition of state identity adopted in this study follows the so-called middle ground 
constructivist IR theory’s position on identity and identity change. Main points of that 
approach can be summed up as follows: 1) identity is a social fact, and not constant and 
exogenously given, but rather constructed and reconstructed in mutually constitutive 
social action; 2) interaction at the systemic level has the potential to change state 
identities and interests (e.g. Christiansen et al. 2001, Buzan et al. 1998, Adler 1997, 
Checkel 1998, Wendt 1994, 1999). A more detailed discussion on social construction of 
state identity and on European integration as a context for identity reconstruction is 
provided in chapter 2.4.2. The connection of constructivist IR theory and 
Europeanization will also be explained there more thoroughly. At this point it suffices to 
note that IR theories are useful in understanding how state identity can change in 
interaction, whereas Europeanization literature can shed light on how European 
integration can impact a given policy area, in this case national foreign and security 
policy. State identity and foreign and security policy, then, are linked together through 
the assumption that the key concepts of national foreign and security policy function as 
the vehicles of identity production which determine the state identity. (The manner in 
which these vehicles of identity production are to be located in the Finnish case is 
explained in 3.) 
 
The second major theoretical assumption of the study thus concerns the role of European 
integration in the change of the key national foreign and security policy concepts. The 
literature on Europeanization argues that EU-membership has an impact on national 
foreign policies – although in different ways in different member states (that is to say 
there is “national variation”). This Europeanization takes place not chiefly by complying 
to EU-decisions but primarily by ”softer” means such as learning, socialisation (leading 
to shared understandings, norms, ways of doing things), i.e. mechanisms related to 
identity reconstruction. Consequently, Europeanization studies on foreign and security 
policy tend to rest on a constructivist scientific world view and sociological 
institutionalism. Chapter 2.2 below will take a closer look on the different ways to 
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define and study Europeanization. That is followed by a closer analysis of those variants 
of Europeanization that are specially tailored for and typically used in analysing the 
change of foreign and security policy. 
 
 
2.2 Europeanization as an approach  
 
“Although there is considerable conceptual contestation with regard to the 
question what it actually is, the bulk of the literature speaks of Europeanization 
when something in the domestic system is affected by something European” 
(Vink 2002, 1). 
 
“[T]he main idea of Europeanization [is] retracing the effects of the European 
integration process at the national level” (Major 2005, 177). 
 
 
It is possible to locate three theoretical debates of broader significance in the 
background of Europeanization research. Firstly, Europeanization is linked to a 
development trend in European Studies which has shifted the focus of studies from the 
EU-level onto the domestic level. There is ”an emerging literature analysing the impact 
of European integration and Europeanization on domestic political and social processes 
of the member states and beyond”(Börzel & Risse 2000, 1). General integration theories 
(such as neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and federalism) often seek to explain 
why nation states agree to abandon parts of their sovereignty in order to pool it in 
supranational organizations such as the EU. These tend to focus on what happens to the 
state and its sovereignty whereas Europeanization analyses what happens to domestic 
institutions and actors. (Börzel 1999, 576-577; Major 2005, 178.) 
 
This turn in European Studies took place in the mid-1990s as some scholars with their 
background in (Comparative) Political Science criticized the dominance of IR-based 
theorizing on European integration.7 For instance Hix (1994, 1999) argued that the IR-
based theories posed the wrong questions: the question of whether there should be more 
or less integration does not motivate the behaviour of most of the actors involved in the 
activities of the EU. Rather, these are individuals and groups pursuing their interests 
within a complex political system (Rosamond 2003, 112). Therefore the re-launch of 
                                                  
7 According to Bulmer & Lequesne (2005, 10) the precursors to the literature explicitly termed ‘Europeanization’ dealt with 
the relationship of state and integration. Three competing conclusions were drawn: Integration strengthens the state 
(intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik 1993); Integration provides new channels of political access and influence for domestic 
actors enabling them to bypass the state (neofunctionalist, Marks 1993); the character of state is transformed (Kohler-Koch 
1996). 
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Political Science approaches in European Studies can be seen as a starting point for 
Europeanization studies. From that perspective previously under-researched questions 
were located particularly in issues related to the domestic implementation processes of 
European policies in such fields as environmental policy or transport policy or the 
European impact on national party systems, political parties and local government. Since 
the concept was initially developed for communitised policy areas in the first pillar (see 
Major 2005) foreign and security policy was not a common topic at the first stages of 
Europeanization studies. 
 
Later on, however, wider or “softer” definitions were presented in which 
Europeanization was not restricted to complying with EU regulations or transposing and 
implementing EU directives, but Europeanization could proceed for instance through the 
framing of domestic beliefs and expectations or by influencing the organizational logic 
of national politics and policy-making or by changing informal rules, norms and ways of 
doing things (Vink 2002, Vink & Graziano 2007; Radaelli 2000). Such an approach was 
suitable for studying national foreign and security policy, too – a policy field where 
there simply are no EU directives to follow.8 
 
The second general theoretical debate related to Europeanization concerns the so-called 
institutional turn in the study of European integration (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000; Hix 
& Goetz 2000, 18; Vink 2002, 11). Börzel and Risse note that Europeanization as a new 
approach ”fits nicely with recent developments in international studies in general which 
increasingly study the domestic effects of international institutions and norms” (Börzel 
& Risse 2000, 1). Börzel sees a predominance of institutionalist analysis in explaining 
the mechanisms of change caused by Europeanization (Börzel 2005). According to Vink 
in answering how European policies, rules and norms (formal or informal, binding or 
non-binding) actually affect domestic politics and policies “scholars of Europeanization 
have almost without exception reverted to the broad spectrum of theories that fall under 
the umbrella of the so-called ‘new institutionalism’” (Vink 2002, 10). 
 
The basic premise of neo-institutionalism can be summed up in the following way: 
Institutions contain the bias individual agents have built into their society over time. 
They structure political actions and outcomes, rather than simply mirror social activity 
and rational competition among disaggregated units. Thus institutions affect outcomes. 
Institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures 
                                                  
8 Currently CFSP operates as the second pillar of the European Union. In foreign and security policy essential authority 
remains with EU member states’ governments, although the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European 
Parliament, are associated with the process. Decisions require unanimity among member states in the EU’s Council. EU has 
introduced more flexible voting procedures on CFSP decisions by allowing individual governments to abstain, or by using 
majority voting, or by allowing a majority of countries to act on their own; but unanimity is still required on decisions with 
military or defence implications. (See Treaty on European Union, Article 23.) 
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and organizations of government; but for neo-institutionalism an institution also 
encompasses informal norms, routines and conventions (March & Olsen 1984, 2005; 
Aspinwall & Schneider 2000, 3; Vink 2002, 11). Neo-institutionalism is usually divided 
into two or three major variants: rationalist and historical institutionalism or 
sociological, historical, and rationalist institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000).9 
In different definitions the understanding of institutions then ranges from legal 
arrangements and formal rules to routines and norms. Both formal and informal 
structures that influence human behaviour are thus included (Aspinwall & Schneider 
2000, 4). 
 
Europeanization as a process: how does the change take place? 
 
Different neo-institutionalist branches lead to different views as to how Europeanization 
takes place and what are the mechanisms of change. What connects most of the variants 
of Europeanization is the assumption that there are two basic conditions for expecting 
domestic change: misfit and adaptational pressure. According to Bulmer “misfit and 
adaptational pressure are the source of the twin track (rationalist and sociological) set of 
factors leading to domestic adaptation” (Bulmer 2007, 53). Misfit refers to “the 
incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and institutions, on one 
hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions on the other”. It is misfit 
that constitutes adaptational pressures necessary for the Europeanization process to 
happen in the first place.10 Caporaso notes that theoretization on how, under what 
conditions and with what response “Europe matters” begins by thinking of the degree of 
pressure created by Europeanization. This pressure is a function of the degree of misfit 
between “Europe” and the domestic level: “If there is a good fit, there is little pressure 
for change at the domestic level. (…) But if the fit is poor (…) greater adaptational 
pressures will be felt” (Caporaso 2007, 29). Additionally, Europeanization studies 
typically  discuss  the  role  of  mediating  factors,  that  is  to  say  the  various  domestic  
structural conditions that affect the impact of European integration. These are seen to 
include for instance cultural factors, formal and informal institutions, as well as so called 
veto groups (national actors with formal right of rejection or with capability to obstruct, 
slow down or amend legislation or implementation) (Caporaso 2007, 30-31). 
 
The rationalist institutionalist view leads to “thin” Europeanization: actors make the best 
of new European opportunity structures by calculating consequences (Vink 2002, Börzel 
& Risse 2000). This might lead to institutional changes in political organization: the 
development of an organizational and financial capacity for common action and 
                                                  
9 A fourth variant, discursive institutionalism, has also been presented (Schmidt 2004). 
10 For scholarly discussion on the misfit-concept or the “goodnes-of-fit” proposition see Börzel and Risse 2007, 491-492; 
Toshkov 2005.  
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governance through processes of reorganization and redirecting of resources (Olsen 
2003). From a rationalist institutionalist perspective Europeanization leads to domestic 
change also through differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution 
of resources at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse 2000). Typical for thin 
Europeanization is that the adaptational pressure is caused by a so called policy misfit: 
“European policies might cause a policy misfit between European rules and regulations, 
on the one hand, and domestic policies, on the other. (…) European policies can 
challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards, the instruments or techniques used 
to achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach.” (Héritier, 
Knill and Mingers 1996; quoted in Börzel & Risse 2000, 5). What justifies calling this 
type of Europeanization “thin” is that it is not seen to radically alter the way the 
Europeanized actor perceives its fundamental interests or identity. 
 
The sociological institutionalist (SI) perspective on Europeanization brings us to the 
above-mentioned third theoretical debate in European Studies which concerns 
introducing and applying constructivist approaches to the study of European 
integration.11 The SI-perspective contrasts the rationalist “logic of consequentialism” 
with a constructivist “logic of appropriateness”: rather than maximizing their subjective 
desires, actors strive to fulfil social expectations in a given situation. “Actors are guided 
by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper (i.e. socially accepted) 
behaviour in a given rule structure. Such collective understandings and intersubjective 
meaning structures strongly influence the way actors define their goals and what they 
perceive as rational action.” (Börzel 2005, 54; emphasis added.) The interpretation of 
institutions also differs from the RI-perspective: “Institutions do not simply regulate 
actor’s behaviour by providing opportunities and constrains. They constitute actors by 
giving them a fundamental understanding of what their interests are and what the 
appropriate means may be to pursue these interests.” (ibid., 54). Institutions are 
constitutive, in that they comprise the criteria by which agents form their identity 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991, 11; Aspinwall & Schneider 2000, 9). The institutional 
change from SI perspective can also refer to changes in structures of meaning. That is, 
focus is on the development and redefinition of political ideas – common visions and 
purposes – that give direction and meaning to common capabilities and capacities (Olsen 
2003, 335). 
 
The sociological institutionalist view leads to “thick” Europeanization: actors adopt a 
new set of preferences, or even a new identity (Vink 2002). From this perspective 
Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and 
                                                  
11 Sociological institutionalism builds on a scientific world view that is constructivist (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). See 
Rosamond 2003 on the relationship of sociological institutionalism and constructivism in EU studies. Chapter 2.4.2 will 
discuss constructivism in IR and European Studies in more detail. 
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structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to 
incorporate into their domestic structures (Börzel&Risse 2000, 9). European institutions 
“entail new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning, which the member states 
have to incorporate. Domestic actors are socialized into European norms and rules of 
appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their 
interests and identities accordingly” (Börzel 2005, 54). Yet, it must be taken into 
consideration that such “cognitive” or “normative” pressures do not necessarily result in 
domestic change. Domestic actors and institutions often resist change despite significant 
pressure for adaptation (ibid.). On the other hand, the domestic level can also offer 
facilitating factors for thick Europeanization: according to Schmidt significant domestic 
policy change towards the European policies is most likely to occur where a convincing 
supportive domestic discourse is deployed (Schmidt 2002, 900; Bulmer 2007, 53). 
 
From the SI-based view point the source of adaptational pressure is often called an 
institutional misfit: European policies, norms, and the collective understandings attached 
to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes, because they do not 
resonate well with domestic norms and collective understandings. Institutional misfit 
may trigger collective learning processes and socialisation which could change actors’ 
interests and identities. It has been argued that such Europeanization might even threaten 
deeply collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon constitutive 
norms such as state sovereignty (Risse 2001; Checkel 2001).12 
 
In closer analysis the degree of such thick Europeanization depends on two mediating 
factors: change agents13 or norm entrepreneurs who mobilize in the domestic change and 
persuade others to redefine their interests and identities; a political culture and other 
informal institutions exist which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing. 
(Börzel & Risse 2000.) A question posed by SI-oriented Europeanization is thus “to 
which degree domestic norms and institutions change in response to international 
institutional arrangements?” (Börzel & Risse 2000, 9.) Consequently the focus is on 
socialisation processes by which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order 
to become members of international society “in good standing” (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998; quoted in Börzel & Risse 2000, 9).  
 
According to Börzel & Risse the two theoretical logics of Europeanization are not 
mutually exclusive, but they often occur simultaneously or characterize different phases 
                                                  
12 Regarding the Finnish case it has been argued that the Finnish conception of sovereignty was revised due to EU-
membership and CFSP (Tiilikainen 2003; Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). For further discussion on the previous studies 
on the Finnish case see chapter 4. 
13 According to Börzel & Risse (2000) there are two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents: epistemic communities and 
advocacy or principled issue networks. 
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of adaptational change (Börzel & Risse 2000). This view is shared by Vink who sees 
that empirical studies should determine the relative weight of thin and thick 
Europeanization by developing contrasting hypotheses from the sociological and 
rational strains of institutionalism (Vink 2002, 13, 17). This idea is followed in this 
study accepting that in order to achieve a comprehensive view on the impact of 
European integration on Finnish foreign and security policy it makes sense to look for 
thin and thick Europeanization, thus utilizing both rationalist and 
sociological/constructivist view on institutions. Eventually, in the empirical analysis the 
main emphasis, however, will remain on thick Europeanization and sociological 
institutionalism; which can be labelled as the mainstream or most common way of 
looking at Europeanization of foreign and security policy – although, as noted earlier, 
the total number of studies on long-term Europeanization of foreign and security policy 
still remains rather limited. 
 
As the above-presented points on the impact of sociological institutionalism on 
Europeanization studies indicate, the third theoretical debate in European studies that 
can be linked to Europeanization concerns the constructivist turn in IR and the 
emergence of constructivist approaches on European integration (see Christiansen et al. 
2001).14 The main contribution of constructivism to Europeanization has been on the 
social construction of identities and interests. Constructivist Europeanization approach 
can, for instance, “explore whether national participants in the EU policy process are 
socialized into different values and behaviour that might impact upon their presentation 
of national policy” (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005, 15). Norms and values may be uploaded 
or downloaded as much as concrete policy preferences or institutional models. 
Moreover, national identity may be understood to be constructed in interaction with the 
EU (ibid.). The connection and compatibility of constructivism and Europeanization is 
further discussed in chapter 2.4.2. 
 
                                                  
14 Applying constructivist perspectives to European integration is a relatively novel issue (Christiansen et al. 2001, 1). 
However, Friedrichs (2003) argues that a certain tradition of “proto-constructivism” has existed for decades. Such proto-
constructivist views have seen Europe as a man-made social and political construct (Friedrichs refers to integration theories 
of E.Haas and Deutsch from late 1950s and 1960s). Furthermore, he states that cultural studies and the multidisciplinary 
debate on the “idea of Europe” have shown how boundaries of Europe are geographically and conceptually contested and 
contingent. Studies on European identity in the early 1990s also deal with social identity and build on the assumption that 
Europe is an ‘imagined community’ (cf. Anderson 1983) or a ‘world of our making’ (cf. Onuf 1989). Checkel (2001) argues 
that theorizing social interaction in the context of European integration has produced good results that build on a 
constructivist starting points. Furthermore, since Christiansen et al presented their argument on the lack of constructivist 
turn in integration studies the number of constructivist-oriented studies on European integration has steadily increased. Also 
theoretical work that builds on constructivist premises has emerged. 
 28
2.3 Europeanization of national foreign and security policy: dimensions and 
directions 
 
Although the majority of studies dealing with Europeanization concern other fields of 
policy than foreign and security policy, both theoretical and empirical studies on the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy have emerged. Hence foreign and 
security policy is not considered immune to Europeanization, despite its many special 
features (Wong 2005, 137). The deepening of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy since the 1990s (see chapter 3) has been seen to advance the Europeanization of 
national foreign and security policies. Yet in the general theoretical debate foreign and 
security policy is often seen as a special case in which Europeanization is less versatile 
than in many areas of social and economic policy (see e.g. Featherstone 2003). The 
reason for this is often located in the highly intergovernmental nature of CFSP or in the 
traditional link between state sovereignty and national foreign and security policy (see 
Gross 2007, 503). According to Bulmer and Radaelli the potential mechanisms of 
Europeanization are particularly influenced by the fact that CFSP consists of “facilitated 
coordination, Open Method of Coordination, political declarations or ’soft law’” 
(Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 345-351). Because of this most of the studies on the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy are based on SI-oriented thinking and 
thick Europeanization and are thus more or less constructivist in their orientation. 
However, as will be pointed out below in connection to the Finnish case, it is also 
possible to look at the Europeanization of foreign and security policy from a rationalist 
institutionalist perspective. It will be seen that such an exercise does not prove wholly 
unfruitful. Yet, the limits of the rationalist institutionalist approach on the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy become soon evident. 
 
Usually the interpretations of the Europeanization of foreign policy are in some way or 
another based on the following SI-oriented idea on state behaviour: states adopt the logic 
of appropriateness according to which they follow institutional rules, unless this 
explicitly infringes one of their vital interests, because they fear being considered 
untrustworthy or ‘inappropriate’ (March and Olsen 1998). Because of this institutions 
can “penetrate into a foreign policy standard operating procedure and influence 
decisions” (Andreatta 2005, 32). Consequently “a process of ‘Europeanization’ could 
follow which, like a coordination reflex, could progressively draw national positions 
closer” (ibid.). Moreover, the conceptualisations of the Europeanization of foreign and 
security policy typically point to the lack of real supranational powers in that field of 
integration: CFSP is “made through intergovernmental negotiations or looser exchanges. 
Legal measures are downplayed in favour of political declarations, targets and so on” 
(Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 355). Based on this it is then asked how powerful can 
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Europeanization be in the case of “governance by coordination”. The answers usually 
refer to the SI-oriented logic of change presented above: the Europeanization of foreign 
and security policy is thus characterized as being “more voluntary and non-hierarchical”, 
“ideational convergence” and “essentially horizontal and dependent of learning.” 
(Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 355).  
 
Another character of foreign and security policy that sets its mark upon Europeanization 
is that it is a highly elite-led and securitised policy field, both on national and European 
level. Therefore the Europeanization of foreign and security policy is seen as a ”process 
of learning amongst national elites” that is based on “changes in the cognitive 
frameworks used by policy-makers to understand and assess reality” (Bulmer & Radaelli 
2005, 355). What drives Europeanization forward are ‘horizontal’ exchanges between 
member government and the resultant learning of shared policy principles” (ibid, 355). 
The influence of SI-thinking is apparent as it is seen that the Europeanization of foreign 
and security policy “shows how institutional changes and development may affect 
identities and interests, as well as how changing identities may create pressures for the 
new institutional forms and modes of behaviour” (Wong 2005, 149).15 Consequently, the 
concept has a strong focus on interrelationship of institutions and identities (ibid.). 
 
In the following I present three dimensions of Europeanization of foreign policy, which 
can also be seen as three different ways to study the Europeanization of national foreign 
and security policy. Additionally, a tentative assessment of their applicability on the 
Finnish case is done in the light of previous studies (most of which do not use an explicit 
or manifested Europeanization approach16, but yet deal with Finland’s foreign and 
security policy and the European Union) in chapter 3. Further analysis, that is to say 
applying these concepts to the Finnish case is done in the chapters 4, 5 and 6 devoted for 
actual empirical analysis of the Finnish case. The following classification is based on the 
work of Reuben Wong (2005, 2006, 2007) on the different ways to analyse the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy. Wong’s aim is to develop 
Europeanization as an alternative way to understand the foreign policies of EU member 
states. To this end his purpose is to build an operational theory of Europeanization. 
According to Wong the concept of Europeanization can be applied to studying national 
foreign policy in the following ways: 1) Europeanization as a top-down process of 
national adaptation; 2) Europeanization as national projection, that is to say a bottom-up 
process involving the export of national preferences and models; 3) Europeanization as 
the socialisation of interests and identities, i.e. identity reconstruction. Wong calls these 
the three dimensions of Europeanization in national foreign policy that are most relevant 
                                                  
15 Note the connection to social ontology, (IR) constructivism and identity change, which are discussed in the chapter 2.3. 
16 With the notable exception of the comparative studies by Jokela 2010 (on UK and Finland) and Rieker 2004 (on Norway, 
Sweden and Finland). 
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and potentially useful for the purpose of studying member states’ foreign policies (Wong 
2005, 141; Wong 2006, 7).  
 
Wong’s classification embraces both sociological and rationalist institutionalist variants 
of Europeanization described above. However, it should be noted that the way Wong 
defines the three dimensions is problematic in the sense that the first two of them are 
defined in terms of the direction of the influence (in national adaptation the member 
state is Europeanized; in national projection the member state Europeanizes, see more 
on this below), whereas the third dimension refers more to the sociological 
institutionalist aspects of the process (identity reconstruction). Hence there appears to be 
a logical incompatibility between the dimensions. Thus the following presentation on the 
different ways to conceptualise the Europeanization of national foreign and security 
policy is followed by critical remarks as well as a suggestion how to better acknowledge 
and utilize the two different institutionalist logics explained above. Eventually, a 
reconceptualisation is suggested in which there are two directions (top-down adaptation 
and  bottom-up projection) and two dimensions (RI-oriented thin and SI-oriented thick 
Europeanization). This fine-tuned version is then used in analysing the Finnish case in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
2.3.1 National adaptation  
 
The first way to analyse the impact of the EU on a member state’s foreign and security 
policy is to conceptualize Europeanization as a top-down process of national adaptation. 
It is used in the Europeanization literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national 
structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. The adaptation pressure 
is seen to come from outside the national system, that is to say from the EU. In order to 
rid of the misfit in question, the member state is reactive and makes adjustments in its 
domestic politics and structures in compliance with the constrains and requirements of 
European institutions. At the same time the EU’s political and economic dynamics may 
become “part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” 
(Ladrech 1994, 69). (Ladrech 1994; Hanf & Soetendorp 1998; Wong 2006, 8; Wong 
2007.)  
 
The national adaptation may lead to bureaucratic organization and constitutional change 
as well as to increased salience of the European agenda. The latter refers to the growing 
importance of the CFSP and ESDP in national foreign policy and to an increased 
importance of the EU’s security institutions in the minds of national decision-makers. 
This results in “advocating increased application of instruments located in the two 
institutions”, that is to say CFSP and ESDP (Gross 2007, 505). Other related indicators 
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of this type of Europeanization of national foreign and security policy are adherence to 
common policy objectives, policies agreed for the sake of EU unity, and relaxation of 
national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and 
institutions (Gross 2007).  
 
The empirical studies conducted from top-down perspective point to the following two 
main findings: The capacity of national institutions to resist or adapt to the impact of 
European integration depends on national factors. These mediating factors (as defined 
above) make the impact of top-down Europeanization different in different member 
states. (Wong 2005, 137.) Top-down studies often build on positivist search for 
causalities. The emphasis on causality has also been presented as the major weakness of 
the approach: when the change takes place as an undetermined transnational process, it 
is  difficult  to  prove  that  the  reason  for  change  is  the  EU  and  not  something  else  
(Featherstone 2003, 12). Consequently, numerous intervening variables complicate the 
presented mechanisms of change (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005, 15). 
 
2.3.2 National projection  
  
The second ”school of thought” in Wong’s classification defines Europeanization as 
promoting and exporting nationally defined policy models, ideas, goals and interests into 
the other member states and to the EU level (Wong 2006, 9). In other words, it is a 
question of bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the 
national to supranational level (Wong 2007, 325). In contrast to the previous approach 
the member states are not seen as passive or reactive actors but as the primary actors of 
change. They are motivated mainly by their pursuit of nationally defined goals. National 
projection can happen via ideational export; example setting (pledging funds and 
resources); strengthening cooperation by involving other international organizations; or 
by discursive influence. If such “uploading” of national goals is successful it might lead 
to emergence of new policies or structures at the EU level, too. In analysing this type of 
Europeanization Wong finds the following criteria central: “Has the state pushed for its 
national foreign policy goals to be adopted as EU goals/policy? Has the state benefited 
from the ‘cover’ of the EU? How indispensable is the EU to the achievement of national 
foreign policy?” (Wong 2006, 16.)  
 
 
There is a variety of mechanisms through which an EU member state can commit 
national projection. Firstly, “ideational export” refers to the promotion of national ideas 
on the European level. Secondly, by “example setting”, for instance by pledging funds 
and resources a member state can encourage the other member states to follow the 
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nationally preferred common European actions. Thirdly, a member state can try to 
strengthen the EU cooperation by involving other international organizations in the 
process. Finally, a member state can also invest on “discursive influence”. (Wong 2005, 
also Miskimmon 2007.) Ideational export can also follow a “horizontal pattern” between 
the member states. Concepts like “cross loading”, and “horizontal Europeanization” 
have been used when referring to modifications coming from other countries, policy 
areas or institutions, with the EU being rather the frame for change than its origin (Major 
2005, 181). According to Vink & Graziano, horizontal effects ”may be understood as the 
result of both increased competition and cooperation between countries and also of 
increased exchange of information and mutual learning simply by being part of an 
integrated Europe” (Vink&Graziano 2007, 10). 
 
A general benefit of the bottom-up approach is that it recognises the role of the national 
initiatives and domestic political debates. The problem, however, is that the analysis 
rarely reaches the question how the national interests regarding EU issues are created in 
the first place. Especially, when based on the rationalist view on institutions and their 
transformation, the national projection approach fails to acknowledge the impact that 
European interaction might have in the construction of the national interests, ideas and 
policy models. National interests or identities should not be considered exogenous to the 
interaction taking place in the context of European integration. From a wider IR theory 
perspective the problem is that state identities and interests are here taken as “given”, 
and the impact of interstate interaction in constructing them is disregarded (cf. Wendt 
1994).  
 
The third approach, presented in the following, builds on the assumption that although 
the member states export their nationally defined foreign and security policy interests 
into the EU, they cannot avoid simultaneously participating in a process of interaction 
which holds the potential to affect the quality of those interests. This constructivist 
aspect incorporated in the approach significantly increases its suitability for analysing 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy. 
 
2.3.3 Identity reconstruction 
 
The third approach in Wong’s classification on the Europeanization of foreign and 
security policy differs from the two others especially in that its applicability in a 
rationalist institutionalist framework is limited. In the third approach Europeanization is 
conceptualised as the socialization of interests and identities, or identity reconstruction. 
According to Wong “Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity 
and interest convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to 
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take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape 
them”(Wong 2007, 325). It does not regard member states’ preferences, interests and 
identities as being somehow external to the action at the EU level. The approach rests 
clearly on sociological institutionalism as it is seen that the EU’s common policies have 
encouraged new conceptions of interest and identity among its member states (Wong 
2006, 10; Wong 2005, 145). The constructivist tone of the approach is evident as norms, 
values and identities are presented as objects of Europeanization, among the decision-
making structures, legislation, national policy modes and concrete political preferences. 
Norms, values and identities are reconstructed socially and primarily in interaction 
among the national decision-making elites. Concerning foreign and security policy it has 
been argued that the CFSP institutions have a strong ”socialising” effect: “Prolonged 
participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU Member States and reorients their foreign 
policy cultures along similar lines” (Wong 2005, 138). In this convergence process the 
socialisation of elites plays a central role. On the level of individual identities 
Europeanization studies have come to the conclusion that officials in the Commission 
and other EU institutions in Brussels are increasingly thinking in ‘European’ rather than 
‘national’ terms: “intense and repeated contacts have socialised not only EU officials, 
but also national officials working in EU institutions. Even national diplomacies are 
becoming more ‘European’ and displaying a ‘coordination reflex’ in foreign policy-
making.17 (Wong 2005, 138) 
 
Tonra’s study on the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland is a good example of this 
approach. He looks at whether the development of CFSP has constrained or empowered 
the national foreign policies of those (small) states. His approach is constructivist in that 
he analyses ”the inter-relationships between agents and structure” in order “to see where 
structure enables/disables action and where action reproduces/changes structure” (Tonra 
2001, 9). He argues that social interaction may result in identity change leading to 
reconstruction of foreign policy. Additionally, he sees that there has been an “apparent 
identity-shift in national foreign policies as a result of participation in European foreign 
and security policy” to which constructivism offers an explanation (ibid. 14). 
 
From a constructivist IR perspective it has also been argued on a more general level that 
European integration forms an interactive context that is favourable for state identity 
change (Wendt 1994). This third Europeanization approach has been seen to have a 
connection to the concept of security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957) – as it “suggests 
the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy” (Gross 2007, 506) – 
and to the broader IR literature on national identity, as well as to neofunctionalist 
                                                  
17 “Élites involved even in the governmental bargaining process of ECP/CFSP show surprising signs of internalising 
supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to their national capitals” (Wong 2005, 146). Wong refers to the 
following studies: Øhrgaard 1997; Smith 2000, Bellier 2000. 
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integration theory (e.g. Haas 1958), since the focus on the redefinition and negotiation of 
identities mirrors “a neofunctionalist reading of a gradual transfer of identity and 
affiliation towards a new supranational Europe” (Gross 2007, 506).  
 
2.3.4 Critical assessment and reconceptualization 
 
As was explained in chapter 2.2 Europeanization as an approach rests on three turns in 
the theoretical debate in European Studies. First of these originated in the work of 
comparative political scientists that succeeded in putting emphasis on the domestic 
impacts of European integration. The second turn related to neo-institutionalism and the 
third brought in constructivist theoretisation. Wong’s three-class conceptualization of 
Europeanization of national foreign and security policy reflects these turns: both impact 
on domestic level and European level are present, as is the legacy of neoinstitutionalism. 
Furthermore, constructivist underpinnings of such concepts as “socialisation” and 
“identity reconstruction” are recognized. 
 
However, while the rationalist/sociological institutionalism-division seems to be 
observable in Wong’s theoretisation, a problem is that national adaptation and national 
projection tend to be explained overwhelmingly in the terms of rationalist 
institutionalism: bureaucratic organization and constitutional change, adaptation of 
domestic structures, projection of national policy models and goals and the like. Hence 
identity reconstruction remains somehow isolated from adaptation-projection dynamism. 
In Wong’s classification identity reconstruction is placed outside the two first 
dimensions, adaptation and projection, and is constituted as a individual “dimension” of 
Europeanization. Yet it is not comparable with national adaptation and projection as 
they are mainly about the direction of the process, whereas identity reconstruction refers 
more to the sociological institutionalist aspects of the process in stating that European 
integration shapes member states’ interests and identities. Furthermore, some of the 
studies on foreign policy Europeanization conclude that national adaptation can result in 
elite socialization (e.g. Smith 2000, Tonra 2001). Similarly, national projection can be 
approached from a SI-perspective for instance by looking at how “Europe” or “European 
interests” are conceptualised and utilised in the domestic political processes and debates 
in which the national goals, models or preferences to be projected to the European level 
ultimately are decided on. 
 
Therefore it is argued here that adaptation and projection should rather be seen as the 
(top-down and bottom-up) directions in which both rationalist institutionalist and 
sociological institutionalist Europeanization can happen. Europeanization of foreign and 
security policy can take place in two main directions: there is top-down national 
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adaptation and bottom-up national projection.18 Identity reconstruction should thus not 
be seen as a separate analogous category as national adaptation (i.e. downloading) and 
national projection (uploading). Rather, there are two interconnected dimensions in this 
process: rationalist institutionalist “thin” Europeanization and sociological 
institutionalist “thick” Europeanization. The former refers to changes in national or 
European level structures and policies; and the latter to changes in perceptions and 
identities (see Table 1). All in all, Wong’s theoretisation is found here very useful for 
the purposes of the study. Fine-tuned with these clarifications and slight modifications it 
will serve as the foundation for the theoretical framework to be used in studying the 
Finnish case. 
 
 
 
Directions of Europeanization 
    Adaptation  Projection  
     
  
  Sociological  
institutionalist  
Dimensions of  
Europeanization  
 
  Rationalist  
institutionalist 
  
 
 
Table 1: Directions and dimensions of Europeanization in foreign policy 
 
 
Another critical issue from the viewpoint of this study concerns the link between 
identity reconstruction and national foreign policy change. The above discussed 
Europeanization literature suggests that identity reconstruction takes place through 
socialization and social learning of elites. Consequently, an underlying theoretical 
assumption appears to be that the Europeanization of identities of the members of the 
foreign policy-making elite results in Europeanized national foreign and security policy. 
                                                  
18 The adaptation/projection dualism includes sideways movement between member states (“cross-loading”): adaptation can 
be a result of indirect effects (increased exchange of information and mutual learning between member states) or a state can 
purposefully project its policy models, goals, perceptions and ideas towards other member states, which in turn can lead to 
adaptation.    
 
Top-down 
thick Europeanization 
 
Bottom-up  
thick Europeanization 
 
Top-down 
thin Europeanization 
 
Bottom-up  
thin Europeanization 
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In other words, a causal connection is assumed to exist between identity reconstruction 
in the individual level and national foreign and security policy change. The assumed 
logic in the ”Europeanization-through-elite-socialisation” is that ”prolonged 
participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign 
policy cultures along similar lines” (Smith 2000, 164) which in turn eventually 
manifests in changes in the national foreign policy of a member state (Wong 2007, 329). 
Changes in self-conceptions, in ideas about who ‘we’ are, are seen to be “intimately 
bound up with long-term foreign policy change (Aggestam 2004, 82). Accordingly, in 
analysing Europeanization of national foreign and security policy the individual level 
and the identities of individuals (officials, diplomats, etc) get an overemphasized 
position. Consequently, the way much of the Europeanization literature deals with 
foreign and security policy change has a strong anthropological or social psychological 
feel to it. Studies focusing on individual identity reconstruction analyse the personal 
identities and perceptions of the foreign policy elites with interviews. Typically two 
types of elites/groups of individuals that may have become Europeanized are presented 
in the literature. Firstly there are EU officials that are seen to be increasingly thinking in 
“European” rather than “national” terms. Anthropological studies suggest that 
Commission officials exhibit traits of cultural “hybridization”: “national being” was 
becoming a “European being” (Bellier 2000, 149-150; Wong 2007, 329). The second 
group of socialized elite consists of national officials working in EU institutions as well 
as national diplomacies. Based on multiple in-depth interviews with the foreign-policy 
makers (see e.g. Tonra 200119) these studies find that national elites interacting with 
Commission, Council and other EU members states’ national diplomacies are 
“becoming more European and displaying a “coordination reflex” in foreign policy 
making” (Tonra 2001, Øhrgaard 1997; see Wong 2007, 329).  
 
Some studies concentrate on even more “subjective” dimension of foreign policy and 
apply a political-cultural approach on foreign policy by looking at “role conceptions” or 
“role identities” – concepts that originate from sociology and social psychology – and 
analyse how foreign policy makers themselves perceive and define their (national and 
European) roles in a “boundary position from which they must mediate between two 
worlds of foreign policy-making: one in the national capital, the other centred in 
Brussels” (Aggestam 2004, 85-86). According to Aggestam role concepts provide 
methodological tools by offering an “analytical and operational link between identity 
constructions and patterns of foreign policy behaviour” (ibid., 82). Role identity and role 
                                                  
19 Sometimes these studies rest methodologically on the tradition of foreign policy analysis – which according to Tonra’s 
definition is “branch of international relations which focuses upon the formulation of national foreign policy” (Tonra 2001, 
48) – and commit in-depth interviews with diplomats and other officials and to analyse their behaviour. Tonra’s influential 
study on the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark builds on such approach. See also White 2004 for a theoretical discussion 
on foreign policy analysis as a framework for studying European foreign policy. 
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concepts “suggest how cultural norms and values are translated into verbal statements 
about expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientations” (ibid., 82). Yet, this 
approach fails to tell us how, actually, the socialisation/identity reconstruction of a 
foreign policy-maker actually results in changes in national foreign policy. 
 
The purpose here is not to commit an anthropological study on Finnish officials, but to 
concentrate on the level of state identity. Consequently, it will be asked if Finnish 
foreign and security policy has been reoriented along CFSP/ESDP lines, and whether 
this change has been profound enough to impact on the key concepts of national foreign 
policy – and thus alter the Finnish state identity. The purpose is to see if new 
conceptions of interest and identity, encouraged by European institutions and EU’s 
common policies, have emerged and found their way to into the official Finnish foreign 
and security policy (or, into the “dominant domestic discourse” as defined in chapter 3 
below). Thus, rather than offering an in-depth study on Finnish elite socialisation or on 
the changing “foreign policy culture” the study should be read as a comprehensive 
analysis of the key national foreign and security policy concepts during the Finnish EU-
membership and how the related changed – and possibly Europeanized – perceptions on 
national interest and security appear in the parliamentary debates, government proposals 
and reports and eventually in the official Finnish foreign and security policy. Identity-
wise the focus is thus on the level of state identity – a collective level social 
construction, that is produced by the domestic foreign and security policy-making 
process and in interaction with the international environment. 
 
Accordingly, in this study an axiomatic assumption of a connection between individual 
identity reconstruction and national foreign and security policy change is found 
problematic: How can we conclude national foreign and security policy change from 
individual level socialisation and identity reconstruction?20 The solution adopted in this 
study is to stick to the level of state identity and complement the theoretical framework 
with constructivist IR theoretisation on state identity reproduction and foreign policy 
(conceptualized as a political practice in which state identity is constructed and 
reproduced) as well as with the methodological solutions stemming from there.  
 
                                                  
20 Critical voices in the Europeanization debate have so far mainly concerned the individual level emphasis from a 
methodological perspective (e.g. the reliability of interviews as primary research material). Wong notes that “Studies on 
foreign policy Europeanization have also tended to rely heavily on interviews with national officials and Commission in 
Brussels for evidence. But can these officials seriously be expected to tell the researcher that they do not subscribe to the 
ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP?” (Wong 2007, 331.) According to Larsen a problem might be that “although 
individual civil servants get to know each other in the EPC/CFSP working groups and in the political committee, in 
diplomacy individuals are generally very mobile, continually replaced. There is not the personal continuity which would 
provide for a person-based ‘communaute de vue’” (Larsen 2004, 77).  
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Thus the study will now turn to look at constructivist IR theoretisation on foreign policy 
and state identity (i.a. Wendt 1994, 2004; Campbell 1992; Adler 1997; Christiansen et 
al. 2001; Checkel 2006). The theoretical exercise is also used to give support the 
conclusion presented in this study that the previous studies on the impact of European 
integration on Finnish foreign and security policy often fail to grasp the real depth of the 
change in question.  
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2.4 Foreign policy and state identity reconstruction 
2.4.1 Introduction  
 
The following part looks at the IR theoretical debate on state identity from the viewpoint 
of the sociological institutionalist version of Europeanization, which, as was explained 
above, is generally considered to be the most suitable approach to study the 
Europeanization of foreign and security policy. The chapter also sheds light on the 
related metatheoretical and philosophical assumptions in constructivist IR theory and 
considers the methodological implications of them. In the centre of attention is 
particularly the usefulness of the constructivist views on state identity in studying 
Europeanization. The chapter will show that constructivist theory on state identity 
reproduction (through foreign policy) has much in common with how the 
Europeanization literature presents the Europeanization of national foreign and security 
policy. 
  
Concerning the Finnish case the study will argue that the vehicles of state identity 
production have changed significantly, and that the European integration process has 
had a role to play in this change. A goal of the following theoretical discussion is thus to 
develop a better foundation for analysing the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and 
security policy. The theoretical guidelines and conceptual tools presented here will help 
to deepen the picture of Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy. This 
takes place by complementing the rationalist institutionalist view (thin Europeanization) 
on changes in the national political system with a constructivist analysis of the factors 
defining the Finnish state identity and their transformation, as well as the political 
processes linked to the change. To this end, foreign policy is in the following 
conceptualised as political practice that reproduces state identity. Additionally, 
constructivist theoretisation on foreign policy and state identity are brought to the 
context of Europeanization. In a resulting theoretical framework a central question is 
“How has European integration, and participation in EU foreign, security and defence 
policy particularly, influenced the process of state identity (re)production?”  
 
 
2.4.2 Europeanization and constructivist IR theory 
 
In International Relations constructivism is typically defined as an “approach that draws 
attention to the impact of national identity and culture on both foreign and domestic 
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policies. It rejects the idea that state interests are determined by the structure of the 
international system, and instead postulates that they are socially constructed and vary 
between states. For a constructivist […] state identity emerges from interaction in 
different social environments, both domestic and international.” (Catalinac 2007, 74-75.)  
According to constructivists norms21 can have a causal effect on state policy 
independent of material interests, by reshaping actors’ interests, self-understandings, and 
behaviour (Katzenstein 1996, 4). In other words, international norms have capacity to 
reconstitute state interests by acting to socialize states into international society 
(Catalinac 2007, 75; Finnemore & Sikkink 2001). As to the question of how such 
international norms came to exist in the first place the constructivist literature refer to a 
variety of possible mechanisms, such as purposive efforts of individuals and groups to 
change social understandings (so called norm entrepreneurs), role of international 
organizations in disseminating new international norms and models of political 
organization, political effects of experts with specialized knowledge and shared 
normative understandings (so called epistemic communities), and the role of argument 
as a mechanism of social construction. It is notable that the Europeanization literature 
pays attention to all these as well (see chapter 2.2 above on sociological institutionalism 
and 2.3.3 on identity reconstruction).  
 
The arrival of constructivism into IR has been well documented elsewhere (see e.g. 
Fierke and Jørgensen 2001, Kratochwill 2001, Zehfuss 2001, Checkel 1998) and there 
seems to be a growing consensus that constructivism is no longer in a marginal position 
but occupies a relatively visible place in the discipline (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001, 3; 
Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998).22 At  the  more  philosophical  level  
constructivists tend to build on the (late)-Wittgensteinian interpretation of language.23 
Language is no longer seen as a mirror, the meaning of a term no longer consists in its 
                                                  
21 In the constructivist literature norms are defined typically as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors 
with a given identity” (Catalinac 2007, 75; cf. p. 10 above on social institutionalist understanding on the logic of 
appropriateness). 
22 Christiansen et al. (2001, 6) identify three moves that have contributed to the constructivist turn in IR. The first move 
took place when Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) pointed out that the then-prevailing positivist epistemology of regime 
analysis that assumed actors’ interests as given was incompatible with the inescapably intersubjective quality of regimes. 
The second move was Wendt’s article (1992) where he argued that ”anarchy is what the states make of it”, that is to say that 
the structure of the international system resulted from social interaction among states. The third move consists of 
establishing different constructivist research programmes. 
23 In philosophy the linguistic turn can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and 
Philosophical Investigation (1953). Wittgenstein argued that language use is a form of action that is constitutive of the 
world, and that individual speech is dependent on a pre-given system of linguistic meaning, which precedes intentionality. 
This challenged the classical notion of autonomy and the idea that rational agents have control over their actions. Different 
constructivisms in IR have somewhat differing philosophical roots. The pioneering constructivists like Onuf (World of Our 
Making 1989) in IR built on Luckmann and Giddens; not on Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida and the like (who have somewhat 
different reading of language). (Fierke & Jørgensen 2001) From a philosophical perspective the conventional constructivism 
(e.g. Adler 1997, Checkel 1998, Wendt 1999 – see Friedrichs 2003) seems to be compatible with moderate forms of 
philosophical realism (Niiniluoto 1997, 128-129, 228-234). 
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exact correspondence to an object in the “outer world” but in its use in speech. Attention 
was thus put to the conventional and pragmatic character of language: it “objectivates” 
shared experiences, which is crucial for making shared conceptions of reality possible 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966, 36-40; Zehfuss 2001, 69). Consequently, the human world 
is not simply given and natural but “constructed” through the actions of the actors 
themselves (Kratochwil 2001, Searle 1995).  
 
Jørgensen (2001) has presented that there are different ways to approach the meaning 
and role of constructivism in IR.24 Firstly, constructivism can be considered as a 
philosophical category. Inside that category there are different versions of 
constructivisms – the radical versions claim that everything is socially constructed 
whereas other versions do not reject philosophical realism. Secondly, constructivism can 
be seen as a metatheory. In the IR debate constructivists were active in the wave of 
metatheoretical criticism directed particularly against neorealism.25  By asking “what is 
theory?” constructivists wanted to stress that there should be more than hypothetico-
deductive mode of theorizing only (Jørgensen 2001, 44). New views on the units and 
levels of IR theory were presented for instance in Wendt’s (1987)26 and Onuf’s (1989) 
work concerning relations between agency, structure and process. The third way of 
seeing constructivism is to concentrate on constructivist theorizing. In Jørgensen’s view 
every possible paradigm in IR can be cast in constructivist terms.27 Consequently, 
Jørgensen argues that there are two ways to do constructivist theorizing on IR: Firstly, 
one can reformulate existing theories into constructivist mode. Secondly, it is possible to 
employ constructivist “generic” theories: theory of speech acts, theory of 
communicative action, modern systems theory, sociological interactionist theory 
(Jørgensen 2001, 49). 
 
Constructivist theorizing on states and their behaviour in the international system has 
taken place in both the above-mentioned ways.28 However, employing “generic” 
                                                  
24 Smith (2001, 196) lists other attempts to classify different constructivisms as follows: Ruggie (1998, 35-36): neo-
classical, postmodernist, naturalistic; Adler (1997, 335-336): modernist, rule-based, narrative knowing, postmodernist; 
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998, 675-678): conventional, critical, postmodern; Christiansen et al. (2001): 
sociological and Wittgensteinian constructivism. 
25 The metatheoretical work has also caused fierce criticism: Moracvsik’s critique that IR constructivists have concentrated 
too much on meta-theory (on the expense of elaborating concrete concepts, theories, empirically testable hypotheses, and 
methods). “[M]eta-theory is not the solution but the problem. Philosophical speculation is being employed not to refine and 
sharpen concrete concepts, hypotheses, and methods, but to shield empirical conjectures from empirical testing. (Moravcsik 
2001, 186.) 
26 According to Moravcsik “Wendt’s article on the agent-structure problem signaled the advent of a self-conscious 
‘constructivist’ theoretical approach to the study of world politics” (Moravcsik 2001, 176). 
27 For instance the realist theory on security complexes has been casted into a constructivist version of security complexes 
by the so-called Copenhagen School (Buzan et al 1998). 
28 Speech act -theories are widely used for instance in studying security - also at the state level (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998 on 
military security and securitisation). Wendt work offers a good example of constructivist re-reading of IR’s basic concepts 
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theories has often lead to approaches which discard or downplay the state as a research 
object, and prefer focusing on “multinational corporations, new social movements, 
transnational and intergovernmental organizations” (Wendt 1992, 424). Therefore the 
dominant way of bringing constructivism into theorizing on state has been to build on 
existing IR theories and casting them into more constructivist mode. This reconstruction 
of a state-centric international theory has been criticised by proponents of more “radical” 
versions of constructivism as being too state-centrist (see Friedrichs 2003).29 In 
answering this criticism the “state-centrist” constructivist have argued, for instance, that 
“in the medium run sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the 
international system” and, more importantly, that “statism need not be bound by realist 
ideas about what “state” must mean” (Wendt 1992, 424).  
 
This study adopts a conventional constructivist approach and thus does not reject the 
state as a research object but looks at it from a constructivist angle. The approach puts 
emphasis particularly on how state identities and interests are constituted and how they 
can change through interaction. In other words, state interests are treated as endogenous 
to interaction, that is to say that interaction at the international systemic level changes 
state identities and interests. (Wendt 1994, 384). This approach is suitable for the 
purposes of this study particularly because what is under scrutiny here is the change of 
(Finnish) state identity in a context where the state in question has committed itself to a 
profound integration process at the state system level (that is to say joined the European 
Union). What also speaks on behalf of the suitability of the approach in the EU context 
is the fact that the European integration can be seen as a process of cooperation that 
holds the potential for collective identity formation. The EU member states are involved 
in a process that – according to the Europeanization literature (see the previous chapter) 
– reconstitutes “identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings 
and commitments” (Wendt 1992, 417).30 Constructivist scholars have stressed that 
“European integration is uniquely linked to inter-subjective ideas and social institutions. 
As a transformative process, European identity is suited to change substantively the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
such as anarchy, interests, identity and interaction – resulting in developing new theoretical propositions (e.g. Wendt 1992, 
1994, 2004). 
29 Mainstream constructivism has also been criticised by ”radical” scholars for remaining epistemologically positivist or 
”foundationalist” (and thus compatible with neorealism), that is to say committed to truth-seeking by scientific methods, 
and to the belief that causal generalization in the form of middle range theories is possible. Radical constructivist, then, 
prefer post-positivist contextual interpretation rather than empirical observation for analysing identity (Risse & Wiener 
2001, 200; Friedrichs 2003, 4.) 
30 From the view point of European Studies it is interesting to note that Wendt utilized general integration theory its views 
on collective identity. It should be noted that the theoretical tradition in question did not explicitly deal with European 
integration (or any other specific regional case); Wendt referred to integration theory generally as focusing on the formation 
of community at the international level, but he also made a number of specific references to European integration and the 
issues that were in the centre of the EU debate in the mid-1990s, such as the Maastrich Treaty, debate on democratic deficit, 
spill over, and European defence policy (Wendt 1994, 392-393).  
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character of European state system and to reshape the identities, interests and behaviour 
of the individual member states.” (Friedrichs 2003, 15; Christiansen et al. 2001.) 
 
Although the question whether European integration has generated, or is about to 
generate, a collective European identity falls outside the scope of this study, from the 
viewpoint of EU studies it is also worthwhile to take notice of the point Wendt makes on 
collective identities: through interaction states might form collective identities and 
interests; and “[t]he structures of regional or global international systems constitute 
interaction contexts that either inhibit or facilitate the emergence of dynamics of 
collective identity formation.” (Wendt 1994, 390). The mechanisms in this process are 
similar to those described by the Europeanization literature: “[A] systemic process that 
may encourage collective identity formation is the transitional convergence of domestic 
values. […] [T]his change in the interaction context may affect only behaviour, but it 
may also change identities and interests. […] By engaging in cooperative behaviour, an 
actor will gradually change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that 
new identity for itself. (Wendt 1994, 390.) 
 
Wendt defines intersubjective systemic structures (that facilitate the emergence of 
dynamics of collective identity formation) as consisting of “the shared understandings, 
expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat 
complexes, in terms of which states define (some of their) identities and interests” 
(Wendt 1994, 389). From the perspective of constructivist approaches to European 
integration the EU indeed forms such an institution. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
this is the case also regarding European foreign and security policy: ”studies from the 
late 1990s indicate that ECP/CFSP institutions that have a strong ’socialisation’ effect; 
élites involved even in the intergovernmental bargaining process of EPC/CFSP show 
surprising signs of internalising supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to 
their national capitals (Wong 2005, 146). 
 
From the Europeanization perspective it is useful to note that constructivism finds that 
these influential norms can be held at both the international and domestic level 
(Catalinac 2007, 75; Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 397; Checkel 2001). It can be argued 
that European integration and CFSP produce such norms and clearly form ”collective 
expectations for the behaviour” of a member state. For a student of the Europeanization 
of national foreign and security policy an essential task would thus be to see how these 
expectations affect and manifest themselves in the domestic policy-making process. 
Additionally, the bottom-up direction is of interest: how nationally defined expectations 
find their way to the European level. Constructivism acknowledges this dimension too: 
“norms embedded in domestic social structures also exert a powerful influence on policy 
makers’ perceptions of the range of foreign policy options available” (Catalinac 2007, 
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75, emphasis added; Risse-Kappen 1996). Hence, in the domestic foreign and security 
policy-making process European and national conceptions clash, and possibly converge, 
with each other. A related question presented in the constructivist debate has been “the 
relative weight to assign to the international or domestic sphere” in the construction of 
state identity (Catalinac 2007, 76). According to Finnemore and Sikkink “constructivists 
agree that state identities were constructed within the social environment of international 
and domestic politics” but disagree on “the weight of international versus domestic 
environments in shaping state identities” (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399). As was 
described in the previous chapter Europeanization as an approach taps exactly into this 
relationship between international and domestic environments. 
 
The interest on the relationship of international and domestic politics combines 
Europeanization and IR constructivism. Europeanization allows the researcher to 
“inquire into the nature of the ‘reciprocal relationship’ between the European and the 
national levels” (Börzel 2002, 195; see also Gross 2007, 504). Constructivists, then, 
share the view that state identities are constructed within the social environment of 
international and domestic politics – although there might be different interpretations 
among them as to the relative weight of international versus domestic environments in 
shaping state identities. Some emphasize the impact of international environment while 
others see identity arising mainly from national ideologies of collective distinctiveness. 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399.) Essential questions in constructivist IR work are, for 
instance “how internal and external factors interact to produce actors with particular 
identities and how, in turn, such identities affect state action.” (Finnemore & Sikkink 
2001, 399).31  
 
This notable compatibility of Europeanization with constructivist IR theory is largely 
due to the fact that Europeanization is located exactly at the intersection between 
domestic and international that is so central also to constructivist IR. To quote 
Finnemore and Sikkink: 
“Not only do different states react differently to the same international norms, he 
[Checkel 1997, 1998] argued, but the mechanisms by which norms are 
internalized within states differ as well. Without understanding how these 
domestic processes worked, we could not understand the political effects of these 
global social structures. By bringing investigation of global norms back into 
domestic politics, Checkel and others have created an important point of 
intersection between international relations and comparative politics.” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 397; emphasis added).  
 
                                                  
31 As this Europeanization study on Finland tackles these questions in the context of EU Studies the eventual research 
findings might be read in the light of both the constructivist IR debate and Europeanization debate. 
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Such a refocusing on domestic politics appears to be an almost identical move with what 
Hix and other advocates of Comparative Political Science have done in EU Studies (see 
chapter 2.2 above): by emphasising the comparative politics approach to European 
integration they turned the focus from the European level to the domestic processes and 
to the question how does European integration impact on the national level. 
Analogously, the Europeanization studies embrace the notion that Europeanization 
brings different results in different (member)states – that is to say that there is national 
variation – and that the mechanisms of Europeanization differ within different states.32 
In constructivist literature a similar perspective is present as constructivists consider 
“how international norms may affect states differently because of their different state 
identities” (Catalinac 2007, 76; Gurowitz 1999). 
 
As was noted in chapter 2.2, a constructivist turn has also been located in EU Studies33. 
It has even been argued that the classical debate between neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism has been replaced by a debate between rationalism and 
constructivism (Pollack 2005). According to Smith constructivism has challenged the 
dominance of rationalist approaches which have restricted the development of the 
literature on European integration, and can offer social convincing and deeper 
explanations of European integration (Smith 2001, 192): “Constructivism can offer 
powerful accounts of European governance precisely because it is based on a notion of 
intersubjective understandings and discourses being central in shaping over time the 
identities, interests and interactions of actors (Smith 2001, 196). 
 
This study follows the assumption that in order to utilize the identity concept properly it 
is necessary to adopt a constructivist approach. This is the case especially when identity 
change is put under scrutiny. The version of constructivism to be selected here enables 
the study of state identity, by keeping state-oriented approach feasible – in contrast to 
those variants of constructivism that are keen to cast state aside and focus on other 
objects (cf. Wendt 1994, 385). When applied in IR, and in this study, the concept of 
identity typically has a collective nature and it is strongly political. This is important to 
keep in mind since it distinguishes IR’s identity concept from psychologically oriented 
considerations at the individual level. Furthermore, the identity questions of IR are not 
sociological questions about how people are or live (Wæver 2002). It is the collective 
and political aspects of identity which make it applicable for studying such objects 
relevant for IR as the nation and the state (and minorities/nation-like ethnic units, 
                                                  
32 In this light one could argue that Europeanization approach has contributed, more or less purposefully, to the 
strengthening of constructivist thinking in European Studies. 
33 In the book titled ”Social Construction of Europe”, published in 2001 (many of the chapters of the book were originally 
published in a special issue of Journal of European Public Policy in 1999) Christiansen et al. argue that they introduce a 
”novel perspective to students of European integration” by bringing ”the potential of constructivist approaches for studying 
the social construction of Europe to the attention of scholars engaged in European studies” (Christiansen et al. 2001; i, 201). 
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civilizations, religions, race). The previous chapter concluded that in the 
Europeanization literature this issue remains often without adequate theoretical 
reflection: when talking about socialisation and social learning as mechanisms through 
which Europeanization as an identity change takes place, the level-of-analysis is often 
blurred. It is not sufficiently defined whether it is a question of personal identities of 
key-decision makers and officials (those are the actors that increasingly interact at the 
European level) or of collective political identity, such as national identity or state 
identity. Their relation is seldom questioned, and thus it remains unclear how changes in 
the former lead to changes in the latter (see chapter 2.3.4 above).  
 
In analysing the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy this study 
utilizes the connection of national foreign and security policy and state identity. National 
security and foreign policy tells us how the state in question sees its position in the 
international system. According to Campbell the constitution of identity is achieved 
through “the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an 
‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’” (Campbell 1992, 8). 
Hence the key vehicles of state identity production can be located in foreign and security 
policy. Identity of state is contained and reproduced through foreign policy. “[T]he 
boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to 
foreign policy” (Campbell 1992, 3; see also Wallace 1991, 65). Campbell sees that 
conventionally foreign policy is understood as the external orientation of pre-established 
states with secure identities, but it should be retheorized as “one of the boundary-
producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose 
name it operates” (ibid., 75). Building on these theoretical claims we can argue in the 
context of Europeanization that the European level enters this domestic political practice 
and contributes to the construction of the “inside” and “outside, “self” and “other”. This 
definition is clearly compatible with Wong’s definition on Europeanization as identity 
reconstruction (see chapter 2.3.3), but adds a deeper dimension to it which introduces 
epistemological and methodological rigour as well as notions on the ontological essence 
of state identity – which the Europeanization literature largely fails to deliver. 
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2.5 Ontological and epistemological premises 
 
How do we know an identity if we see one? (Catalinac 2007, 76) 
 
Is the state an actor or a structure? Is it nothing more than the sum of individual 
government actions, the empirical behaviours of government officials? Or is it a ‘ghost 
in the machine’, some kind of undefined and undefinable essence (Wight 2004, 276)? 
Does it make sense to talk about a collective level identity that somehow represents the 
individual identities of citizens and yet at the same time is more than the sum of those, 
that is to say is non-reductible to individual interests? Can we talk about the 
Europeanization of a state’s identity or should we say that it is the identities of key 
politicians and government officials that have changed due to the European integration? 
Is there a difference between these two? 
 
When we connect Europeanization with state identity reconstruction we come to the 
question concerning the ontological and epistemological status of state identity: “what is 
state identity and how can we measure it and its change?” So far we have learned that 
state identity is reproduced by foreign policy and that this reproduction process is 
affected by interaction at the international (European) level. Ontologically this means 
that contrary to the realist and rationalist accounts state identities are not fixed or 
”given”.34 Neither are they solely historically constructed, as historical institutionalism 
tends to claim, but largely constructed in and by social interaction. Constructivism thus 
sees state identity as a social fact. According to Searle (1995; a frequently cited source 
in constructivist IR literature) the term refers to things like money, sovereignty, and 
rights, which have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe 
they exist and act accordingly (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 393).35 An implication of 
this view is that identities and interests are actually “always in process during 
interaction” (Wendt 1994, 386). On the one hand state identity fundamentally shapes 
state preferences and actions; yet on the other identity can change and is changeable by 
social and political action (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399).  
 
Like many other conceptual tools, ”identity” has actually been imported into IR from 
other scientific disciplines. In philosophy and psychology it is originally a concept that 
concerned the individual level, but in IR identity has been moved to another level-of-
                                                  
34 Neorealist and neoliberalist views take self-interested actors as constant and exogenously given. From those perspectives 
questions about identity- and interest-formation were therefore not important to students of international relations. 
Neorealism aims at integrating sub-state conflicts between antagonist ethnic and nationalist groups within a structural theory 
of international system, but without revising the ‘identity of the constitutive unit’ as being that of self-help (Wæver 2002).  
35 According to Campbell “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, 
states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell 1992, 11). 
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analysis: it most often concerns different types of collectivities, such as states and 
nations, or ethnic minorities, tribes, clans, religions, civilizations or races (see e.g. 
Buzan et al. 1998, 123). Consequently, the first fundamental theoretical dilemma 
regarding state identity concerns the borrowing of the concept and moving it to another 
level of analysis. In this respect the IR debate has dealt with questions such as “does the 
explanatory value of the concept endure when it is moved from individual level to state 
level?” or “what theoretical assumptions concerning individual identity are valid when 
talking about different collectives such as the state?” In introducing collective identity to 
IR the theoretical debate has therefore started from the philosophical debates on 
individual level identity (see e.g. Neumann 1995, Wendt 1994). Although state identity 
is by now a routinely used concept in IR, in order to avoid too vague a use of identity 
concept a certain philosophical reflection is needed. Too often different versions of 
identity theory are taken and used as unproblematic IR, making identity a “catch-all 
term” (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399). In the following the ontological debate on state 
identity is revisited from the perspective of constructivist IR. After that we will move on 
to the methodological implications of the selected theoretical framework and of the 
ontological and epistemological starting points. 
 
In the light of Jørgensen’s classification of different constructivisms (see chapter 2.4.2 
above) it can be noted that the constructivist approach adopted in this study is closer to 
philosophical realism than some other variants of constructivism are. According to 
Wendt “To say that worlds are defined intersubjectively is not to say they are malleable, 
however, since intersubjective constructions confront actors as obdurate social facts. 
[…] Intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of 
meanings that actors act” (Wendt 1994, 389).36 The middle ground constructivist 
approach on which this study builds on is based on subjective ontology and objective 
epistemology.37 Table 2 depicts the relationship of this constructivist approach to other 
ontological/epistemological standpoints. (As was explained earlier, there are actually 
different variants of constructivism, all of which do not possibly share the ontological 
and epistemological stances presented here (see Smith 2001, 197).)  
 
                                                  
36 Zehfuss notes that Wendt presents a structural theory based on a state-centered ontology. But structure only exists and has 
causal powers as process, that is, through actors’ practices. Self-help and power politics, for instance, are institutions that 
have developed out of interaction in the international system and are sustained by such interaction. (Zehfuss 2001.)  
37 Such combination has also been a source of criticism: Friedrichs argues that the (successful) attempt to establish and 
mainstream constructivism as a theoretical ‘third way’ between rationalism and post-positivism has lead to “estrangement 
from the post-positivist challenge to that mainstream” and “simultaneous adoption of a positivist epistemology and a post-
positivist ontology”. (Friedrichs 2003, 1.) 
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            Ontology 
 
 
Epistemology 
Objective 
“There is a world out 
there” 
Subjective 
“The world is socially 
constructed” 
Objective 
“..which can be 
measured and 
analysed” 
 
POSITIVISM 
 
 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
Subjective 
“Contested nature of 
knowledge 
production” 
 
CRITICAL THEORY 
 
 
POSTMODERNISM 
 
Table 2 (Adapted from Manners 2002) 
 
 
On both ontological and epistemological terms a division to positivist and post-positivist 
approaches forms the basic line of demarcation in the table. The traditional positivist 
approach, objective both in its ontological and epistemological starting points, assumes 
that “there is a world out there” (objective ontology) “which can be measured and 
analysed” (objective epistemology). On the opposite corner of the figure, being post-
positivist in ontological and epistemological terms, stands the postmodern approach, 
which according to Manners (200238) departs from the basic assumptions that “the world 
is socially constructed” (subjective ontology) “which cannot be easily measured and 
analysed because of the contested nature of knowledge production” (subjective 
ontology). Conventional constructivism (“constructivism” in Table 1) sees that “while 
symbolic interaction constructs meaning, it is assumed that social reality does exist 
beyond theorists’ view”. Consequently, constructivists stress the importance of 
empirical work (Christiansen et al. 2001, 8). 
 
In constructivist thinking the social construction of the “world” revolves largely around 
identity: our ideas about ourselves and our environment shape our interactions and are 
shaped by our interactions; thereby they create social reality. Collective meanings 
constitute the structures which organize our actions. Identities are relatively stable, role-
specific understandings and expectations about self. Identities provide the basis for 
interests, and these are defined in the process of defining situations. A relatively stable 
                                                  
38 Manners used his table originally in the context of security studies. 
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‘structure’ of identities and interests is an institution. Change is possible when actors 
alter their identities because of critical reflection upon the self. Through identity change, 
other patterns of interaction, and thus other realities, can be created. (Zehfuss 2001, 58; 
Wendt 1992, 405). 
 
According to Jackson the debate on the ontological status of state consists of two 
different philosophical aspects. Firstly, there is ‘philosophical ontology’ which “deals 
with the way in which entities are considered to exist in the first place” (Jackson 2004, 
257). Secondly, ‘scientific’ or ‘practical’ identity “details the kinds of things that exist in 
the world demarcated by a particular theoretical approach” (ibid.). 39 With the help of 
Bartelson (1998) we can distinguish between the state as a type and the state as a token. 
Type identity concerns the identity of the state as a general concept40, whereas token 
identity concerns the common characteristics of individual states (Bartelson lists the 
following: indivisibility, distinctness, continuity). In Jackson’s categorization “state as 
type” falls into the category of philosophical ontological considerations, whereas “state 
as token” is more related to the scientific/practical identity. In light of Bartelson’s and 
Jackson’s definitions, in this study the state identity is thus understood as token identity, 
and philosophical ontological questions on which way states “are considered to exist in 
the first place” or on the “general conditions of statehood” are largely cast aside.41 
Instead, the focus is on changes that take place in the characteristics of a particular state. 
It is, in other words, argued that the state identity of Finland has changed, and the 
change might be due to interaction among other states (that are engaged in an integration 
process in which shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge play a 
significant role). 
 
Regarding the conception of state this implies rejecting the “givenness of the state”, a 
view according to which the state is a brute fact of international reality. This view claims 
that the state is intelligible by virtue of its existence as an irreducible part of 
international political reality, and the main function of the concept of state in theories of 
IR is to represent a portion of ready-made political reality, thus making it accessible to 
theoretical and empirical knowledge (Bartelson 1998, 299). Instead, the selected 
approach implies constructedness of the state: the state is an institutional, man-made 
                                                  
39 Among IR scholars a debate on the ontological status of the state goes under the title “person-hood of state “or 
“anthropomorphising the state”. According to Jackson (2004, 258) the question of state person-hood is important for IR 
theorists because the international system, as a topic of IR theory, is shaped and structured by a notion of states as actors. 
The question of state-personhood also “has implications for how we think about agents and agency in world politics”. 
40 General conditions of statehood, “the question of state identity is a question of being of the state, and what makes a state a 
state and not something else” (Bartelson 1998). 
41 Although from the perspective of European Studies it might be interesting to pose the theoretical question can a state be 
Europeanized to a point where it ceases to be a state in ontological sense, that is to say that it no longer meets the general 
conditions of statehood – for instance by loosing sovereignty over issues that are considered essential for a state (typically: 
defence, territory, etc). 
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fact. The state ultimately exists because it is believed to exist or because agents act as if 
it existed, and has therefore been institutionalized as behavioural patterns in 
international society. Identity of the state has been constituted through interaction, this 
identity is also bound to dissolve sooner or later. Bartelson sees that ”the most obvious 
way for this to happen is through increased interdependence or internalization, so that 
the emergent mutuality of interests sooner or later will spill over into new forms of 
identity of perhaps a shared one” (Bartelson 1998, 305).  
 
These differing views also have their impact on what sort of answer is given to the 
question concerning the intelligibility of  state  –  under  what  conditions  is  the  state  
accessible to human knowledge and human action. Is the state accessible to 
understanding because it exists, or whether it exists only by virtue of being instantiated 
in political practices? (Bartelson 1998, 297.) In the context of this study the latter option 
applies; and foreign policy is seen as the political practice through which state identity is 
reproduced. Therefore we can approach state identity via analysis of foreign and security 
policy documentation and domestic debates and the key concepts therein. In the 
following the methodological implications of the selected theoretical approach are 
explained in more detail. 
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2.6 Implications on Methods and Material 
 
The key methodological offering of the theoretical debate and the selected theoretical 
framework is that due to its collective and political nature state identity is ontologically a 
“social fact” which can be approached with the methods of discourse analysis.42 Any 
political identity is a discoursive and symbolic construction. Therefore there is no need 
to get inside the heads of the individual actors in  identity analysis. In contrast to 
individual level identities and their psychological and cognitive analysis, collective 
identities do not possess ”internal life” but are ”superficial” and constructed (Campbell 
1992). In studying the dominant domestic discourse what interests us is “neither what 
individual decision makers really believe, nor what are shared beliefs among a 
population, but which codes are used when actors relate to each other” (Wæver 2002, 
26). These codes can be identified through a systematic study of nation-states’ official 
documents and the speeches of its leaders (Wæver 2002, also Rieker 2004, 371). 
Therefore it is the domestic foreign and security policy discourse that serves as the 
primary material from which the Europeanization (as state identity reconstruction) can 
be read. Discourse is understood here as a macro concept: in contrast to the approaches 
which engage in detailed textual analysis (such as critical discourse analysis), the focus 
is on broadly based discourses which are identified in relevant texts. Discourse can be 
defined as a limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings 
which are formed and changed in social interaction. Hence discourses are not seen as the 
product of individual language users’ brains or psychology. According to Larsen this 
definition of discourse entails that “[a]n analytical focus on the views of an individual or 
a politician is therefore only relevant as expression of broader societally shared 
discourses” (Larsen 2004, 65). The analysis stays at the surface of the text and pays 
attention to the vocabulary in the text – and not on what is ‘really’ meant by a particular 
text or statement. (Larsen 2004, 65.)  
 
The primary material to be looked at when analysing the Europeanization of Finnish 
foreign and security policy consists firstly of the official documentation on foreign and 
security policy: Government Reports (white books) on security and/or defence policy 
(1995, 1997, 2001, 2004) and related speeches by key decision-makers43; legislative 
amendments or new laws (Government proposals) concerning foreign and security 
                                                  
42 Variety of empirical research methods is used in constructivist studies: for instance discourse analysis, process tracing, 
genealogy, structured focused comparisons, interviews, participant observation, and content analysis (Finnemore & Sikkink 
2001, 395). 
43 This view is similar to Rieker’s approach who sees in her study on the Europeanization of Nordic security identities that 
“it is possible to identify the security identity of a nation-state by studying official documents and speeches produced by the 
political leadership.” (Rieker 2006, 514). In doing that Rieker put a “special focus on the language used in speeches, official 
texts and documents that express the national security identity.” (ibid., 515.) 
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policy (which most often relate to Finnish participation in UN, EU, or NATO-led peace-
keeping and crisis management operations; e.g. peace-keeping/military crisis 
management legislation of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006); Government material stems also 
from national preparation for EU intergovernmental conferences (IGCs, 1996, 1999, 
2004) as well as from reactions to CFSP and ESDP development (European Security 
Strategy 2003, EU crisis management operations, and EU battle groups; see chapter 3 
for discussion on these). Secondly, to give a richer picture of the national discourse the 
official documentation on foreign and security policy is supplemented with the related 
parliamentary debate (political discussion in the plenary sessions), and statements and 
reports of Parliaments Committees (Foreign Affairs Committee, Defence Committee, 
Constitutional Law Committee and Grand Committee).44  
 
Regarding the Government Reports on security and defence policy as sources it is 
interesting to note that these so-called white papers, or white books, used to be prepared 
by a body consisting of parliamentarians but parliamentary committees have later on 
given way to governmental preparation. A result of this is, as Ojanen notes, “[i]n 
Finland, in fact, the Parliamentary Committees may not necessarily share all the views 
expressed in the reports” (Ojanen 2002, 205). This aspect is useful for the purposes of 
this study since it means that there is a lively political debate – documented word for 
word in the official parliamentary documentation – between Ministers and 
parliamentarians, and between opposition and government party members in the 
Parliament. In that debate there are contradicting views, contrasting perceptions and 
different ways to use “European” argumentation, different ways to perceive CFSP and 
its significance and consequences for Finland. By integrating this dimension into the 
material reach of the study a more comprehensive view of the Europeanization process 
of Finnish foreign and security policy can be acquired. The parliamentary political 
discussion gives a vantage point to the process in which national dominant discourse on 
foreign and security policy is formed. By chronological analysis of the primary material 
the possible changes in the meanings attached to different foreign and security policy 
concepts can be observed. Moreover, the political construction of adaptation pressure 
can also be analysed with the help of this material. 
 
During the Cold War an essential feature in Finnish security and defence policy was that 
it was directed by the President. In the 1970s parliamentary defence committees were 
established, consisting of parliamentarians and experts appointed by parties and defence 
administration. The committees (1970-1971, 1975-1977, 1980-81) can be seen as 
                                                  
44 In acquiring the relevant primary documentation the on-line databank of the Parliament (web.eduskunta.fi) was utilized 
and the parliamentary documents from Finland’s EU-membership era (and the pre-accession phase; 1994-2008) were 
checked with search words such as “foreign policy”, “security policy”, “defence policy”, “Common Foreign and Security 
Policy”, “European Security and Defence Policy” (all in Finnish). 
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attempts to increase parliamentarism and openness in Finnish policy-making but security 
issues were not very openly or widely discussed in the Finnish society. According to 
Limnéll the Finnish security policy debate became more open and political after the end 
of the Cold War and the EU accession. The definition of security concepts and threat 
pictures has since become more clearly a political and debatable issue. (Limnéll 2008, 1; 
Visuri 2003, 31.) 
 
Since the mid-1990s Government Reports have been the main method of Finnish 
foreign, security and defence policy definition.45 The first Government Report on 
security policy was given to the Parliament in 1995. After that security and defence 
policy reports have become an established modus operandi and the Government gives its 
foreign, security and defence policy definitions in the form of a Government Report to 
the parliament (as well as to the Finnish society) once during every electoral turn. 
(Limnell 2008, 2.) The official parliamentary glossary of the Finnish Parliament defines 
Government Report as a “report submitted by the Government to the Parliament dealing 
with the governance of the country or with international relations and on which a vote of 
confidence cannot be taken.”46 This method has become a central feature and tool in 
Finnish foreign, security and defence policy-making. These white books are political 
documents, presented by the Government as their definition of policy which they will 
then defend in public and to which the Government is expected to commit itself once the 
approval of the Parliament is received. The Reports are discussed and considered rather 
thoroughly in the Parliament and its committees.47 Related parliamentary debates and 
committee handlings have become a key forum in Finnish foreign, security and defence 
policy. According to Limnéll this has dismantled elitism in security and defence policy-
making, and has also increased the parliamentarization of Finnish foreign, security and 
defence policy. Although the Reports lack juridical binding force and do not 
automatically imply a vote of confidence (on whether the government or a particular 
minister enjoys the confidence of Parliament) Governments have largely followed the 
policies presented in the Reports. According to Limnéll the Government Reports also act 
as a political message from Finland to the world on how Finland sees its security 
environ and its threats and problems, as well as on how Finland will prepare itself for 
these threats (Limnéll 2008, 2). This characteristic of the Finnish Government Reports is 
highly compatible with the theoretical approach of the study, in which it is seen that 
state identity is contained and reproduced by foreign policy, and Europeanization might 
contribute to the construction of threats and ”self” and ”other” causing changes in the 
                                                  
45 In Finnish the process is called ”selontekomenettely”. 
46 Finnish Parliamentary Glossary, http://mot.kielikone.fi/mot/eduskuntasanasto/netmot (19.1.2011) 
47 Limnéll has counted that during the preliminary debate (referral debate) on the security and defence policy white book 
(Government Report 6/2004) 206 speeches were given in the parliament, and the follow-up debate consisted of 162 
speeches (Limnéll 2008, 2). The material analysed in this study consists of thousands of parliamentary speeches (see the list 
of documents and related parliamentary debates in the bibliography). 
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vehicles of state identity production (see chapter 2.4.2). Limnéll sees that white books 
carry a domestic communicative, even educational, significance in that they give the 
citizens information on Finnish security and defence policy. He notes that procedures 
around the Government Reports can well be described as “national security therapy”, as 
Väyrynen has done (Väyrynen 2007). Limnéll depicts the Government Reports as a 
focal point where parliamentary debate, expert discussions, public opinion and media 
meet. The public expectations regarding the reports are huge. (Limnéll 2008, 2-3.) 
 
A purpose of the Reports is also to seek for wide acceptance and consensus in national 
foreign, security and defence policy. In addition to the Parliament’s Committee 
handlings, an security policy monitoring group (”seurantaryhmä”) has been since the 
Report of 2004 been involved in the preparations of the reports. The groups consist of 
members of parliament from different parties – including opposition parties. The goal 
has been to ensure the commitment of parliament and parties to the policies presented in 
the white books. 
 
Concerning the nature of the discourse it can be noted that as foreign and security policy 
is typically a highly elite-led sphere of politics, the dominant discourse is produced by 
highly institutionalized actors and is considered to concern issues of exceptional 
importance (such as “national security”, “sovereignty” etc.). Therefore it is often 
difficult to gain credibility and understanding – let alone political success – for ideas that 
are not in line with the dominant discourse (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998, Wæver & Hansen 
2002). However, the empirical analysis presented in the following chapters locates a 
number of cases in which significantly contradicting political argumentation on national 
foreign and security policy line appears. Such cases are in the analysis regarded as 
indicators of potential turning points in how national interests and state identity are 
perceived. When such events are observed in the primary research material they are 
taken under closer scrutiny. 
 
The above-presented methodological and material solutions imply putting emphasis on 
the domestic political and legislatory process as the process where the national foreign 
and security policy is eventually formulated, or where the final approval for the policy 
and changes in it must be attained. Consequently, the interplay of norms, expectations 
and adaptation pressures originating from the European level on one the hand, and the 
domestic expectations on the other is expected to be observable there. This is in line 
with the conclusions and findings of the current studies on the Finnish foreign and 
security policy decision-making system. They indicate that the Parliament’s role in 
foreign policy decision-making has strengthened. There have been, for instance, 
procedural changes in the parliament act which have given the parliament a change to 
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follow closely the definition of Finnish foreign and security policy.48 (Forsberg 2001, 
Tiilikainen 2007, see also chapter 3 below.) 
 
Together the above-mentioned documentation and the parliamentary debate form the 
primary research material for the study. Secondary material, consisting of research 
literature on the Finnish case, is reviewed in chapter 3. The empirical analysis will 
proceed chronologically and is divided in three phases (1994-1996, 1997-2002; 2003-
2007). As will become evident in the empirical chapters, the division is based on the 
finding that the character of the Europeanization process differs significantly in each 
phase. Primary material related to each of these phases is described in more detail in 
each consecutive chapter. 
 
In the pre-study phase the parliamentary debates proved to be a particularly suitable 
source material for the purposes of this study. Basically, in this study “domestic debate” 
is a broader term and consists of more than the mere parliamentary debates but in the 
pre-study phase it became clear that the majority of relevant issues in the broader 
national debate conducted in the public sphere on Finnish foreign and security policy 
have found their way into the parliamentary debate. All the main themes of the domestic 
debate could be located in the parliamentary debates. Furthermore, the parliamentary 
debates contained direct references to practically all the significant speeches, news paper 
articles, public comments by experts, items of news and so on to which the secondary 
material referred to. The parliamentary debates therefore lie in the heart of the domestic 
discourse. Much of the analysis and conclusions presented in this study are based on the 
parliamentary debates, and this is because they are seen to carry significant weight as 
evidence when it comes to the research questions set for this study.49 All in all, the 
foreign, security and defence Government Reports together with the legislative 
amendments and new laws on peacekeeping and crisis management and related 
parliamentary debates form a most suitable primary material for a study based on a 
theoretical framework that builds on constructivist IR theoretisation on state identity 
reproduction. As this study focuses on state identity that is reconstructed through foreign 
policy, the material produced by the foreign and security policy-makers in the 
Government, Parliament and its Committees is essential.  
                                                  
48 A significant issue in this respect is the fact that the Prime Minister gives a report to the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee on the Finnish positions on CFSP before participating in EU Council meetings. Compared to many other EU 
member states the Finnish parliament plays a strong role in decision-making on EU affairs. The Government and each 
minister must enjoy the confidence of Parliament in activities within the EU as well. The parliaments Foreign Affairs 
Committee has to be kept informed and speaks for Parliament with regard to the CFSP. In other issues the Grand Committee 
serves as Parliaments EU committee. International treaties, including amendments to the Union’s treaties must be approved 
by the Parliament’s plenary session. 
49 Such delimitation of material also made it possible to carry out a longitudinal study that covers most of the Finnish EU-
membership era so far. If material produced by, for instance, civil society actors, media, interest groups or smaller political 
formations was included, the amount of primary material would have been too overwhelming for thorough enough analysis. 
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References to the particular speeches are made when they are considered significant 
with respect to changes in broader common understandings in the discourse. The 
parliamentary speeches constitute a large material segment. References to the MPs’ 
speeches are in this study done in the following way: when the abbreviation e.g. 
(exempli gratia, “for instance”) is used in the footnote – as in “e.g. MP Siimes 
21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006” – the speech in 
question is considered to represent a view shared by a considerable number of MPs. 
That piece of primary source material is thus found significant when the common 
understandings or changing perceptions regarding the issue in question are assessed. The 
name of the MP is in such cases of secondary importance, as the reference is selected on 
the basis that it has value in describing the broader tendencies observed in the debate. 
The parliamentary group, party or position regarding Government and opposition is 
mentioned only in cases where it provides added value, for instance when it is question 
of an opposing stance to the Government’s view by an MP belonging to a party that is 
represented in the Government. In some cases the membership or chairmanship in a 
Parliamentary Committee it is indicated for the same reason. Therefore direct quotes 
(translated by the author) from the speeches are presented only in order to illustrate 
certain central changes in the domestic discourse. This is done mainly in connection 
with the key arguments of the study in each of the three phases. The quotes serve as 
examples of the dominating way of thinking and broader changes in argumentation and 
in common understandings. Thus it is not a question of in-depth textual analysis of  
individual speeches and words or argumentative structures used therein. All the speeches 
referenced against the names of MPs can be found on the on-line databank of the 
Finnish Parliament by the title of the debate and the date, both given in the footnotes.  
 
As was explained in the previous chapter the selected approach rejects the idea of 
aggregating individual level changes in self-perception and equating the result with state 
identity change – no matter how central persons in foreign policy-making are in 
question.50 From a methodological point of view this implies demarcating from 
approaches that – often along the lines of foreign policy analysis-tradition (FPA) – focus 
chiefly on individuals and their roles. The individuals in question are typically diplomats 
placed at the intersection of national and international in EU institutions (such as 
national officials located in Brussels and in government policy-making machinery) or 
bureaucrats which are seen through individual level socialization to produce an 
                                                  
50 Some have suggested a straight-forward solution to the problem: that indeed the personal identity of certain human 
individuals, i.e. diplomats, is to be equated with state identity. According to Faizullaev (2006) the state identity becomes 
part of the personal identity of diplomats – much in the spirit of Louis XIV’s famous words L’Etat c’est moi! A more down-
to-earth solution, perhaps, is to see ”foreign policy-makers are understood as agents collectively representing the state as a 
social actor in foreign policy “(Aggestam 2004, 85).  
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administrative response of the state to Europeanization.51 Thus the selected 
methodological approach does not follow approaches that methodologically rest on in-
depth interviews and analysis of “role identities” and personal identities and other 
individual level socialisation. Often such studies treat biographical and personal 
evidence as important sources and tend to see Europeanization and the development of 
CFSP norms as a result of interactions in an informal, clubby atmosphere between 
individuals involved, particularly political directors (Larsen 2004, 76).52  
 
In order to clarify the extent to which the underlying joint European goals, values and 
threat pictures of CFSP have been adopted the following questions of more detailed 
nature are used when dealing with the empirical material: What role has been given to 
EU security arrangements in the post-Cold War Finnish foreign, security and defence 
policy? Is there evidence of increased general prominence of the CFSP and ESDP in 
national foreign policy? What about the political construction of adaptation pressure: 
How is the participation or non-participation in those arrangements justified nationally: 
is there evidence of adherence to common policy objectives; policies agreed for the sake 
of EU unity; relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the 
progress of EU policy and institutions (cf. Gross 200753)? In the general terminology of 
the Europeanization approach adopted in this study the questions can be repeated in the 
following form: Has the Finnish security policy been Europeanized? By what kind of 
means of adaptation to European policies has this taken place: changes in politics, 
domestic decision-making structure or in legislation (such as bureaucratic reorganization 
or constitutional change)? What about the projection of national preferences to the 
European level? The steps of the domestic change are analysed with the conceptual tools 
of Europeanization theory explained in the previous chapter. These include the policy 
misfit between European rules and regulations and national and the institutional misfit 
between European policies, norms and collective understandings and the domestic ones, 
as well as the facilitating factors.  
 
The empirical analysis scans the domestic discourse for signs of thick Europeanization, 
that is to say, changes in the way the key goals and values behind national foreign and 
security policy are defined as well as how threats are perceived. The significance of 
those changes in the state identity re-construction process is then assessed, and in the 
final part of this study (chapter 7) the key findings of the three phases (analysed in 
chapters 4,5 and 6) are aggregated and conclusions are drawn on their implications on 
                                                  
51 FPA tools of analysis have been used in Europeanization studies for instance by Vaquer 2001, Tonra 2001 and Aktipis 
2007. 
52 Larsen calls these phenomenological/symbolic interactionalist approaches (Larsen 2004, 76). 
53 Gross’ study on the Europeanization of German foreign and security policy focuses on the role Germany has assigned to 
policy instruments located in the CFSP and ESDP in crisis management since 1999 (see Gross 2007). 
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Finnish state identity as a whole. The conclusions will thus concern the extent to which 
the process of state identity production and the construction of “self” and “other” has 
been influenced by European integration. 
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2.7 Summary on the theoretical chapters 
 
The general question and debate in the background of this study is how the EU has 
changed Finnish foreign and security policy. Basically, the possible logical answers 
range from “no change at all” or “the change is caused by other factors than the EU” to 
“change exclusively caused by the EU”. The main promise of the Europeanization 
approach is that it can give analytical ability resulting to deeper understanding of how 
the change has taken place and what sort of political processes relate to it. There is a 
variety of ways in the Europeanization literature as to how to define and approach the 
Europeanization process. As was discussed above they all reflect different theoretical 
traditions and thus build on somewhat differing metatheoretical assumptions. However, 
the three major theoretical turns in IR and European studies – the relaunch of 
(Comparative) Political Science, institutional turn, and constructivist turn –  can be 
located in the background of Europeanization studies generally. Particularly the 
institutional turn appeared useful here in clarifying the differences between the 
Europeanization approaches and conceptual definitions. Furthermore, the closer 
examination of the rationalist and sociological institutionalist roots of different 
Europeanization approaches made visible the way in which the approaches can 
complement each other and coexist side by side when actual analysis on a given EU-
member state is committed. The sociological institutionalist and constructivist 
underpinnings of foreign and security policy Europeanization were discussed and on that 
basis “thick Europeanization” and the respective misfit-mechanism was defined for the 
purposes of the empirical analysis to be presented in the following chapters. 
 
From a theoretical perspective this study will also evaluate the applicability of the 
rationalist versus the sociological institutionalist approach on Europeanization. The 
conclusions of the study will support the argument that the sociological variant is more 
suitable for studying the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy. 
However, it should be noted that the rationalist approach is also capable of uncovering a 
number of cases of European integration’s impact on national foreign and security 
policy. But grasping and understanding the real depth of the change requires a 
sociological institutionalist approach on institutions and their transformation. 
 
Concerning the three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization (as defined by 
Wong) it was argued that a better conceptualisation would consist of two directions (top-
down adaptation and bottom-up projection) and two dimensions: rationalist 
institutionalist “thin” Europeanization (changes in national or European level structures 
and policies) and sociological institutionalist “thick” Europeanization (changes in 
perceptions and identities.) Revisiting IR constructivism from the perspective of 
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Europeanization studies was seen necessary in order to overcome the theoretical 
haziness that troubles much of the Europeanization literature when dealing with the 
socialisation and identity change at the individual level and the link between that and 
foreign policy change and state identity reconstruction. A conclusion taken in this 
respect was to focus on state level identity reconstruction. Consequently, foreign policy 
was conceptualised as the political practice through which state identity reconstruction 
takes place. The constructivist theory and the theorists themselves – although talking 
about general IR, not geographically targeted “regional” study – refer on a number of 
occasions to European integration as an example that supports the theoretical claims 
presented. These constructivists are clearly inspired by the European integration case. 
Although the significance of this point should not be overestimated, all in all it can be 
taken as sign of the conventional constructivisms theoretisation’s suitability for 
analysing the European case.  
 
The link between foreign policy and state identity was found essential: the approach 
adopted in this study rests on the theoretical assumption that state identity is contained 
and reproduced through foreign and security policy.  A key methodological implication 
of the selected assumption that state identity is socially constructed is that it is possible 
to track down specific concepts in the foreign and security policy discourse (consisting 
mainly of official foreign policy documentation and related parliamentary debates and 
statements and reports of Parliament’s Committees) that serve as the vehicles of identity 
production. The way to study and operationalise state identity change is to analyse these 
concepts and their change, as well as how they appear in the political argumentation on 
national foreign and security policy.  
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3. CFSP and Finland: clarifying the starting points for the empirical analysis 
 
This chapter looks at both ends of the Europeanization process, that is to say CFSP and 
Finland and prepares the ground for the empirical analysis presented in chapters 4, 5 and 
6. European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy – and CFSP 
as the policy level materialization of that – is defined as the source of the adaptational 
pressure that sets the Europeanization process in motion. A related key argument of this 
chapter is that CFSP indeed constitutes a misfit pressure resulting to Europeanization, 
and that, consequently, it makes sense to analyse the impact of EU on a member state’s 
foreign and security policy. It is also argued that the adaptational pressure caused by 
CFSP has gradually increased during the Finnish EU membership era because of the 
deepening of European integration in security and defence. Particularly starting from the 
first years of the 21st century CFSP and ESDP have created a significant adaptational 
pressure on the domestic level. Finland, then, is seen as the “dependent variable” and its 
role in the receiving end of the Europeanization process is clarified in this chapter.54 
Based on the previous research on the Finnish case (the secondary material in this study) 
it is suggested that there are certain characteristics in the state identity of Finland and in 
the related cultural understandings that function as facilitating and mediating factors in 
the Europeanization process and increase the potential proneness of Finland to 
adaptational pressures caused by the CFSP.55 
 
3.1 CFSP as the source of adaptational pressure 
 
When defining the Common Foreign and Security Policy as the source of adaptational 
pressure in the Europeanization process, it should be noted that according to the 
constructivist approach followed in this study it is not only a question of whether the EU 
“really” is an international security actor or how effective CFSP is in practice or what 
“hard capacities” it possesses for advancing its foreign policy goals. It is also a question 
of the national reactions to CFSP and how CFSP is perceived in the national policy-
making process. The dominant Finnish perception on the security policy significance of 
the EU membership just after the accession in 1995 was that the EU is a security 
                                                  
54 The bottom-up direction of Europeanization, defined as national projection in the previous chapter, is also kept in mind 
because CFSP, like any EU policy, is originally a process that the member states themselves have created in the first place, 
and continue to have a say in how it is developed, thanks to the predominantly intergovernmental nature of CFSP. 
55 Concerning the concepts “foreign policy”, “foreign and security policy”, “security policy”, and “security and defence 
policy” it should be noted that “EU foreign policy” is usually understood as comprising of the national foreign policies of 
the member states, the EC external trade and development policy and the CFSP (Wong 2007, 322). The term used in this 
study,  ”foreign and security policy”,  refers to CFSP (including ESDP),  and not to “EU foreign policy”.  This implies that  
trade and development policy are excluded from this study. This definition is also more in line with the way in which 
“foreign and security policy” is typically used in the Finnish vocabulary.  
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community where solidarity and reciprocity among the members strengthens the security 
of each (Ojanen 2007, 35). It was seen that the EU had clear security implications and 
even military implications: the Finnish Government Report of 1995 on security policy 
states that “Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and 
prevent attempts to exert political pressure” (Government Report 1/1995, 40). 
Concerning the truthfulness of the Finnish view Ojanen sees that “[t]his may have been 
much more than what was generally acknowledged within the EU, where the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was at the time very new. Not many believed in a 
real development toward a common security and defense policy.” (Ojanen 2007, 35). 
From a constructivist viewpoint, however, the Finnish understanding that the EU 
membership has security policy significance is a decisive factor and a sufficient element 
to suggest that CFSP had an impact on Finnish foreign and national security. 
 
Since 1995 and Finland’s EU accession CFSP has developed and gained significance in 
the eyes of the other member states too.56 Consequently, the level of Europeanization 
pressure during the Finnish EU membership era has increased due to a progressive 
deepening and widening of European integration in the foreign policy. Starting from the 
1990s the level of ambition to speak with one voice in foreign affairs has increased to 
include even security and defence questions (Aggestam 2004, 81). In the EU Studies 
literature there has been an extensive debate on “the existence of a common European 
foreign policy” (Wong 2007, 321) which deals with the capacity of European foreign 
and security policy for instance in terms of EU’s “ability to agree, the ability to act and 
the resources dedicated to the support of those actions” (Tonra 2001, 54; see also Forster 
& Wallace 2000). The roots of the debate go back to the question of state versus non-
state actors in IR. As Wong notes, ”[a]lthough the international system is populated by 
important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in IR still conceives of foreign policy 
as essentially the domain réservé of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to 
states.” In light of this traditional view, the combination of EU and foreign policy might 
appear problematic since the EU is not a unified state actor, nor does it have clear and 
consistent external objectives, nor a coherent and authoritative decision-making center 
(see e.g. Bull 1982, Hill 1993, Kagan 2003). Rather, it is seen that there are persistent 
national foreign policies that operate under or alongside – and sometimes in variance 
with – “EU” foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European Parliament 
and/or the Council (Wong 2007, 321-322). 
                                                  
56 Some have argued that an intensification of CFSP actually took place due to the forthcoming enlargement of 1995. There 
were fears that neutral newcomers might hamper the development and functioning of CFSP. In any case, the concerns that 
the old 12 members had on the negative impact of the neutral countries accession resulted in activated advancing of 
integration on foreign and security policy before the enlargement was to take place. Consequently, when accessing the EU, 
the new, neutral, member states had to accept a more consistent CFSP along with the other achievements of the integration 
process thus far. (Ojanen 2000.) 
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CFSP can indeed be seen as a contested institution (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Koenig-
Archibugi sees that a customary view among policy-makers and scholars is that 
compared to the economic domain where the so-called Community method57 prevails, in 
foreign and security policy supranational institutions have little or no power, and the 
obligations laid upon governments are vague or frequently ignored. He traces this view 
back to the skepticism about functional spillovers that integration theorist Stanley 
Hoffmann voiced in the 1960s: “When the functions are concerned with the ineffable 
and intangible issues of Grosspolitik, when grandeur and prestige, rank and security, 
domination and dependence are at stake, we are fully within the realm of traditional 
interstate politics.” (Hoffmann 1965, 88; Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 139). Moravcsik 
argues from the viewpoint of liberal intergovernmentalism that “the primary source of 
(European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative 
power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991, 75, cited in Wong 2007, 323). Many 
scholars argue among the same lines that EU foreign policy is not an independent 
variable, but a variable dependent on the roles played by member states themselves – 
especially the larger and more powerful ones, in fashioning EU structures and policies” 
(Wong 2007, 328). In other words, large member states can project their national goals 
into CFSP or try to increase their international influence with the help of larger 
European backing. Similarly, Wivel sees that “[e]ven though EU security institutions 
have been formally strengthened, they have been de facto marginalized in the sense that 
it has become still more acceptable for big EU Member States to create informal ad hoc 
directorates as illustrated in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan” (Wivel 2005, 
405).  
 
However, and coming to the viewpoint adopted in this study, states may not simply 
withdraw from multilateral cooperation if they see that the benefits accruing from 
cooperation do not compensate the costs incurred. Consequently, the CFSP “has become 
a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, 
and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining 
others” (Wong 2007, 382; see also Øhrgaard 1997, Bátora 2005). Rieker has suggested 
that the EU is to be regarded as “a comprehensive security actor”. She adopts a broad 
definition of security and concludes from that perspective that the “EU’s potential to 
coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and military – makes it 
one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War context” (Rieker 2004, 
370). Rieker sees that the EU’s comprehensive security approach contains both an 
internal and external dimension. As concrete examples of the latter she presents the 
enlargement process, the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean 
                                                  
57 Koenig-Archibugi defines Community method as “a complex set of institutional rules and practices that ensure a 
prominent role for supranational agencies and a high level of legalization” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 139). 
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Partnership, the programme for Conflict Prevention and ESDP. Examples of EU’s 
comprehensive internal security policy, then, include the European police cooperation, 
civilian protection and on the fight against money laundering which all are seen as 
efforts made in order to combat terrorism. (Rieker 2004, 370; also Rieker 2006.) 
 
Furthermore, the recent developments in CFSP and ESDP have challenged the 
traditional assumption that European integration in security and defence is impossible or 
highly unlikely (Ojanen 2006, 57). Effective military capabilities have started to appear 
in form of EU battle groups, military crisis management operations and other 
instruments of intervention, and related politico-institutional frameworks (see Howorth 
2007). In the connection of the Constitutional Treaty a terrorism-related solidarity clause 
and even a mutual defence clause were initiated. The creation of CFSP and ESDP and 
EU member-states continuous efforts to create effective institutional structures and to 
formulate common policies “challenge realist assumptions about the limits of 
cooperation and pose a general problem for IR theory, as they question the notion of 
state sovereignty” (Gross 2007, 503). The EU is “neither a state, nor a traditional 
alliance, and it therefore presents a heterodox unit of analysis” (Andreatta 2005, 19). 
Howorth sees the emergence of ESDP in many ways a shocking and surprising 
development that has posed a particular challenge to theories that see security and 
defence policy as the exclusive domain of sovereign nation-states (Howorth 2007, 22-
32). Hence, it can be seen that CFSP has significance not only in the light of being a 
“critical sociological force” but in terms of harder, non-discoursive terms, too. We can 
safely agree with Hill and Wallace in that even though the precise implication that the 
CFSP has for national foreign policy is a matter of contention in the academic literature, 
few analysts would probably disagree with the observation that CFSP has “moved the 
conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state national sovereignty model 
towards a collective endeavour, a form of high level networking with transformationalist 
effects” (Hill and Wallace 1996, 6; Aggestam 2004, 81.) As Whitman has concluded “it 
now seems more appropriate to suggest that EU Member States conduct all but the most 
limited foreign policy objectives inside a EU context” (Manners & Whitman 2000, 243).  
 
The arguments presented in the debate on CFSP development have varied considerably, 
but certain consensus seems to exist on the main development trend: the pressure 
towards more concrete European solutions is increasing, and contrary to earlier attempts 
some tangible moves have been made. A traditional military-oriented security 
conception started gaining significance in the European integration process since the 
1990s.58 There has clearly been a shift towards multinational defence planning and the 
                                                  
58 The trend is clearly reflected in for instance the following EU documents: Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998 
(St.Malo Declaration); Helsinki Headline Goals 1999; Petersberg tasks (Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union), 
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“post-national” legitimisation basis of armed forces in Europe. The field of defence is no 
longer seen as a “no-go” area for the EU competence. The idea that “the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” 
(Treaty on the European Union 1992) undoubtedly gained more credibility in the 1990s. 
Similarly, the traditional security and military sector have gained weight in the EU’s 
security conception (see Palosaari 2009). The events of the 1990s support the argument 
that common foreign and security policy has developed from “verbal acrobatics” to new 
institutions and military capabilities commitments with great ease and velocity (Ojanen 
2002; Ojanen et al. 2000, 35-36). All this has changed the tone in which issues like 
common standards, planning, the operating procedures of the armed forces, and even the 
common defence are discussed. The velocity of events has surprised many observers.59 
 
In a social constructivist perspective described in the previous chapter the decisive 
factors regarding CFSP’s ability to cause Europeanization on the national level lay 
chiefly in the perceptions of actors. The EU has managed to construct itself as an 
international actor, with its own interests and policies, vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(Larsen 2004, 69). To a large extent other international actors also have conceived of it 
as an international actor (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999). Whereas in the rationalist 
reading there is still considerable room for hesitation and debate, from the constructivist 
point of view it seems clear that the EU constructs itself as an international actor which 
defends its own interests and has an obligation to take responsibilities in the light of 
international challenges (Larsen 2000). This discursive practice constructing the EU as 
an international actor is reflected in policy practice. Larsen has argued that ”[u]ntil 1998, 
the dominant EU discourse was one which stressed the role of civilian means in the 
foreign policy of the Union in relation to solving concrete international issues […] 
Union in the 1990s has constructed itself as a political power which should draw on its 
political, economic and military means to further its political goals” (Larsen 2004, 71). 
In the new dominant discourse it is articulated that access to military means might be 
beneficial in responding to international crises and in contributing to international peace 
and stability, so that the Union has access to the full scope of instruments” (ibid., 72; see 
also Palosaari 2009). 
 
Previous Europeanization studies have shown that CFSP indeed causes misfits between 
the European and domestic level as well as adaptational pressure and thus has 
Europeanization effects leading to changes in state’s foreign policy as a result of 
national and European interactions (Gross 2007). For instance, research has indicated 
changed working patterns among the diplomats of the EU member-states resulting in a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (Cologne European 
Council Declarations 1999, Annex III); Security Strategy of the EU (European Council 2003). 
59 Ojanen noted in 2002 that mainstream integration theories are “momentarily at a loss” (Ojanen 2002). 
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coordination reflex going beyond calculated exchanges of information (Nuttall 1992, 
Forster & Wallace 2000, Tonra 2001). Gross notes that Europeanization studies have 
also documented changes in national foreign policy as a result of EU accession in the 
case of Ireland (Keatinge 1984) and Spain (Torreblanca 2001). Rieker has shown that 
the EU has developed a foreign and security policy discourse independent of its member 
states, and that this comprehensive EU security discourse has influenced the security 
approaches of Sweden, Finland and the non-EU-member Norway (Rieker 2006). Rieker 
sees that “[w]ith the EU becoming an increasingly important provider of security, as 
well as being more integrated than other multilateral frameworks, there is good reason to 
expect that its security approach will also have an impact on how security is defined at 
the national level” (Rieker 2006, 511). 
 
In the following an overview on the key events in the development of CFSP and ESDP 
is presented. The purpose is to provide necessary background information for the 
empirical analysis, as these events are frequently referred to when the Finnish reactions 
and contributions (that is, downloading and uploading) to the development are assessed. 
When found necessary some of these events are described in more detail later on in 
connection with the empirical analysis. As was noted in the previous chapter (see 2.6 on 
material and methodology) the empirical analysis is divided into three phases (1994-
1996, 1997-2002, 2003-2007) within which the characteristics of the Europeanization 
process differ. In this variation the events at the European level have naturally played a 
significant role. 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s – before the fourth enlargement and Finland’s accession – 
major changes took place in the EC’s approach to security policy. At Maastricht, for the 
first time, the member states incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty the objective of a 
“common foreign and security policy”60. The European Political Co-operation became 
the CFSP and one of the three pillars of the European Union. The Western European 
                                                  
60 Already in the 1950s, an idea and initiative on European Defence Community was presented. The pressure from the Cold 
War, notably the communist expansionism in Europe and Korea, provoked this. Despite the then clear linkage between 
security and integration (and all the introductions of the idea of a European army during and between the World Wars), the 
French proposal of European Defence Community with a European army did not succeed. The so-called Pléven plan aimed 
to create an integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of negotiation between the member 
states of the ECSC from 1950 to 1952, and led to the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community 
(EDC). An outcome of the creation of the EDC was a political project, presented in 1953, for creating a federal or 
confederative structure. The “European Political Community” would have created a two-house Parliamentary assembly, a 
European executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The political Community was to have very wide 
powers and responsibilities and was, in the long run, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, it never came to fruition 
since the French National Assembly rejected it. (Pinder 2001, Urwin 1995.) On the pre-CFSP development see also Dinan 
1994 and Preston 1997. Tonra divides the evolution of the institutional framework into three periods which he calls “the 
skeleton of a procedural infrastructure (1969-1980), “putting policy muscle on the bones of a procedure (1980-1988); and 
“developing a stronger physique” (1988-1993). As the titles indicate, via the historical review Tonra documents significant 
advancing in the institutional development. 
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Union (WEU) was defined as an integral part of the development of the Union and a 
reference to common defence was for the first time included in the treaty. Qualified 
majority voting was introduced in matters of procedure, and “common positions” and 
“joint actions” were created. The often quoted article of the treaty notes that “[T]he 
common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of 
the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in 
time lead to a common defence.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 39; Treaty on the European Union, 
article J.4.1.) 
 
At least the interpretation by the European Commission of this change was an 
enthusiastic one:  
 
“Since the Treaty’s entry into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union as 
such can make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on 
armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental 
principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and 
which it is committed to defend” (European Commission 2003).  
 
These comments refer clearly to the alleged need to further strengthen the political 
security structures, and prepare the whole organization and its members for new types of 
decision-making procedures in questions related to foreign and security policy. The 
experienced weakness of joint European foreign policy tools in dealing with the crises 
related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), collapse of Yugoslavia (1990-91) are 
likely to have boosted the CFSP development (Archer 2008, 10; Howorth 2007, 55). Yet 
at this point the overall Europeanization pressure emerging from CFSP on member 
states can be considered rather modest since CFSP as a policy was at an early and 
largely conceptual stage. But for the new member states, and particularly for Finland, 
there were significant adaptational pressures emanating from the newly established 
CFSP. These were also reflected in the Finnish EU accession treaty in that it included a 
declaration in which Finland committed to CFSP without any national preconditions or 
constrains (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy 21.12.1993; see 
chapter 4.1 below).  A number of other features that increased the domestic impact of 
CFSP in the Finnish case can also be located. One can, for instance, refer to the general 
Musterknabe attitude, that is being a constructive and responsive member state, adopted 
by Finland in relation to European integration. Together with Finland’s aim in its 
integration policy to secure a place in the EU’s core this attitude materialized as an 
active support for CFSP development. I will come back to the factors that facilitate the 
Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy in chapter 3.2 below when 
discussing the distinctive features of Finnish state identity in the context of 
Europeanization and the proneness of Finland to Europeanization.  
 69
 
According to Howorth in the mid-1990s the European mainstream in the development of 
the national armed forces was largely about modernizing of armed forces into more 
mobile, rapid reaction and power projection form. The Cold War era European states’ 
static line defences, based on mass mobilisation of conscripts, artillery and tanks were 
now considered outdated and unsuitable for the new post-Cold War circumstances. The 
Gulf War (1991) lessons revealed Europeans’ dependence to US military technology, 
their armies’ ineffectiveness and inappropriateness in such post Cold War crisis 
management. A new strategic culture was emerging according to which new assets were 
needed, and the first line of defence was to be moved abroad, in the form of 21st century 
crisis management missions. Howorth argues that the development towards ESDP also 
can be seen part of this process where European states, UK and France and NATO too 
started to change from the Cold War territorial defence objective to the new post-Cold 
crisis management tasks.61 Simultaneous and interlinked transformation processes were 
ongoing: professionalisation, modernisation, rationalisation of armament and defence 
planning. In professionalisation and abolishing conscription the motivation lied not only 
in transforming the militaries into deployable forces for overseas crisis management, but 
for many countries the purpose was also to downsize and reduce the military budget 
(such as Belgium, Spain and many CEE countries). At the same time the new wide 
security concept spread from the academic world into think tanks and to politics and 
eventually found its place in national security strategies. (Howorth 2005, Howorth 
2007.) 
 
The provisions of the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into 
force on the 1st of May 1999. Co-operation in the field of armaments was mentioned as a 
way in which the member states, as they consider appropriate, can support the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy. The treaty referred to the defence of 
the territory of the Union in that it adds to the CFSP the objective of safeguarding the 
integrity and independence of the Union. Thus the EU was defined as a referent object 
for security politics. Moreover, such terms as “integrity” and “independence” carried 
rather traditional security connotations. The treaty also included the tasks of preserving 
peace and strengthening international security, including the security of the EU’s 
external borders. Furthermore, common strategies were added to the tools of CSFP. The 
treaty also established the post of a High Representative for the CFSP to represent and 
also to assist in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions. A 
policy planning and early warning unit was also established to assist in achieving shared 
views and assessments. The purpose of all these structures has been to contribute to the 
                                                  
61  According to Howorth this change is manifested in UK Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Defence Reviews of 1994, 1995 
and 1998; new NATO Strategic concept of 1991; and in France’s Defence White Book of 1994 (Howorth 2007, 97-98).   
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political strength and credibility of the EU as an organization and actor to be reckoned 
with in international politics.  
 
In this phase the institutional development was relatively successful; the Amsterdam 
Treaty indeed gave the CFSP new instruments while strengthening its consistency with 
the European Community’s traditional external activities. The EU now had political and 
administrative structures enabling it to speak “with a single voice” in international 
politics. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the so-called “Petersberg 
tasks” into the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. This meant that the EU became an actor in the field of crisis management 
with the competence to deploy military resources as part of its response to international 
crises (Ojanen et al. 2000, 40; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; see also chapter 5 on the 
Finnish-Swedish initiative to bring the WEU’s Petersberg tasks into the ESDP’s range of 
activities). 
 
This development was strengthened in the Cologne European Council meeting in June 
1999 as crisis management tasks were placed at the core of the process of strengthening 
the European common security and defence policy. The European Council decided that, 
to this end, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. The 
Union’s relationship to NATO was also discussed in detail in a Franco-British summit in 
November 1998 that led to the so-called St. Malo Declaration. Before that the member 
states, France and Britain particularly, were divided on issue of European security and 
defence policy.62 Now it was seen, however, that the EU “must have the capacity for 
autonomous action backed by credible military force” (Joint Declaration on European 
Defence 1998). The St. Malo Declaration defines three sorts of multinational military 
operations involving Europeans feasible: NATO missions, “autonomous” EU missions, 
and EU missions that use NATO assets (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998). 
This summit also played a central role in launching a new phase in European defence 
issues, especially in the creation of decision-making institutions and in the commitment 
to increased European defence capabilities. (Bonnén 2003, 45-46; Archer 2008, 10; 
Howorth 2007.) 
 
Some have labelled the development of a common EU security and defence policy 
between December 1998 and December 2000 revolutionary, at least compared with the 
slow progress made during the preceding half century (Rutten 2002). The Union was 
                                                  
62 For a long time France had already wanted the EU “to act like a responsible power on its own security identity” (Lang 
1998), but Britain had twice vetoed Franco-German proposals for a joint EU defence force in the 1990s.  
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now provided with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its 
security, including the gradual formulation of a common defence policy – this means 
that the European Security and Defence Policy forms part of the CFSP. This common 
defence policy could lead to a common defence if the European Council were so to 
decide and the decision was adopted and ratified by the fifteen member states. It was 
stated that ESDP does not, however, affect the specific nature of the security and 
defence policies of certain member states, and is also compatible with the policy 
conducted in the framework of the NATO. 
 
The Cologne European Council also charted an 18-month timetable to put in place the 
necessary decision-making framework and operational capabilities.63 The Cologne 
Summit decided on the institutional framework for European defence. The ESDP issue 
was developed further in that the EU’s Political and Security Committee (COPS, 
according to the French acronym) would co-ordinate the CFSP on daily basis, EU 
Military Committee would give military advice to COPS, and EU Military Staff 
(consisting mainly of former WEU personnel) would be a planning organ. Successive 
European Councils have given more substance to the process that aims to give the Union 
the capacity for autonomous action in international crisis management, where NATO as 
such is not engaged. Accordingly, the strengthening and securing of the capability of the 
EU to act autonomously in international politics gained an increasingly central role in 
the way the EU perceived security politics. 
 
The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 decided to proceed toward 
the practical implementation of the ambitions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne 
European Council Declaration. It was decided to establish a European military capacity 
to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks. The Helsinki European Council defined 
the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. For the Union this meant being able, 
by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, a rapid 
reaction force of up to 60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of 
Petersberg tasks. It was also decided that new political and military bodies and structures 
would be established within the Council to enable the Union “to ensure the necessary 
political guidance and strategic direction to such operations” (European Council 1999b, 
Annex III). Furthermore, a non-military crisis management mechanism would be 
established to co-ordinate and make the various civilian means and resources more 
effective, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the member 
                                                  
63 See Presidency Conclusions, especially points 55-56, and Annex III, which includes the “European Council Declaration 
on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” and the “Presidency Report on Strengthening of 
the common European policy on security and defence” (European Council 1999a). 
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states (European Council 1999b, Annex IV64). A subsection of ESDP devoted to 
civilian crisis management (CCM) was established in Feira European Council in 2000. 
The priority areas of civilian crisis management were identified as police, strengthening 
the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection (Rutten 2001, 
134; Howorth 2007, 125). CCM was advanced in conceptual and programmatic terms 
especially during the Swedish EU presidency in 2001. The first Civilian Crisis 
Management Capability Conference of EU ministers took place in 2002. 
 
The Nice European Council summit decided to establish within the Council new 
permanent political and military structures to provide political control and strategic 
direction in a crisis, namely the above-mentioned Political and Security Committee and 
Military Committee, as well as the military staff composed of military experts seconded 
by the member states assisting the latter. Among the documents dealing with the 
“implementation of the defence initiative” was a paper entitled “Military Capabilities 
Declaration”. Although it is explicitly noted in the declaration that it “does not involve 
the establishment of a European army”, the declaration aroused interpretations 
suggesting that it “in reality will establish the European army” (EU-Observer 2000).65 
All in all we can conclude that the institutional development from 1992 to 2002, 
regarding both civilian and military aspects, significantly increased the potential of 
CFSP and ESDP to cause Europeanization pressure on the member states. 
 
In the Laeken European Council in 2001 ESDP was finally declared functional: “the 
Union is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” (European Council 
2001, Annex II). Since that, ESDP has evolved both in terms of institutional framework 
for decision-making and military and civilian capabilities for power projection and crisis 
management in and outside Europe. According to Howorth the EU’s entire “military 
mindset” has transformed: the EU is now engaging autonomous military and policing 
missions under a European command chain and the European flag (Howorth 2007). The 
first ESDP operation was launched in 2003 (EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). In addition to the establishment of EU battle groups in 2007, there has 
been EU military missions in Macedonia (2003), DR Congo (2003, 2006), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2004-), Chad and Central African Republic (2008-) and the coast of 
Somalia (2008). In the field of civilian crisis management operations have taken place 
                                                  
64 Annex IV contains the “Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on ‘Strengthening the Common European 
Policy on Security and Defence’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union”. 
65 The documents produced by the Nice summit also include points concerning the relationship between the EU and NATO, 
such as the links between the EU and NATO members not in Union, and standing arrangements for consultation between 
the EU and NATO. These relationships were discussed already in Helsinki where the main items were the development of 
an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led 
military operations in response to international crises. Also the “consultation, co-operation and transparency” between the 
EU and NATO, as well as the need to avoid unnecessary duplication, were emphasised. 
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e.g. in Macedonia (2004-2005, 2006), Palestinian territories (2005-), Georgia (2004-
2005, 2008), Aceh (2005-2006), Iraq (2005-), Sudan/Darfur (2005-2006), DR Congo 
(2005-) and Kosovo (2008-). (European Council 2009.)  
 
In December 2003, the European Council in Brussels accepted the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” which sets out the normative 
strategic thinking behind ESDP (European Council 2003, Howorth 2007, 199). 
According to Howorth ESS reflects a comprehensive security view, meaning that 
security is seen as indivisible and it addresses basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, economic and environmental cooperation as well as peace and stability. ESS 
also draws on human security and pays attention to “interdependent global goods” such 
as physical security and stability, enforceable legal order, open and inclusive economic 
order, general wellbeing, health, education and a clean environment. Howorth sees ESS 
a compromise between different cultures and approaches among the EU member states. 
In the global security environment ESS pays attention to the root causes of poverty and 
global suffering. It identifies five key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts. When outlining the EU’s strategic 
objectives ESS stresses two features: the first line of defence will often be abroad (via 
conflict prevention, that is), and none of the new threats are manageable through purely 
military means. ESS contains commitment to upholding and developing international 
law and recognizing the UN as the main source of international legitimacy. ESS placed a 
new emphasis on using the EU’s powerful trade and development policies in a 
conditional and targeted way, but also mentioned the need to develop a strategic culture 
that fosters “early, rapid and, where necessary, robust intervention. (Howorth 2007, 200-
203; see also Biscop 2005.) 
 
The ESDP operations, together with the European Security Strategy have clearly added 
a new dimension to the Europeanization of national foreign and security policies of the 
member states. We will come back to these issues development in chapters 5 and 6 when 
analysing the Finnish reactions and contributions to the ESDP development. 
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3.2 Finland as the receiver: Beyond structural changes  
 
In light of the previous studies focusing on institutional change rationalist 
institutionalism draws attention to a number of relevant topics for Europeanization 
studies in the Finnish case. (As defined in chapter 2 according to the rationalist 
institutionalist perspective Europeanization is about bureaucratic reorganization and 
constitutional change, adaptation of domestic structures, projection of national policy 
models, and domestic change through differential empowerment of actors.) The studies 
often refer to the connections of the EU membership and the new Finnish Constitution 
(2000) that changed the national decision-making structure of foreign and security 
policy. The Constitution distinguishes between ”traditional foreign policy”, belonging to 
the President (in cooperation with the Government), and ”EU affairs”, being the domain 
of the Prime Minister.66 It has been argued that a major reason for this strengthening of 
Prime Minister’s power was the EU-membership: it was considered natural that Finland 
was represented by the Prime Minister among the other prime ministers of EU-members. 
And in order to be a trustworthy and credible partner in that group, the Finnish Prime 
Minister needed a suitable and sufficient mandate (Forsberg 2001, Meres-Wuori 1998). 
In this respect, the reason and pressure for increasing the Prime Minister’s power was 
caused by the European interaction. 
 
Previous studies have indicated that the Government and Parliament have gained more 
power when it comes to foreign policy-making in the national decision-making system. 
A reason for this is that as it has become more and more difficult to draw the line 
between issues regarding European integration belonging to the domestic and foreign 
policy sphere, it made sense to parliamentarize foreign policy – similarly as in other EU 
member states. The Constitution of 2000 reflects the parliamentarization and the 
increase of the Prime Minister’s status by giving decision-making power in all EU-
issues, foreign and security policy included, to the Government. The President is 
responsible for the “traditional”, non-EU foreign policy in cooperation with the 
Government. A usual conclusion has been that the Constitution clearly moved power in 
foreign and security policy-making from the President to the Prime Minister and the 
Council of State – partly because the majority of foreign policy issues can be seen to 
have a connection to EU affairs in one way or the other. This development has been 
strengthened also by the termination of the Defence Council [puolustusneuvosto] in 
2000 and the moving of its main tasks to Government’s Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
                                                  
66 According to the old model the President decided on Finland’s relationships with other states. The Parliament had a role 
when decisions on war and peace were made. Additionally, it was stated that the borders of Finland could not be changed 
without the consent of the Parliament. (Jansson 1987, 73.) 
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and Security Policy. Additionally, the previous studies have pointed out that the Prime 
Minister’s position has been strengthened in that the EU secretariat is responsible for the 
coordination of EU affairs has been relocated from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to 
Prime Minister’s Office and is now called Government Secretariat for EU Affairs. 
(Forsberg 2002, Tiilikainen 2007.)  
 
From the perspective of Europeanization these examples of institutional changes that 
have often been traced to the EU membership’s impact fall into the category of thin 
Europeanization and related rationalist institutionalist reading of institutions. In a 
theoretical Europeanization framework a problem is, however, that in these cases it 
would be difficult to demonstrate a clear misfit-pressure that would be the sole or key 
cause of the change in question. In fact, the whole rearrangement of Finnish decision-
making on foreign and security policy could be quite convincingly explained by 
referring to the general parliamentarization of that policy field (on the 
parliamentarization of Finnish foreign policy see Raunio 2008). Thus the change 
becomes part of a broader process of decreasing the presidential powers – a process that 
can be seen as independent of European integration. Forsberg and Vogt (2003) have 
pondered upon this ”measuring problem” of Finland’s Europeanization as follows:  
”It is not fully clear how much of the recent change in Finnish foreign policy can 
be explained by the EU-membership. In any case, it cannot be said that the change 
is exclusively due to the membership, since the Finnish EU-entrance and the 
consequent adaptation to the common foreign and security policy were largely 
due to deeper forces of change in the international position of Finland. Many of 
the rearrangements would have been made even if Finland had not joined the EU; 
but at the same time it seems undisputable that the membership has speeded up, 
deepened and widened the change of Finnish foreign policy.” 67 (Cursives added.) 
 
Another significant impact of the EU membership highlighted by the previous research 
which can be interpreted as thin Europeanization concerns the general structural changes 
in Finnish foreign policy. After the EU accession a considerable amount of bilateral 
relations with other European states became part of internal EU cooperation. A portion 
of Finland’s foreign policy got converted in this sense into domestic policy. A 
                                                  
67 Original text in Finnish: “Ei ole tietenkään täysin selvää, kuinka paljon Suomen ulkopolitiikan viimeaikaisesta 
muutoksesta voidaan suoranaisesti selittää Euroopan unionin jäsenyydellä. Joka tapauksessa muutosta ei voida palauttaa 
yksinomaan jäsenyyteen unionissa, sillä liittyminen ja sitä seurannut sopeutuminen yhteiseen ulko- ja 
turvallisuuspolitiikkaan on ollut paljolti seurausta syvemmistä muutosvoimista Suomen kansainvälisessä asemassa. Mikäli 
Suomen jäsenyys EU:ssa ei olisi toteutunut, monet uudelleenlinjaukset olisi todennäköisesti tehty muutenkin, mutta samalla 
lienee kiistatonta, että jäsenyys on vauhdittanut, syventänyt ja laajentanut Suomen ulkopolitiikan muutosta.” (English 
translation by the author.) 
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documented structural consequence of this has been that the competence of the 
traditional foreign policy actors, such as the President and Foreign Ministry, has 
declined, whereas the Government, Parliament and sectoral ministries have gained more 
competence. (Tiilikainen 2007, 186; Jyränki & Nousiainen 2006.) Another change took 
place when a significant part of Finland’s relations with other international actors was 
incorporated in EU’s external affairs and CFSP. On the one hand, Finnish-Russian 
relations, for instance, became part of the common position making. On the other hand, 
CFSP introduced new geographical areas and issues to the Finnish agenda which started 
to require Finland’s own contributions and position taking. (Tiilikainen 2007, 186.)68 
 
The previous studies suggest that the national decision-making structure has clearly 
changed, and possibly Europeanized (cf. the RI-oriented claim on differential 
empowerment), but attempts to unambiguously verify the source of change and the 
chain of causality soon run into trouble – or into complex “contra-factual” thinking on 
whether or not certain changes could have happened without the EU-membership. All in 
all, analysing Europeanization of such issues proves out to be problematic if the 
approach used rests merely on rationalist measurement and straightforward causal 
thinking.  
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, national projection is usually seen as a domain 
of the bigger EU-members (Wong 2005, 137). Still, in light of the previous studies it 
would seem possible to apply a bottom-up approach to the Finnish case to a certain 
extent, too. For instance the Finnish initiatives on the Northern Dimension of the EU or 
civil crisis management (in the context of the so-called Petersberg tasks) can be read as 
Finland’s attempts to “customize” the EU into a form that is more suitable and useful for 
Finland (Ojanen 1999). With the help of the back-up provided by the EU Finland has 
also transformed its Russian relationship from a bilateral mode towards a more 
multilateral arrangement (Pursiainen 2000). The Finnish attempts to project its foreign 
and security policy interests into CFSP (and particularly into the EU’s Russia strategy) 
as well as the promotion of Nordic governmental traditions (such as transparency) are 
further examples of such Europeanization (Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). These 
issues could be analysed as cases of national projection, but have not yet systematically 
been analysed in the terminology of Europeanization studies (however, see Haukkala & 
Ojanen, forthcoming). 
 
                                                  
68 Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reorganized from topical into geographical sub-divisions in the early 1990s because of 
the forthcoming EU-membership. Although this type of reorganization in ministries might eventually have certain 
implications on the way the national foreign and security policy is constructed (for instance by changing the division of 
power between key officials), the Europeanization impact on Finnish foreign and security policy resulting from such purely 
structural changes inside the ministries is in the context of this study regarded rather limited. 
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In the above-mentioned examples the institutional change is approached from a 
rationalist institutionalist perspective. As was discussed in the previous chapter the 
sociological institutionalist understanding is dominant in actual Europeanization 
research literature on foreign and security policy. According to that perspective 
institutional change is about the development and redefinition of political ideas. 
Collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with 
domestic understandings, cause adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes and 
may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. An obvious 
example of such institutionalist change mentioned in the previous research on the 
Finnish case is the fact that Finland has given up the notion of neutrality (e.g. Vesa 
1998, Huru & Jalonen 1995, Forsberg & Vogt 2003; Forsberg 2002, Tiilikainen 2006, 
Ojanen 2000, Rieker 2004). For instance according to Rieker the source of the 
adaptational pressures that have led to this change in Finnish foreign and security policy 
concepts appears clear: “With the establishment of a political union with a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Finland found that it would have to change its security 
doctrine to make membership possible” (Rieker 2004, 172). Similarly as with the above-
presented examples of thin Europeanization the picture is complicated by other possible 
intervening factors: in addition to the EU-membership, this change can be caused by 
”deeper forces of change” (see Vogt & Forsberg above): after the end of the East-West 
confrontation there was simply no possibility for the traditional type of neutrality 
between the two blocs (cf. Joenniemi 1993, 26). Quite similarly, the debate on the 
legislation regarding peacekeeping in the 1990s was intertwined in an undetermined 
combination of pressures and expectations of EU-politics on one hand and deeper 
changes in world politics (regarding the role of the United Nations as well as the EU’s 
international actorness) on the other (see more on this topic in chapter 4).   
 
The previous studies on Finnish EU-politics that use the identity perspective seem to 
conclude that the Finnish foreign and security policy has not been significantly 
Europeanized. A few studies dealing with the Finnish EU-membership have analysed 
the relationship between national history, identity and European integration (Tiilikainen 
1998, Browning 2002, Moisio 2003), thus leaning towards a SI-oriented approach. The 
interpretations have varied especially concerning how vulnerable to change the national 
identity is seen to be and how solid boundaries national history sets for identity. Those 
views emphasizing the historical construction of national identity are more likely to 
highlight the durability of identity – which makes it less open to the impact of 
Europeanization. In light of the studies building on historical institutionalism the Finnish 
way to approach integration is based on historical factors that define state identity, such 
as the Lutheran tradition (Tiilikainen 1998). This means that national history also 
defines for its part the current Finnish EU politics. When applied to European 
integration historical institutionalism generally tends to stress the role of prior 
 78
commitments and institutional and policy “stickiness”, which can counter the 
adaptational pressure caused by Europeanization and slow down the institutional 
change. 
 
Some of the studies, however, build on the argument that national history has actually 
been interpreted and used quite flexibly in the ”national identity project” (Moisio 2003). 
According to this reading Finland has been actively Europeanised in the domestic 
politics in that national history has been purposefully re-interpreted in a way which 
supports the current pro-integration policies. Consequently, a purpose of Finnish 
membership and active pro-integration policies has been to correct the “wrong” 
geopolitical and identity political positioning of Finland. In the same fashion the Finnish 
EU-membership has been politically presented as a natural return to home, to the West 
(Browning 2002, Browning 2008). Thus, according to these studies it has been a 
question of a political attempt to present a European narrative of Finland – and to 
present the decisions made in Finnish foreign and security policy after the Cold War as a 
logical continuum to the previous decisions. These explanations have often aimed for 
uncovering hidden intentions behind the rhetoric of the decision-making elite. On the 
other hand, they have rightly pointed to the political nature of arguments based on 
values, culture or identity – even identities are not positive truths but socially 
constructed, historically changing and under constant reproduction. 
 
In light of this interpretation Finland has used and uses the EU-membership and active 
pro-integration politics as a tool with which to prove the European identity of Finland. 
The EU is an instrument in making identity politics, rather than a source of adaptational 
pressure. Therefore the Europeanization of Finland does not appear deep in this reading. 
The pressure to change the direction of national foreign and security policy came from 
inside, and the EU-membership was only picked up as a channel for making the identity 
political move towards the West. This move was made possible by the end of the Cold 
War, and would thus have been possible even without the EU, too. Consequently, it was 
not a question of learning or socialisation or other mechanisms of identity 
reconstruction, but the changes required, for instance, by the sudden advance of CFSP 
were simply accepted as inescapable facts”. Moreover, attempts were made to minimize 
the negative impact of those changes on the traditional foreign and security policy by 
projecting national interests to CFSP (see the point on “customizing” above). The aim 
was thus to reconstruct a European identity for Finland but at the same time to counter 
or slow down the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy. 
 
Rieker has studied the impact of EU’s security policy on the national ”security 
identities” of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland from a constructivist/sociological 
institutionalist viewpoint (Rieker 2004). Rieker observes a misfit between national 
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security identities that are constrained by their legacy from particularly the Cold War 
period and the EU’s norms, values and rules that have been developed in a post-Cold 
War European security context without such constrains (Rieker 2004, 372). According 
to Rieker the European integration process is currently the most important tool of 
Finnish security policy and the Finnish security discourse has Europeanized – meaning 
that a new vocabulary on foreign and security policy has been introduced, and some 
changes in the way the actors define security threats and instruments of security policy 
have taken place. However, she sees that these changes have not been profound, and the 
traditional security concept still dominates Finnish security thinking. She argues, that all 
the changes that have taken place in the Finnish security policy have been legitimized by 
references to how they help to strengthen the territorial defence of Finland. Rieker 
argues that no “learning” or “socialisation” has taken place, but in the Finnish case it is 
question of mere “instrumental adaptation”. This means that there has been no identity 
change and no (social) institutionalisation of the change into a part of national thinking. 
The changes such as giving up neutrality, active support to EU-integration, political 
initiatives (Northern Dimension, Petersberg tasks) are instrumental in nature: in Rieker’s 
reading they only aim at strengthening of territorial defence. Finland’s security policy is 
thus best characterized by “continued traditionalism” (Rieker 2004, 174-175).69 
Instrumental adaptation means that reactions can be observed in the Finnish national 
security discourse for instance to the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a 
political union; development towards the ESDP as well as development towards a 
comprehensive European security approach in the EU. However, Rieker argues that all 
changes made in the national foreign and security policy are also defended with rather 
traditional arguments related to national territorial defence (Rieker 2004, 384). 
Therefore, although the impact of the integration process is most evident in Finland, 
compared to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, it is question of mere instrumental 
adaptation. This means that Finland has started to instrumentally adjust its discourse and 
actions to community norms, but at the same time tries to find “new” ways of preserving 
traditional interests. Proper Europeanization in the form of socialization and learning 
would happen only when “the actor becomes convinced by the community’s discourse” 
(Rieker 2004, 384). Consequently, Rieker’s conclusion is that there are still no signs of a 
change in Finnish security identity” (Rieker 2004, 384).  
 
What seems to connect all the interpretations presented above is that they tend to see 
that ”real” Europeanization has not taken place in the Finnish case, but Europeanization 
                                                  
69 Rieker draws the line between “adaptation” and “learning” with the help of Cowles et al. (2001). 
“Adaptation” refers changes which occur when actors merely adjust their behaviour to external factors (‘strategic 
adjustments’), whereas “learning” implies changes in actors’ preferences or identities. She also refers to the three ways of 
change defined by Goldmann (1988): (1) Learning: revision of policies in the wake of negative feedback; (2) changes in 
domestic balance of power: when a new group with different ideas comes to power; (3) adaptation to changes in the external 
environment. A fourth class added by Carlsnaes (1993) is also mentioned: actor’s capacity for innovative thinking. 
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has rather been in an instrumental role: providing (rhetorical) justifications for 
promoting old goals and interests. This lack of genuine change would also imply that the 
main features of Finnish state identity remain unaffected.70 Regarding the previous 
studies on Finland it is suggested in this study that they have often underestimated or 
failed to acknowledge the role played by CFSP in redefinition of the key foreign and 
security policy concepts. The link between foreign and security policy and state identity 
is likewise inadequately recognized. Furthermore, the following empirical analysis will 
document an escalating emergence in the domestic political debate of expectations, 
values and foreign policy goals constituted at the European level. The transforming 
interplay and frequent clashes between the traditional national interest oriented 
reasoning and more internationalized thinking in the domestic political process deserve 
to be analysed closer and through a more systematic and comprehensive look into the 
Finnish foreign and security policy discourse. By looking closer into the parliamentary 
debates and the legislative and other processes where the official documentation is 
decided on new arguments, new understandings of national interest, security and identity 
can be located. A richer and more nuanced picture of the Finnish case can be achieved 
also by stretching the time span to the years 1994-2007. 
 
Concerning the Finnish case the tentative argument thus is that the Europeanization of 
Finnish foreign and security policy might actually be more profound than the previous 
studies on the Finnish case indicate. This is mainly based on the suggestion that in 
addition to changes in the organizational structure and output of national foreign and 
security policy-making, the Finnish state identity has changed significantly due to the 
impact of European integration. Based on the theoretical views presented in the previous 
chapter it is argued that European integration has played a role in the transformation of 
the ways the central actors of Finnish foreign and security policy perceive the interests 
and identity of Finland on the international stage. “Finland” has been reconstituted in 
this process and the EU has entered the process of Finnish state identity reconstruction. 
The key concepts of national foreign and security policy – which are here seen as factors 
that define state identity – have not remained untouched by this change. This implies a 
change in the way Finland is defined in relation to the other actors of international 
politics.  
                                                  
70 Similar login can be observed in the Realpolitik-oriented explanation of Finnish EU-membership: the EU balances 
Russian power in the area, without provoking Moscow (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 1998). The assumption of non-change of 
Finnish state identity could also be supported by the argument presented by Joenniemi: For Finland, like in many North 
European state, ”the end of the Cold War did not signify the end of the East-West divide. It was rather comprehended as 
presenting a new context within with one’s position might be shifted further to the West.” (Joenniemi 2005, 144). 
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Features that facilitate the Europeanization of Finnish security policy 
 
Based on the previous research on the Finnish case it is suggested that there are certain 
characteristics in the state identity of Finland that function as facilitating factors in the 
Europeanization process and increase the potential vulnerability of Finland to 
adaptational pressures caused by the CFSP. In chapter 2 it was noted on the mediating 
factors that facilitate Europeanization in that they contain various domestic structural 
conditions (such as cultural factors, formal and informal institutions) that affect the 
impact of European integration.  
 
Firstly, it can be noted that there has been a general responsive tendency – a pursuit of a 
place in the “core” of the Union – in Finland’s policy towards EU. Particularly in the 
early years of Finnish membership, “the Finnish government was consciously trying to 
move from the periphery to the core in order to maximize its political influence.” 
(Ojanen 2007, 36; also Antola 1999, Forsberg 2001, Tiilikainen 2006, 213). This so-
called Musterknabe attitude, being an active and constructive good pupil, is often used 
to describe early Finnish EU policy (see Mouritzen 1993). The non-aligned Finland had 
to work hard against the suspicions about being potentially difficult as a neutral member 
and to participate actively in CFSP development. The logic of sociological 
institutionalist thick Europeanization is very compatible with the Musterknabe idea: as 
Ojanen has suggested “participation changes Finnish policies, and the very interests 
Finland is furthering are being defined anew in the process. Without doubt, the 
Musterknabe allegiance leads to revised interpretations. […]“The need to move within 
the majority of the EU countries, or its most active core, pushes Finnish positions: in 
order not to obstruct the others, and in order not to visibly give up its own priorities, it 
most probably has to redefine its own goals.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 119) 
 
Secondly, non-alignment can be treated as a facilitating factor to the Europeanization of 
Finnish foreign and security policy. Rather than causing obstacles or counteracting the 
impact of CFSP on Finland, non-alignment has actually become an outstanding example 
and indicator of change: it has transformed, been redefined and repeatedly reconstructed 
in the Finnish discourse.71 The implications of EU membership, CFSP and ESDP have 
been heavily debated in domestic politics. Referring to the Musterknabe issue it can be 
seen that non-alignment has facilitated Europeanization because it forced Finland to 
work hard to ensure the other member states and the EU that non-alignment does not 
make Finland a hindrance to CFSP development. Furthermore, it has been argued in 
                                                  
71 Ojanen et al. wrote already in 2000 that “while Finland has maintained its non-alignment and thus certain continuity, its 
policies and interests have changed. The results of the “Europeanisation” of Finnish foreign and security policy can be seen 
in the increasingly flexible interpretation of what non-alignment means.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 142.) 
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research literature that non-alignment has made Finland promote civilian aspects of the 
EU’s external relations and emphasize crisis management instead of defence in the 
development of CFSP as well as to lobby for civilian means and non-military aspects of 
crisis management (Ojanen 2002, 168-173). What non-alignment obviously means in 
practice in the Finnish case, is that Finland is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. This clearly increases the significance of the EU and the ESDP in Finnish 
security policy considerations. For instance, the debate on the mutual defence 
commitment introduced in the draft Constitutional Treaty carried a totally different 
weight in the Finnish domestic debate than in other member states (see chapter 6 of this 
study).   
 
Thirdly, the Finnish emphasis on efficiency in all EU’s actions can be seen as a 
facilitating factor since it has implied “open-mindedness toward qualified majority 
voting in foreign and security policy even in matters other than implementation, and 
even toward application of flexibility or enhanced cooperation in security and defence 
policy cooperation” (Ranta & Vierros-Villeneuve 2006, 305-306; cited in Ojanen 2007, 
36). Additionally, the Finnish public opinion has been positive as regards to ESDP. 
Raunio and Tiilikainen note that “[w]hen it comes to ESDP, it would seem that Finnish 
people in general support it even more than the politicians” (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003, 
135). People actually see EU membership as the factor that contributes most to the 
strengthening of Finnish security (MTS public opinion poll 2006). In this light the public 
opinion would not pose significant hindrances to the Europeanization of Finnish foreign 
and security policy.72 The overall significance of security issues was appreciated in the 
national perspective also when the EU-membership was pondered upon,  by both elites 
and the public. Huru notes that already in 1992 the Finnish political leadership quietly 
regarded foreign and security policy interests as an essential reason for joining the 
EC/EU (Huru 1995, 175). The cultural understanding of “centrality of security policy” 
has  meant  that  the  EU  has  been  seen  from  a  security  policy  standpoint  after  the  
accession as well. It has also shaped Finland’s position on the ESDP (Ojanen 2007, 34). 
 
Lastly, the small stateness can be seen as a factor that enhances the proneness of Finnish 
foreign and security policy to Europeanization. Wivel argues that small state security 
identity usually portrays the small state as promoting a multilateral and non-military 
approach to security policy based on ideals of conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence 
and a just world order (Wivel 2005, 395-396). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
states with insecure international identities, respond more to international norms than 
countries with secure international identities (Gurowitz 1999). Small state identity is 
                                                  
72 According to the MTS poll of 2006, 56 % saw that the EU should keep to its present peacekeeping and crisis management 
tasks. 27 % preferred common European defence, and only 14 % saw that the EU should completely abstain from military 
tasks. (MTS public opinion poll 2006.) 
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defined in contrast to the great power politics of strong international actors. 
Traditionally in IR small states are usually seen as the main beneficiaries, and thus also 
supporters, of international institutions. This is because institutions constrain the actions 
of great powers, facilitate peaceful conflict resolution and provide voice opportunities 
for the lesser powers. In traditional IR terms international institutions cushion the effects 
of international anarchy by regulating the use of force and reducing the importance of 
power asymmetrics. (Wivel 2005, 395-396; Antola 2002, 74-75.)  
 
Locating the conceptual vehicles of identity production 
 
In light of the research examined above there appears to be certain volatility in the 
factors which according to this research define Finnish state identity. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provided a ”situation of strong uncertainty”73 
where the previous foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy had to be 
rethought – starting from the fact that neutrality between the Western and Eastern blocs 
was no longer possible as these blocs ceased to exist. The close connection of foreign 
policy and state identity – state identity is reproduced by and in foreign policy – implies 
that the rethinking and redefinition of key foreign and security policy concepts has 
consequences on the Finnish state identity. Conceptualizing Europeanization as identity 
reconstruction rather than structural changes in the politico-administrative system guides 
attention to these vehicles of identity production. 
 
A potential way to challenge the previous studies’ conclusions on the relative lack of 
Europeanization in Finnish foreign and security policy is to underline the connection 
between foreign and security policy and the construction of state identity. This means 
contrasting the previous findings (such as the superficial adaptation of traditional foreign 
and security thinking to the changed circumstances) with a deeper change that touches 
upon the state identity – from which the foreign and security policy ultimately stems 
from. As was discussed in the previous chapter this is best done by incorporating 
constructivist IR-theory’s views with Europeanization, both concerning the sociological 
institutionalist mechanism of change and European integration as a general context of 
interstate interaction. Such a framework is instrumental in recognizing how Finnish state 
identity has changed, and what the role of European integration, and CFSP particularly, 
has been in the reconstruction process of state identity. 
 
                                                  
73 According to Checkel cases in which actors change their identities and interests – as opposed to merely adjusting their 
means and strategies (cf. RI-oriented Europeanization) occur rather rarely and usually take place after critical policy failure 
or in perceived crises and in situations of strong uncertainty (Checkel 2001). Marcussen et al. argue similarly: “Shifts in 
nation-state identities occur at critical junctures when the political environment is receptive to new kinds of social identities 
and self-categorizations” (Marcussen et al. 2001, 102). 
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As was discussed in the previous chapter the key concepts in the current Finnish foreign 
and security policy are observable in the Finnish official documentation on foreign and 
security policy as well as in the parliamentary debate and in the speeches of key 
politicians and officials – in some cases explicitly, and in other cases rather as more 
veiled political values that guide and give justification for the policy. The change in 
these key concepts of national foreign and security policy, i.e. vehicles of identity 
production, becomes apparent when one looks at the key concepts of Finnish foreign 
policy during the Cold War. Firstly, Finland was – or rather saw itself as – neutral. The 
conception of neutrality was for a long time a key issue in Finnish state identity (no 
matter how well, or by what means it was conducted in practice). Secondly, Finland was 
‘Nordic’; the Nordic countries and various Nordic cooperation forms provided almost 
the only international forum on which Finland could safely act without risking its 
neutrality. Moreover, Finland considered itself clearly a small-state, and somehow 
peripheral and Northern in a negative sense. The political conclusion drawn from this 
was that Finland could not afford to escape the Realpolitik of the Cold War but always 
had to base its policies on geography and careful consideration of current power politics. 
(Tiilikainen 1998, Rieker 2004, Forsberg 2000b.) 
 
Based on the previous research literature on Finland, and on the pre-study of the primary 
research material supported by intuitive reasoning, the key categories of vehicles of 
identity production to be looked at in the empirical analysis are defined as follows. The 
first category, neutrality and alignment, focuses on those aspects of Finnish foreign and 
security policy discourse that cluster around the change from neutrality to non-alignment 
and eventually to political alignment and defence cooperation within the frame of ESDP. 
Related to it are also domestic political debates on Finland’s position taking in and with 
the EU. The second category embraces the change taken place from UN-mandated 
traditional peacekeeping to participation in military crisis management operations led by 
EU and NATO. Conventional peacekeeping and participation in UN operations have 
since the 1950s played a crucial role in Finland. Peacekeeping has been perceived as an 
important factor in Finnish state identity and it remains a constant topic of domestic 
media interest. Behind the related changes in legislation concerning the using of 
Finland’s military assets abroad interesting and contradictory features in the domestic 
discourse can be located. There are, for instance, clearly new understandings of the 
value basis of national foreign and security policy as well as new ways of argumentation 
regarding CFSP and ESDP and Finland’s preferred relation to them.  
 
The third category, collecting together the themes in the empirical research material that 
relate to small stateness, consists of three dimensions: firstly, looking inside the 
domestic foreign and security policy-making, small stateness has traditionally implied a 
generally accepted claim for consensus in national foreign and security policy-making. 
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Regarding this question the chronological empirical analysis will, however, document a 
diversification in the domestic discourse and a gradual fracturing of consensus. “Post-
consensus” is characterized for example by policization and parliamentarization of 
foreign and security policy, meaning that previously highly securitized issues are more 
openly debated in the Parliament. Additionally, a new European level of decision-
making has entered the stage and this has had influence on the domestic decision-
making procedures and culture. Secondly, closely related to small state identity has been 
an understanding of a “legitimate security interest of small state” that rests on nationally 
defined interests. As will become evident in the following chapters these have been 
countered by a view that sees foreign and security policy interests as common interests 
and defined in common European processes. The third dimension of small stateness is 
related to geography and to the changes in the extent to which geography is seen to 
delimit the room for manoeuvre for Finland’s foreign and security policy. The emerging 
new understandings of the Finnish geopolitical position fall under this category. The 
ongoing process in which the geopolitical implications are thought over produces 
various arguments and reconceptualizations which are relevant in the Finnish state 
identity reconstruction. For instance, empirical analysis with respect to this category 
looks at the transforming roles of North/Nordicness and Europe as vehicles of state 
identity production. 
 
The purpose here is not to argue that this would be the only possible way to classify the 
key Finnish foreign and security policy concepts. But for the purposes of this study the 
above-described categorization is found useful: it structures the empirical analysis when 
trawling through the primary research material, that is to say the Finnish domestic 
discourse on foreign and security policy, for signs of sociological institutionalist thick 
Europeanization. In all these categories we come across concepts that are redefined or 
replaced by new ones during the Finnish EU membership era. Indicators of thick 
Europeanization and sociological institutional change are to be located in the domestic 
discourse as new ways of argumentation and new understanding of national interest and 
security threats and solutions. This brings the analysis, and the empirical findings to the 
level of state identity and to the question of “how has European integration influenced 
the process of state identity (re)production?” By aggregating the findings on the 
different categories and phases conclusions can be drawn in the final chapter regarding 
possible changes in the constitution of “Finland”, “self” and “other”, “foreign” and 
“domestic”. This way it can also be concluded if it is a question of just continued 
traditionalism or whether there are deeper, yet uncovered aspects of Europeanization 
that extend to the factors that define Finland’s state identity. 
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4. First phase (1994-1996): “The decision to join follows the active and pragmatic 
Finnish security policy”    
 
“Finland’s EU membership is connected with the Post-Cold War international radical 
change. The decision to join follows the active and pragmatic Finnish security policy” 
(Government Report 1/1995, 39). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Notes on the pre-accession period 
 
Finland, Austria and Sweden joined the European Union in the first wave of post-Cold 
War enlargement in 1995.74 The rules for accession were set by the Copenhagen criteria, 
which include the following economic and political conditions for membership: “a 
stable democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law, the protection of minorities, a 
functioning market economy, and the adoption of the common rules, standards, and 
policies that make up the body of EU law” (European Council 1993). According to the 
criteria, the applicants were expected to accept the acquis, which is the detailed laws and 
rules adopted on the basis of the EU’s founding treaties, mainly the treaties of Rome, 
Maastricht, and Amsterdam. The view of the Commission regarding the enlargement 
was that “widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Enlargement must not be a 
dilution of the Community’s achievements” (European Commission 1992, 11). In 
addition to the single European market and the Maastricht provisions on Economic and 
Monetary Union the applicants had to accept and be able to implement the common 
foreign and security policy (European Commission 1992). This criterion was implicitly 
aimed at the neutral applicants of Austria, Finland and Sweden (Sjursen&Smith 2001, 7; 
Sjursen 1997).75 Hence for the applicants it was a question of adapting to a common 
foreign and security policy that was clearly reflected in the membership criteria. 
 
An obvious defining moment for the analysis of Europeanization of Finnish security 
policy is provided by the EU-accession of Finland. According to Ojanen et al. “[i]n a 
sense, EU membership replaced neutrality as a new tool in security policy” and the 
                                                  
74 The Central and Eastern European Countries presented their official applications for EU membership in 1994 (Poland), 
1995 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia) and 1996 (Czech Republic, Slovenia). 
75 According to Miles the Swedish neutrality was “voluntary and active”, whereas Finland’s neutrality was “semi-mandatory 
and passive”. In his classification the Austrian neutrality was “mandatory”, “in many ways passive” and “a mathematical 
function of the East-West power conflict”. (Miles 1997, 89-92.) The Finnish Government White Paper of 1988 had stated 
that EC membership was incompatible with Finnish neutrality. 
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change from neutrality to non-alignment was a notable step towards a new security 
policy (Ojanen et al. 2000, 103). However, it should be noted that European integration 
has actually had potential impact on Finnish foreign and security policy before the EU 
accession took place in January 1995, especially during the pre-accession period and the 
membership negotiations.76 The Parliament approved the membership application in 
March 1992 and the application was submitted on the same day. The political 
commitments regarding the Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP were likewise 
agreed upon before the accession, during the accession negotiations, which started on 1 
February 1993. 
 
It was acknowledged in the Commission opinion on Finland’s application for 
membership that “Finland has indicated that as a member of the Union it will support 
the security of the other members in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and that 
“President Koivisto recently confirmed the Finnish acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire, the Maastricht Treaty and the finalité politique of the European Union” 
(European Commission 1992, 23). The Commission concluded that “Finland could fulfil 
all common foreign and security policy obligations”. A noted reason for this was that in 
contrast to some other countries the Finnish neutrality policy was seen as less developed 
and “not rooted in national or international law” (ibid., 22-23). Furthermore, although 
neutrality continued to appear as a public description of Finland’s security policy, it was 
reformulated as “military non-alliance combined with an independent defence” – a move 
that found fertile ground in Brussels (Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 254). However, in 
the European Commission’s reading there appeared to be a considerable misfit between 
Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP’s defence dimension. The Commission 
noted that Finland had “not yet fully clarified its position regarding the eventual framing 
of a common defence policy and in particular regarding the possible establishment in 
time of a common defence.” (European Commission 1992, 23) . Furthermore, it was 
seen that the anticipated effects of the policy of neutrality – “or what is left of it” as the 
report formulated – could pose problems for the Union:  
 
“The question is whether the Finnish policy of neutrality – even reduced as it 
is to its core of military non-alignment and credible, independent defence – 
might stand in the way of a full acceptance of the Union’s external policies. 
Moreover, in respect of the common foreign and security policy, the 
question arises to what extent Finland, which, as an armed neutral, has 
always laid great emphasis on the capability of defending the national 
territory, can fully share some of its objectives, such as the safeguarding of 
                                                  
76 The Europeanization literature offers several examples of studies on how European non-EU-members have adapted to 
European integration in various policy areas, foreign and security policy included (e.g. Svedrup 1998 and Rieker 2004 on 
Norway, Kux 1998 on Switzerland, and Thorhallsson 2004 on Iceland). 
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the independence and security of the Union (Article J.4).” (European 
Commission 1992, 22.) 
 
  
Regarding this question the Commission called for further confirmation and specific and 
binding assurances during the accession negotiations with regard to Finland’s political 
commitment and legal capacity to fulfil the obligations of the common foreign and 
security policy. This was needed “in order to be satisfied that this would not hamper the 
possible evolution in time of a common European defence” (European Commission 
1992, 23.) The Finnish response came in the form of Minister of Foreign Trade’s 
confirmation that Finland was ready to contribute constructively to the development of 
the defence dimension of the EU. The core of Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy was 
referred to as military non-alliance combined with an independent defence (Finland’s 
opening statement in the membership negotiations, Salolainen 1 February 1993, 
Brussels; Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 254; Ojanen et al. 2000, 100). 
 
Eventually, Finland together with the three other countries applying for EU-membership 
at the same time (Sweden, Norway and Austria) gave a declaration in which it 
committed to CFSP without any national preconditions or constraints (Joint Declaration 
on Common Foreign and Security Policy 21.12.1993). The declaration is included also 
in the accession agreement.77 When Finland joined the EU the official national 
interpretation was that Finnish military non-alignment and CFSP do not contradict with 
each other (Government Report 1/1995, 39).78 
 
Consequently, the misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy and the 
requirements of the EU accession was eliminated by a manoeuvre of national adaptation 
in which the meaning of neutrality was redefined. What also contributed to the reduction 
of the misfit was the rather narrow way in which CFSP was constituted in the domestic 
discourse: in its Integration report the government emphasized that CFSP only 
complemented national foreign policies and was limited to non-controversial areas. 
Likewise, it was stressed that CFSP did not imply a need to alter bilateral relations, and 
that the responsibility for defence would remain national, and that independent national 
                                                  
77 ”[T]he new Member States will, from the time of their accession, be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union; the new Member States will, on 
accession, take on in their entirety and without reservation all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of Title V thereof, 
and the relevant declarations attached to it; the new Member States will be ready and able to support the specific policies of 
the Union in force at the time of their accession.” (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy, 21.12.1993.) 
The EU found the newly established CFSP vulnerable, and saw that the neutral new-comers might undermine it. The 
experience with the one Nordic country that was already a member was not encouraging in this respect: Denmark had 
managed to achieve opt outs in CFSP, meaning that, for instance, it would not participate on development of common 
defence. 
78 Also e.g. MP Tuomioja 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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decision-making was still  possible.  The CFSP’s aims were seen to be in general issues 
such as peace, security and promotion of human rights (Government Report 2/1991, see 
Ojanen et al. 2000, 98). Arter has argued that the government’s references in the report 
to the core of neutrality, that is to say military non-alignment and credible national 
defence, were targeted to the domestic audience and served as a “fig leaf” used at hiding 
the political alignment implied by the Maastricht Treaty and EU-membership (Arter 
1994, 20). According to Karvonen & Sundelius “[d]uring the period after applying for 
membership, Finland’s foreign policy leadership pursued with great skill the art of 
having its cake and eating it too” meaning that Finland partly described itself as non-
aligned and partly strived for a common defence (Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 245-
246).  
 
Although it can be concluded that the reinterpretation of neutrality, a key concept in the 
national foreign and security policy, was required by the EU accession or at least 
“spurred by suspicions on the part of some EU member countries and the Commission 
about whether Finland as a militarily non-aligned country would really be able and 
willing to fulfil all the requirements linked to the eventual development of a common 
defense policy” (Ojanen 2007, 36), this change cannot be explained exhaustively by 
Europeanization and taken merely as the first indication of national adaptation caused by 
the EU. As was noted earlier, the meaning and contents of neutrality were fundamentally 
transformed by the deeper international forces of change: after the end of the bipolar 
international security architecture the traditional Cold War era neutrality between East 
and West was no longer a possible option. The process in which neutrality was 
reconstructed had actually started already in the beginning of the 1990s. Neutrality was 
“reduced to its essence” by a series of government communications and reports between 
1988-1992 (Ojanen et al. 2000, 92).79 At the same time neutrality became depicted as 
having less and less instrumental value and giving an unclear picture of Finland’s 
preferred international position (ibid., 105).  
 
The Finnish foreign and security policy did not remain unaffected by European 
integration before the accession in 1995, but in the changes that took place in Finnish 
foreign and security policy during that period a significant role was played by the large 
scale changes in the international security architecture, that is to say the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the bipolar antagonism between the Western and Eastern bloc, 
rather than by European integration. Applying for the EU-membership was rather a 
                                                  
79 “First, the doctrine of neutrality ceased to apply in broad humanitarian issues, with the exception of those where the 
interests of the great powers were in direct conflict. Secondly, economic integration was detached from the field where 
neutrality policy was applied.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 103-104) What was left then, was the military field and narrowly 
defined matters of security policy – “the core of neutrality implied staying outside military alliances in order to enable 
neutrality in war“ (Ojanen et al. 2000, 104, Möttölä 1993). 
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suitable solution, an instrument, selected in order to take advantage of the changed 
international security environment than a cause of foreign and security policy change 
per se.80 The actual Europeanization effects (and particularly the “thick” ones), then, 
become observable during the years of EU-membership, via the everyday participation 
in the European integration process in which Finland is faced with decision-making 
regarding the evolving and deepening CFSP.  
 
All in all and taking the previous in consideration the main focus of this study is on the 
EU membership era and the changes during that time – in what way being a member of 
EU has changed the national foreign and security policy. There are already a number of 
studies on the national decision to joint the EU and related political debate on Finnish 
EU application and events linked to it in the early 1990s. Likewise, the events 
immediately after the end of the Cold War, such as Finland’s unilateral revisions of 
some of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty and FCMA-treaty in September 1990 
and the replacement of FCMA-treaty by a treaty of good neighbourly relations with 
Russia in 1992 have also been covered by political scientists and political historians. 
(E.g. Moisio 2003, Tarkka 2002, Tiilikainen 1998, Törnudd 1993, Penttilä 1992, 
Möttölä 1993, Möttölä 1998, Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003, Ojanen 2000, Forsberg & 
Vaahtoranta 1993, Arter 1996, Ingebritsen & Larson 1997, Karvonen & Sundelius 
1996). Studies that reach the 21st century are, however, not that numerous. So far, 
Finland has been included only in two comprehensive studies on foreign policy 
Europeanization, both of them comparative studies: in Pernille Rieker’s doctoral study 
on the Europeanization of Nordic “security identities” (Rieker 2004) the material 
analysed ends in 2002; Juha Jokela’s study on UK and Finland reaches its analysis till 
2001 (Jokela 2010). Comprehensive studies with a time-span beyond that are lacking.  
 
Notes on the key documents and events in phase 1 
 
There are three key national documents (and the related national parliamentary debates) 
that set the tone of the domestic discourse in the first phase. The Report by the Council 
of State of 1995 titled Security in the Changing World (hereafter called Government 
Report 1/1995) given shortly after the EU accession serves as a declaration of the 
Finnish interpretation of the post-Cold War international security environment. In 
defining the new corner-stones of the national foreign and security policy it offers a 
good basis for analysing the vehicles of Finnish state identity production, their change, 
and the impact of European integration on that change. It also spells out the perceived 
                                                  
80 Hanna Ojanen has argued that although it is often said that Finland joined the EU for reasons of security – the memoirs of 
president Mauno Koivisto (1995, 554) are often referred to in this context – ”it would seem that Finland did not join in order 
to enhance its security but rather because it felt safe enough to do so, or because joining no longer affected its security in a 
negative way: Joining the EU no longer was politically controversial or compromising to security.” (Ojanen 2007, 35.) 
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security policy significance of the EU membership for Finland. Thus it is below 
analysed as the first key document of the first phase of the Europeanization of Finnish 
security policy. According to it the transition period started by the end of the Cold War 
had been left behind and geopolitical realism was supplemented or even replaced by 
value-based foreign and security policy that builds on European values (democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, and market economy).  
 
The Government Report 3/1995 (titled “Finland’s participation in the military 
implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty”) and the related Parliament’s 
Committee reports and plenary session debates on Finnish participation in a new type of 
crisis management, that is to say the IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, depict the 
national views on the novel and previously excluded tools of security policy that were 
now seen necessary. Their argued necessity derives directly from the new interpretation 
of the international security environment. In the national discourse this question revolves 
around the term “enhanced peacekeeping” (“laajennettu rauhanturvaaminen” in Finnish) 
which  referred to peacekeeping operations implemented by other organisations than the 
UN and could potentially include stronger use of force than the traditional forms of 
peacekeeping in which Finland had been involved until that. In the parliamentary debate 
these documents, the Government Reports 1/1995 and 3/1995 are closely intertwined. 
Practically the national debate is here a combination of a wide scope of general security 
policy questions and the Bosnia IFOR operation, the latter including also a number of 
very detailed and technical questions related to the operation. The third cluster of 
primary material is provided by the Government Report 1/1996 (“Finland's points of 
departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”) and the related 
parliamentary debate and Committee report and statements. In dealing with the national 
preparations for the forthcoming intergovernmental conference (IGC) it gives a picture 
of the national expectations on and attitudes towards CFSP and its further development. 
 
As will become apparent in the following analysis, the key themes rising from this 
material include military crisis management and peace enforcement, rapid reaction 
capability (the question of establishing and training of a Finnish rapid reaction force to 
be used in crisis management), the relationship between national defence and crisis 
management, and the preferred roles of the defence dimension and crisis management in 
CFSP and in its future direction. Furthermore, OSCE occupies a rather central place in 
the documentation (Government Report 1/1995 particularly) whereas the view on the 
EU’s role as a security actor appears relatively minor. Much of the EU related security 
policy issues are, however, discussed in terms of WEU. Additionally, on a more general 
level it can be noted that politics is clearly returning to foreign and security policy, in the 
sense that there are frequent calls for the traditional national unanimity in issues that are 
considered nationally vital. The government and opposition parties accuse each other of 
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breaking the traditional consensus in foreign and security policy. Often these relate to 
worries and differing views regarding the compatibility of military non-alignment and 
CFSP/ESDP. This “post-consensus” tendency gains more ground in the later phases. 
What comes to the direct references to Finland’s role and identity as an international 
actor, the Government Report 1/1995 states that the EU-membership has become part of 
the Finland’s international identity. Yet, in the parliamentary debate it is the traditional 
small state identity and non-alignment that prominently stand out. The following 
analysis will point out that below the surface, however, new views on political values 
and identity are emerging. 
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4.2 Non-alignment meets CFSP 
 
In Finland a central purpose of the Government Report 1/1995 was to spell out the 
Finnish view of the new international security environment and to define the security 
policy means by which Finland can adapt to the new circumstances.81 In doing this it 
also provided the basic justifications for the renewal of the national peacekeeping 
legislation. The official Finnish view on the post-Cold War security environment 
described by the Government Report is dominated by a “broad and comprehensive 
concept of security” which includes several new security problems, such as political 
instability, regional and internal disputes, uncontrollable migratory movements, 
nationality disputes and environmental problems (Government Report 1/1995, 10-11). It 
is seen that in addition to political and military aspects of security, “security means 
respecting human rights and consolidating the rule of law, together with economic 
cooperation and mutual solidarity in protecting the environment” (ibid, 11). In the new 
international circumstances characterised by continuing change ”security policy applies 
not only to military issues but also to all the external factors that affect the welfare and 
security of Finnish society.” Consequently, security policy also deals with ”promoting 
stable development on the basis of democracy, respect for human rights and a market 
economy.” ”It should in accordance with the broad concept of security incorporate the 
external factors that affect the attainment of Finnish society’s values and goals” (ibid, 4-
5). On the other hand, an aspect of the adopted broad security conception is that military 
conflicts are seen to possess new features too: ”armed conflicts (…) are increasingly 
connected with internal or historical ethnic or religious disputes or nationality issues. 
Conflicts sometimes lead to a collapse of state structures (…) The forms violence takes 
include violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and terrorism. The 
result of the conflicts is often a wave of refugees in nearby regions and elsewhere” (ibid, 
8).  
 
Regarding the EU and its general impact on Finnish foreign and security policy it is 
notable that the Government Report 1/1995 states that the major changes in the 
international security architecture, that is to say the end of the bi-polar antagonism 
between the two superpowers, have made the Finnish EU-membership possible in the 
first  place.  Secondly,  even  though  the  role  of  the  EU  as  a  security  policy  actor  on  a  
practical level is regarded rather limited in the sense that the significance given to the 
CFSP and its instruments is modest, the EU-membership is clearly associated with 
“cohesion security”, and “cooperational security”. That is to say it provides a basic point 
of departure in Finnish foreign and security policy from which Finland can in different 
                                                  
81 Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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ways participate in building the new European security system. It is seen however, that 
in  this  building  process  other  organizations  than  the  EU  play  a  more  decisive  and  
practical role. In describing the interrelationship of the “security policy organizations” 
the Government Report highlights the role of the OSCE: it is the organization that 
defines the relationships both between and inside states. The other organizations in 
Europe, then, base their actions and the legitimacy of those actions on the principles of 
the OSCE. The role of the EU is seen to build on its broad economic assistance 
programmes. WEU is referred to as an organization building on crisis management 
capability. NATO’s post-Cold War role is seen to be based on its superior military 
capacity; whereas the Council of Europe “possesses human rights expertise and 
instruments”. (Government Report 1/1995, 36.) 
 
Prior to the EU accession the dominant view was that even an observer status in WEU 
would be incompatible with neutrality and non-alignment.82 The European Commission 
placed direct Europeanization pressure on Finland in this issue: the Commission was not 
satisfied with Finland’s wait-and-see attitude on the WEU question (Finland wanted to 
postpone its decision on how it would relate to WEU) and contested the Finnish way of 
perceiving the WEU chiefly as a crisis management organisation. The policy misfit was 
solved as Finland became a WEU observer (together with Denmark, Austria and 
Sweden) in February 1995, despite the earlier intentions to consider the matter longer 
(Ojanen et al. 2000; 107, 146, 127). At the same time in the Finnish official discourse 
the WEU membership was reconstituted as being compatible with military non-
alignment. The government argued that “WEU is not a full-scale military alliance” 
(Government Report 1/1995, 57) but rather should be seen as a CFSP instrument in 
implementing decisions related  to peacekeeping and military crisis management (see 
Jalonen 1995, 115). The observer status was seen to increase Finnish possibilities to gain 
information and to influence without implying any change in Finland’s position as a 
military non-aligned country that sustains independent, credible defence. Any direct link 
between the WEU observer status and membership in WEU or NATO was denied 
(Government Report 1/1995, Prime Minister Aho 11.10.199483). Differing views were 
also presented in the related political debate, for instance by the chairmen of 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees (Jalonen 1995, 115-116).  
 
In the evolving post-Cold War organizational security architecture Finland placed much 
emphasis on the development of cooperative security and saw the OSCE as 
                                                  
82 E.g. chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee MP Paasio 29.11.1993 (Helsingin Sanomat 30.11.1993, see 
Ojanen et al. 2000; 107, 147). 
83 Speech on civil defence courses in Helsinki, quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000, 108. 
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indispensable.84 Equipped with a comprehensive security conception the OSCE  was 
held capable of tackling the challenges posed by the current turbulent times 
(Government Report 1/1995, 38). What was also seen to increase the importance of the 
OSCE was its nature as a forum in which Russia is included and where crises 
concerning Russia could be dealt with. With respect to UN, the OSCE’s role is to solve 
the local disagreements or to delegate them to the UN Security Council if needed. The 
final responsibility for international peace and security is seen to lie in the UN (ibid. 37). 
Compared to the later phases of Finnish foreign and security policy, it is striking how 
much faith is put on the OSCE: it is seen to offer an overarching security policy model 
and framework that embraces all other aspects of security politics and thus forms the 
foundation on which the future European security system can be built. Furthermore, 
Foreign Minister Halonen notes that the OSCE security model is closely reminiscent to 
that presented in the Finnish Government’s Report on national security policy85. 
Although the OSCE continues to hold a place in the national security policy debate 
during 1990s, it is gradually getting sidelined. In the 21st century national security policy 
terminology the “Helsinki Summit” no longer refers to the 1992 OSCE meeting but 
rather to the Helsinki EU Council of 1999 and the Helsinki Headline Goals (see chapter 
5). 
 
In the Government Report the Finnish security policy is based on the view of a ongoing 
European and global security policy transition period. The post-Cold War security 
architecture is unstable and constantly on the move. The main principle and guideline in 
Finnish policy is to adapt to this change in a controlled manner (Government Report 
1/1995, 42, 43). According to the report,  the major challenge for Europe is to construct 
a new common security order that will replace the old bipolar system (ibid, 9). Military 
conflicts inside states or former federal states are seen as threats for European security. 
The likelihood of such conflicts escalating into a European major-scale conflict is 
considered small, but yet they may harm the European value community on which the 
post-Cold War security policy cooperation is based. In addition to this potential harm 
done on the norms and principles of the new and united Europe such conflicts might 
undermine the credibility of international organizations and lead to humanitarian 
catastrophes. This is especially the case if the conflicts have their roots in local ethnic, 
religious, minority or national issues. (ibid, 19-20) 
 
                                                  
84 ”Finland supports the strengthening of OSCE’s prestige and capacity. No other institution can replace it as a value 
community.” [“Suomi tukee ETY-järjestön arvovallan ja toimintakyvyn vahvistamista. Mikään muu instituutio ei voi 
korvata sen roolia arvoyhteisönä.”] (Government Report 1/1995, 37.) 
85 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; also MP Salolainen 
16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995. 
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The more concrete security policy solutions for the above mentioned problems are 
chiefly located in stability policy, early warning methods and conflict prevention, 
peaceful settlement of conflicts and crisis management. When it comes to political crisis 
management and conflict prevention the OSCE is the sole organization referred to. 
However, the OSCE and the EU’s failure to prevent the escalation of the constitutional 
and political crisis in the former Yugoslavia into a full-scale war is presented as a 
justification for other organizations’ participation in the implementation of future 
peacekeeping operations, such as NATO and WEU. The question of participating in the 
NATO-led IFOR operation naturally brings the issue of military non-alignment into the 
national political debate (see chapter 4.3 below). 
 
Regarding the role given to the EU and CFSP in Finnish foreign and security policy and 
the related steps towards the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy the 
evidence is mixed. According to the Government Report 1/1995 the EU’s security 
policy significance to Finland actually depends on Finland’s own activity and 
contribution: the EU offers new opportunities to influence the change of the security 
environment and its stability. The EU membership is regarded as a tool for both 
advancing national interest and contributing to broader international security.86 
Concerning military security it is noted that it remains Finland’s own responsibility but 
the EU membership ”will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts 
to exert political pressure” (Government Report 1/1995, 39) – even without any 
particular military security clause in the EU treaties. Neutrality is now referred to as a 
policy of the past, which is no longer applicable since the bipolar antagonism between 
the East and West has ended. Neutrality is replaced by ”active participation in 
international political and security policy cooperation” (ibid. 39). However, it is made 
clear that this does not imply military alignment of any kind: ”The decisions Finland has 
made do not involve any military security guarantees, or any other obligations 
concerning  a  common  defence.  The  EU  is  not  a  military  alliance,  nor  is  it  an  
independent actor in the field of defence” (ibid, 39). It appears a widely-shared view in 
the parliamentary debate that although the EU-membership does not provide direct 
military security guarantees, it has preventative significance. This is illustrated well by 
the following extract from a speech by a member of parliament in the preliminary debate 
on the Government Report 1/995:  
“It is evident that EU-membership has strengthened the security policy 
position of Finland. The EU, obviously, is not a military union, but a 
political community building on common European values. Therefore the 
EU-membership does not provide military security guarantees as such, but it 
does prevent others taking decisions on the fate of Finland without us being 
                                                  
86 Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995; Government Report 1/1995, 
40. 
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able to have any influence, as has happened many times in history. (…) Any 
actor threatening Finland has to take into consideration that Finland is in a 
union with a community of 350 million inhabitants and that the EU does not 
accept the intimidation of any one of its member states.”87  
 
In addition, the adoption of a broad security concept in the official national foreign and 
security policy further increases the EU’s weight in Finnish security policy. The broad 
security concept increases the perceived significance of common values, particularly 
human rights and democracy, and international institutions in building security.88 
 
All this implies a rather contradictory picture in what comes to the indicators of 
Europeanization and the role given to EU security arrangements in Finnish foreign and 
security policy. On the one hand the official Finnish view that EU membership helps 
Finland to repel any military threats suggests that the EU is associated with a 
considerable security policy significance. On the other hand, non-alignment as a 
continuing key element of Finnish foreign and security policy is simultaneously 
stressed.89 The gap between these two aspects is attempted to be closed by a 
“construction of compatibility” through redefinitions of both the Finnish key concepts of 
foreign and security policy and CFSP (see Ojanen et al. 2000, 86)90. European 
expectations and adaptation pressures have clearly led to rethinking and redefinition of 
the meaning of non-alignment. But at the same time there is an ongoing redefinition of 
CFSP that rests on national preferences and emphasizes those aspects of CFSP that are 
seen most convenient from a national viewpoint. For instance, crisis management is 
stressed at the cost of the defence dimension of CFSP (see below). 
 
From the theoretical Europeanization perspective complete compatibility would imply 
that there is no misfit between Finnish security policy and CFSP, and consequently no 
adaptational pressure and no Europeanization process to talk of.91 However,  CFSP’s  
development makes this construction of compatibility a continuous process of 
redefinition: as Ojanen has noted regarding the first 5 years of Finland’s EU 
                                                  
87 E.g. MP Ihamäki 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on Government Report 1/1995. 
88 Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on Government Report 1/1995. 
89 Browning has suggested that this was done largely as a response to domestic expectations and in order to safeguard the 
image of continuity in the national foreign and security policy line (Browning 2002). 
90 According to Ojanen the nationally presented proofs of this compatibility were twofold: firstly, the compatibility 
argument was supported by the view that common defence was not on the CFSP agenda, and even if it did one day make its 
way onto the agenda, it would still remain in the realm of unanimous decision-making and veto right. Second main proof of 
compatibility was the assumption that the goals and values behind CFSP and Union’s policies were identical with Finnish 
ones (peace, security and the promotion of human rights). Furthermore, “it was also pointed out that the CFSP did not imply 
a need to alter bilateral relations with neighbors” (Ojanen 2007, 35.) 
91 “If there is a good fit [between “Europe” and the domestic level], there is little pressure for change at the domestic level” 
(Caporaso 2007, 29; see chapter 2). 
 98
membership, “the contents of the Finnish policy of non-alignment follow the steps taken 
by EU policies” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 86)92. Europeanization thus takes the following 
logic: when CFSP proceeds further the misfit pressure begins to build; in order to 
maintain this compatibility there is a need to reorientate national foreign and security 
policy.  
 
Debating the underpinnings of national foreign and security policy: “Legitimate 
security interest of a small state” versus European value community  
 
By looking at the Government Report 1/1995 as a declaration of the official Finnish 
foreign and security policy one is left with the impression that Finland has successfully 
adapted its security policy to the post-Cold War environment and has adopted a modern 
value-based view on security and threats shared by the European value community. In 
this picture there is no observable contradiction between the promotion of national 
security interest on one hand and that of the international community on the other. They 
are  seen  as  complementary,  being  almost  the  same.  However,  the  scrutiny  of  the  
parliamentary debate on the Government Report reveals that the picture is more 
complicated than that. There appears to be a significant tension that revolves around the 
question how national security interest should be defined, and what is the relation 
between international/European and national goals and values in it. This tension 
manifests itself in the form of political disagreement on the practical level decisions 
concerning the preferred development of national security policy, such as decisions on 
peacekeeping and crisis management operations as well as on the need of establishing 
and training rapid reaction forces. Although this disagreement does not explicitly find its 
way into the official foreign and security policy documentation93, it is essential to realize 
its existence – otherwise the picture of the Europeanization of Finnish security policy 
and the significant political processes linked to it remains incomplete. The 
acknowledgment of these tensions might be helpful also in explaining certain 
formulations in the official foreign and security policy. This is the case particularly with 
the gradual revising of the peacekeeping legislation (in 1995, 2000 and 2006). These 
differences in the approaches on security continue to play a certain, even if changing and 
somewhat diminishing, role also in the later phases of the Europeanization process (see 
chapters 5 and 6).94  
                                                  
92 Ojanen has sarcastically noted that “the most salient feature of Finnish non-alignment seems to be the continuous 
adaptation and flexibility with which Finland reformulates its position.” (Ojanen 2000, 87). 
93 Although it is observable in the form of written objections in the Parliament Committee Reports and differences between 
Committees’ Reports and Statements during this phase. 
94 From a theoretical view point a reason for their continuing impact can be seen in that they are connected to the vehicles of 
state identity production. The factors that define the state identity are often quite persistent to change and thus shifts in 
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A widely shared basic assumption in the parliamentary debate is that there is no 
significant military threat against Finland currently or in the near future. However, when 
it comes to the question of what kind of threat pictures Finnish foreign and security 
policy should be based on the views are more diversified. Two competing main lines 
appear in the domestic discourse in this respect, neither of them holding a clearly 
dominant position. The more traditionally and nationally oriented approach nicely 
demonstrates the persistence of historical factors in security thinking. It is presented that 
based on the national historical experiences on other states’ actions Finland needs to be 
prepared for the worst options too, that is to say to a situation where Russia would cause 
a military threat to Finland, much in the same manner as was realized during the second 
World War. In the core of this reasoning is an assumption of a “legitimate security 
interest of a small state”95, as illustrated by the following extract from an address of a 
member of parliament in the plenary debate on the Government Report 1/1995: 
“There is no military threat in sight for Finland. Yet, what the past centuries 
have taught us is that we have a right and a duty to prepare also for the most 
difficult and worst alternatives. This is the legitimate security interest of the 
small state.” (MP Ihamäki 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government 
Report 1/1995.) 
 
The logic behind this reasoning is anchored in a hard and narrow security conception: 
the main threat picture is military and territorial by nature. The consequent means of 
security policy, then, are based on that threat picture and security logic: despite the post-
Cold War changes in the international security environment the national defence of state 
territory is seen as the primary task and the security policy tools must be maintained, 
developed and prioritised accordingly. Furthermore, national defence should gain a 
position in which it is considered independent and credible by the other states. The 
underlined factors that define Finland’s state identity are according to this view the 
geographical location, smallness, history and the permanency of geopolitics. Such a 
traditionally oriented approach is clearly observable in a significant number of 
parliamentary speeches, both by government and opposition parties, regarding the 
Government Report. The Defence Committee of the Parliament also builds its statement 
on the same approach when discussing, in a negative tone, Finland’s participation in the 
EU’s crisis management cooperation (Defence Committee statement 2/1995, see chapter 
4.3 below). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
nation-state identities “occur at critical junctures when the political environment is receptive to new kinds of social 
identities and self-categorizations” (cf. the theoretical chapter; Marcussen et al. 1999). 
95 For discussion of the historical background of the term see Rehn 1994. 
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The traditional view is challenged by the emergence of more internationally oriented 
thinking that has its corner-stones in the interests of the post-Cold War international and 
European value community – to which Finland is seen to have committed itself via the 
EU-accession. This approach is characterized by a different type of security logic: the 
threat picture is not based on a direct territorial threat but rather there is a multifaceted 
mix of political, societal, economic, environmental and military problems that might 
escalate and cause regional, and consequently also international, instability. The key 
security policy tools in tackling these threats are international conflict prevention and a 
new type of post-Cold War crisis management in various forms. Adaptation to the new 
international circumstances and movement towards alignment are important issues 
(re)defining Finnish state identity. This implies that the ways in which Finland 
participates in international security cooperation should change accordingly. 
Participating only in traditional UN peacekeeping is considered a too limited solution. In 
contrast with the traditional view the safeguarding of national interest is seen to require 
more commitment to the mainstream European way of creating new European security 
system, preferably with the same methods as the other EU member states.   
 
The tension between these two approaches becomes evident on a concrete level when 
the issue of international crisis management is debated and contrasted with national 
defence in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report as well as on the 
peacekeeping legislation (Government Report 1/1996) and IFOR operation (see chapter 
4.3 below). Thus it is eventually a question of national disagreements on how military 
capacity  as  a  tool  of  security  policy  should  best  be  used.  The  compatibility  of  
international crisis management with the “legitimate security interest of a small state” is 
questioned in the parliamentary debate. The debate concerns questions such as: Do the 
new forms of international crisis management contribute to the pursuing of Finland’s 
security interests? Can, or should, the participation in international crisis management 
help national defence?  
 
There are different answers to these questions in the debate – and they are here taken as 
an indicator that certain vehicles of state identity production have opened for re-
definition in the political process. There are clearly different views on how Finland’s 
national security interest should be constructed. At this point none of them have 
achieved a dominant position in the domestic discourse. What is notable in this 
connection is that the traditional role and identity of Finland as an active participant in 
peacekeeping does not simply translate into a factor that would automatically support 
participation in the new crisis management. Usually, peacekeeping and crisis 
management are not seen to compose a continuum of any kind. Quite the contrary, 
according to the most conformist interpretation (e.g. in the Defence Committee 
statement 2/1995 and in related the parliamentary debate) participation in military crisis 
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management is seen to jeopardise Finland’s reputation and credibility as a trustworthy 
and stability-building actor in international politics which has been achieved during the 
decades of Finnish peacekeeping. Although the Government does not share such a strict 
view, a clear line is drawn in the Government Report as well concerning the types of 
crisis management in which Finland can participate (see chapter 4.3 below). 
 
All in all, based on the analysed material, both on the level of official documentation (by 
the Government) and on level of national parliamentary discussion, there seems to be a 
certain mismatch or discrepancy that can be explained with the above-explained 
differences in the logic of security policy reasoning: On the one hand it can be observed 
that redefined starting points for foreign and security policy have appeared and are 
visibly promoted in the official foreign and security policy line. On the other hand, a 
clear persistence of the old key concepts of foreign and security policy can be observed. 
The traditional territorially-oriented threat picture and the “post-territorial” value-based 
broad security concept are not easily merged. 
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4.3 Enhanced peacekeeping and the delicate balance between crisis management 
and national defence  
 
 
In the post-Cold War security environment Finland’s peacekeeping activities were put 
under transformation pressure. As discussed above, it was acknowledged in the official 
domestic discourse that Finland must adapt nationally to the post-Cold War security 
environment. This was to take place, for instance, by Finnish participation in the new 
forms of international crisis management. To that end Finnish peacekeeping capacity 
should be renewed to meet the challenges posed by operations that are broader and more 
demanding than before. For instance, the troops must be capable of self-defence and 
prepared to flexibly form new formations required by different missions. The new 
requirements also included the development of capacities for humanitarian protection 
and monitoring missions. (Government Report 1/1995). Linked to this was also the 
question establishing and training a rapid reaction force to be used in international crisis 
management which became a topic of intense debate and disagreement in the 
parliamentary debate (particularly in the context of Government Report 2/1996 on 
Finland’s readiness to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations). 
Eventually, the establishment of a rapid reaction force received the majority’s support in 
the parliament.96 Finland also decided to take part in the NATO-led IFOR-operation 
(and its continuation SFOR) starting in December 1995. In the domestic debate these 
two issues are intertwined.   
 
The question of establishing rapid reaction capacity and participation in international 
crisis management operations are not unconnected to the CFSP development in the 
debate. There are different national interpretations for instance as to whether the EU-
membership obliges Finland to establish a rapid reaction force or not. The Government’s 
view is that there are no particular political expectations or moral obligations concerning 
the rapid reaction force that would go beyond those stemming from the EU-membership 
generally. The connection of the tentative national plans on rapid reaction forces and 
WEU is denied in the parliamentary debate by the Government.97 However, according to 
the Prime Minister, Finland will unavoidably be faced with the question of rapid 
reaction forces, like it or not, through the international organizations in which activities 
Finland takes part, that is to say the UN, OSCE, PfP or WEU.98  
                                                  
96 Consequently, a training programme is established in 1996 and the first battalion is declared operational in 1998 
(Tiilikainen 2007, 182). 
97 Minister Haavisto 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1994. 
98 Prime Minister Aho 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1994. 
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From the opposition parties there are critical voices arguing that although the Maastricht 
Treaty does not clearly contain any juridical obligation, the Government seems to be 
basing its policy on an interpretation that the EU-membership together with WEU 
observer status cause moral and political obligations towards establishing a rapid 
reaction force capable of crisis management. Furthermore, it is argued that the creation 
of a rapid reaction force would be purposefully targeted as the Finnish contribution to 
the development of EU’s common defence policy.99 Contrast to that the Government is 
keener to emphasize the national defence dimension of the crisis management. It is seen 
that participation in international cooperation will contribute to national defence firstly 
by offering modern field experience and military expertise for the purposes of national 
defence. Secondly, in light of the broad security concept it is seen that defending the 
interests of the international and European value community will contribute to national 
security100. The participation in international crisis management is seen to have a 
defence policy dimension: 
“As well as fulfilling its national defence function, Finland must create and 
enhance its preparedness for international peacekeeping and crisis 
management operations which are more demanding militarily and also more 
diversified. Crisis management preparedness must be seen as a growing 
component in defence policy overall, and as a new tool for security policy 
and also as an element in strengthening the country’s defence capability.” 
(Government Report 1/1995, 6) 
 
 
In the national political debate and in the parliamentary handling of the Government 
Report 1/1995, however, such a positive interpretation on the defence dimension of the 
rapid reaction force and crisis management is challenged. The view of the Parliament’s 
Defence Committee is that crisis management is incompatible with and harmful to 
traditional peacekeeping:  
“In case Finland will participate in crisis management the way the 
Government proposes, it will practically demolish Finland’s qualifications to 
act as a credible peacekeeper. Crisis management and peacekeeping must be 
kept apart in time and in space. Same countries cannot operate with 
credibility in both sectors. If there are battle units and peacekeeping units 
operating under a common flag in the same target area, the actions of the 
                                                  
99 For instance MP Laakso 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
100 Government report 1/1995; see Defence Committee statement 2/1995. 
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former will be revenged on the latter.” (Defence Committee Statement 
2/1995.)101  
 
The Defence Committee attempts to draw a clear line between crisis management and 
peacekeeping. Only the latter is found suitable for Finland as it is compatible with 
Finland’s traditional state identity and role in international politics as a small state: 
”The Government report starts from the premise that Finland will not take 
part in operations which require the use of force against other states of 
parties of the conflict. The Defence Committee finds that this is the only 
solid starting point when weighting what kind of peacekeeping operations a 
small state as Finland can participate in. The enhanced peacekeeping on 
which the Government is planning fits poorly with this point of departure.” 
(Defence Committee statement 2/1995.)102  
 
The purpose of the Government, however, is to soften the division between crisis 
management and peacekeeping. This is done by introducing the concept ”enhanced 
peacekeeping” which stems from the multifaceted challenges posed by the new 
international environment as well as from  the broad security concept. In practical terms, 
enhanced peacekeeping is defined as a sort of a middle ground between traditional 
peacekeeping and military crisis management. The concept becomes a topic of intense 
debate in the parliament. Critics see it as a “homespun” construction with no 
significance or equivalence on the international level. As described by the following 
excerpt of the debate on the Government Report 3/1995, they argue that the concept is 
aimed only at the domestic audience in order to smoothen the development towards 
Finnish participation in international military crisis management:  
”The homespun concept “enhanced peacekeeping” remains unclear. It is a 
concept that is used nowhere else in the world. During the last phases of this 
process we are increasingly forced to ponder whether there is anything else 
than traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and if the middle 
                                                  
101 Translation by the author. Original text in Finnish: ”Mikäli Suomi lähtee mukaan kriisinhallintaan hallituksen 
esittämässä muodossa, sillä puolustusvaliokunnan näkemyksen mukaan käytännössä tuhotaan edellytykset toimia 
uskottavasti rauhanturvaajana. Kriisinhallinta ja rauhanturvaaminen on eriytettävä sekä ajallisesti että alueellisesti. 
Käytännössä on myös niin, että samat maat eivät voi toimia uskottavasti molemmilla osa-alueilla. Mikäli kohdealueella on 
sekä taistelu- että rauhanturvayksiköitä saman lipun alla, kostetaan jälkimmäisille edellisten teot.” (Defence Committee 
Statement 2/1995.) 
102 Translation by the author. Original text in Finnish: ”Selonteossa on lähdetty siitä, että Suomi ei osallistu operaatioihin, 
jotka edellyttävät voimakeinojen käyttämistä muita valtioita tai konfliktin osapuolia vastaan. Puolustusvaliokunnan mielestä 
tämä on ainoa kestävä lähtökohta harkittaessa, minkä tyyppisiin rauhanturvaoperaatioihin Suomen kaltainen pieni maa voi 
osallistua. Hallituksen kaavailema laajennettu rauhanturvatoiminta kriisinhallintajoukkoineen sopii huonosti tähän 
lähtökohtaan. Valtuutus voimankäyttöön kuuluu olennaisena osana jo laajennetun rauhanturvatoiminnan ominaispiirteisiin, 
kuten edellä on todettu.” (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.) 
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ground [between them] is undetermined to the extent that it does not exist at 
all.103  
 
The delicate balance of national defence and crisis management causes notable 
disagreement between the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence 
Committee. Firstly, there is the above-mentioned question of does a rapid reaction force 
increase or decrease Finland’s defence capacity and readiness. Secondly, it is questioned 
whether the participation in new international crisis management – or in enhanced 
peacekeeping  – abolishes the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional peace-
keeper or not. The Defence Committee’s view on the first question is that the 
establishing of a rapid reaction force would not strengthen Finnish defence capability. 
Quite the opposite: being expensive and funded by the defence budget it would damage 
the development of other parts of defence forces. Furthermore, it is argued that due to its 
small size the planned force would not play a significant role from the view point of 
national defence. The Defence Committee also notes that the mobilisation of the rapid 
reaction force from abroad back home to defend Helsinki, if so needed, would not be 
possible rapidly enough. (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.)  
 
The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee does not share these views. Concerning the 
first question it sees that enhanced peacekeeping would not obliterate Finland’s 
possibilities to participate in traditional peacekeeping. On the second question the 
Committee’s stance is that a well-trained rapid action force would form an effective part 
of the national defence system, if needed. Enhanced peacekeeping would not decrease 
Finnish defence capacity or readiness. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 12/2005) In 
this respect the Foreign Affairs Committee’s view is thus more in line with the European 
mainstream of that time in security policy thinking (cf. Howorth 2007). 
 
The political debate on peacekeeping versus crisis management culminated in the 
participation in IFOR operation and the related new act on peacekeeping. The purpose of 
the Government’s legislative proposal (Government proposal 185/1995) was to enable 
Finland’s participation in enhanced peacekeeping that includes various kinds of 
operations, particularly humanitarian assistance and civil protection. The purpose was to 
enable Finnish participation in peacekeeping also when the operation in question has the 
mandate for a restricted reactive use of coercive means in order to implement the 
objectives set or when a full collaboration of all parties of the conflict is lacking. 
Furthermore, the Government proposal aimed at making Finnish participation possible 
also in operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE but executed by other 
organisations, such as NATO. Finland’s anticipated participation in the NATO-
                                                  
103 MP Juhantalo 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
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administrated multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in December 1995 
played a key role in the amendment of the law. The invitation of Finland to take part in 
the operation had been given by NATO at the end of the December (Aro 2000, 54). 
Without changes in the peacekeeping legislation dating from 1984 Finnish participation 
in the military part of the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty would 
have been impossible. 
 
The task of IFOR was to keep the troops of both parties apart; to monitor the peace line 
of over 1000 kilometres; and to stabilise the situation in the country. The UN security 
Council authorised the UN member states to take all necessary measures in order to help 
ensure compliance with the military provisions of the peace treaty. IFOR had the mutual 
agreement of both parties to use force beyond the definitions of traditional self-defence 
in order to implement the peace agreement. The basic rules of engagement of the IFOR 
operation consisted of self defence, the international legal principles of proportionality 
and minimum use of force, international law, and regulations concerning war.104 
According to the Government proposal Finland would participate in IFOR with the 
strength of a “building detachment” of approximately 420 soldiers and staff, amounting 
to 450 persons total. The reconstruction battalion was to build and repair the working 
and accommodation facilities needed by the staff and stations of the Nordic brigade. 
(Government Report 3/1995; Aro 2000, 54-56). 
 
Before the national decision was made the Finnish participation in the operation was 
discussed in the meetings of the Government and the President as there is a 
constitutional demand for cooperation between the President and Government in foreign 
and security policy. The Parliament was also informed on the issue via the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and by the Government Report 3/1995 on Finland’s participation in 
the military implementation of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty (18.12.1995). 
Participation in IFOR was approved by the Parliament by the following votes: 147 yes, 7 
no, 2 absent. (Aro 2000, 55.) 
 
The national decision-making process on the issue consisted of two interrelated 
processes: firstly, the peace keeping act was amended in order to enable Finnish 
participation in peacekeeping operations which are implemented by other international 
organizations than the UN or the OSCE. Secondly, a report was given by the 
Government to the Parliament on Finland’s participation on the military implementation 
operation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty (Government Report 3/1995). The 
new act on peacekeeping dictated that a Government Report is required in cases where 
                                                  
104 SFOR, the continuation operation of IFOR began as IFOR mandate ended on 20 December 1996. There were no changes 
in the regulations concerning the authorisation for use of force, and NATO’s role as the executor of the continuation 
operation remained the same. 
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the rules of engagement are wider than in traditional peacekeeping. The operation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina met such criteria.105 Thus it was question of ”enhanced 
peacekeeping” which might include reactive and delimited use of force in order to 
secure the tasks set for the mission (Government Report 3/1995). Additionally, the 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee saw that participation in a peacekeeping 
operation implemented by an organization with which Finland had not previously 
cooperated in peacekeeping – that is to say, NATO – was a foreign and security policy 
issue of such significance that it required Parliament’s involvement before the final 
decision by the President was to be made. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 22/1995.) 
 
The Government’s justification for the proposed new legislation built on the notion that 
the international circumstances had changed after the Cold War, and as a result of this 
the forms of peacekeeping had developed into a new direction. Taking the issue to a 
very concrete level the Defence Minister explained to the parliament that the UN 
peacekeeping forces had previously been used to form a buffer between the parties of 
the crisis in question and to monitor an armistice. In the post-Cold War cases where the 
UN was asked to intervene in conflicts inside state borders, states became part of the 
picture, for instance in the form of state building or humanitarian protection tasks. The 
possibilities of the UN Security Council to get involved in various crisis situations had 
also improved – during the Cold War the bipolar antagonism had often resulted in using 
the veto by one camp or the other.106 The revising of the Finnish act on peacekeeping 
was directly linked to this development in the quality and volume of peacekeeping of the 
international community. 
 
The Government’s legislation initiative for amending the relevant legislation stated that 
the main purpose was to enable Finnish participation in a broader scope of peacekeeping 
operations, especially in humanitarian assistance and protecting civilian population. 
Consequently, this meant that Finland was to participate in operations which are 
mandated to use some degree of force and which might lack the full consent of all the 
parties of the conflict. A practical effect was that it no longer mattered which 
international organization implemented the operation, as long as it was mandated by the 
UN or the OSCE. An additional qualification was that Finland was to have some sort of 
established partnership with the implementing international organisation. The NATO-
led IFOR operation was to be the first of such cases. (Government proposal 185/1995.) 
Finland had joined the new partnership structures of NATO in 1992.  
 
A significant time pressure for the decision-making process was caused by the 
international time-table of the IFOR operation. The Government noted that in order for 
                                                  
105 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
106 Defence Minister Taina 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995. 
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Finland to be able to participate in the operation, the national decision should be taken as 
soon as possible (Government Report 3/1995). This external pressure becomes a 
characteristic feature in the revision of the peacekeeping legislation, which is also 
observable in the later cases, as will be shown in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Issues in the debate 
 
There were a number of aspects in the IFOR operation which made national handling 
smoother. First of all, despite being NATO-led the operation was clearly mandated by 
the UN (Resolution 1031 1995) and the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
peace treaty enjoyed the consent of both parties. The parliamentary debate often stressed 
the moral obligation to participate in a mission which was to return peace and prevent 
further major conflict in Europe.107 Furthermore, the operation was seen to carry wider 
significance in the sense that it included both NATO-members and military non-aligned 
states and hence contributed to the creation of a new international peacekeeping system 
as well as new cooperative European security system (Government Report 3/1995). 
Consequently, Finnish participation in the operation was generally seen as a sign of 
support to the UN’s role in the post-Cold War transition period. More specifically, the 
participation of non-NATO countries signalled that using NATO and the capacities of a 
defence union in the implementation of peacekeeping operations was not to became the 
main rule.108 
 
On the other hand, a source of more contestation was provided by the question of 
broadening the scope of peacekeeping and drawing the line to peace enforcement. 
Although the original format of Finnish participation in the IFOR operation – 
reconstruction battalion – was clearly not meant to possess military assets required for 
peace enforcement of any kind, in the context of the new peace keeping act the 
definitions of peace enforcement, enhanced peacekeeping and peacekeeping became one 
of the major topics of the debate.109 Also the possibility of escalation of the IFOR 
operation into peace enforcement or military enforcement was discussed in length. 
Questions discussed in the Parliament were e.g.: Should the troops be withdrawn in the 
case of escalation – and if so, how? What sort of procedure would the withdrawal rest 
on: was the final decision to be made by the President or the commander of the Finnish 
troops on the field?110 
 
                                                  
107 E.g. MP Wahlström 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
108 Defence Minister Taina, MP Tuomioja, MP Tennilä 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
109 E.g. MP Tarkka 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
110 E.g. MP Saari 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; MP Lindqvist 20.12.1995, follow-up 
debate on the Government Report 3/1995.  
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In the Government’s view the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
is clearly defined111 whereas the line between enhanced and traditional peacekeeping is 
more wavering.112 Traditional peacekeeping takes place on the consent of both parties, is 
neutral and contains the use of force only in cases of self-defence.113 Peace enforcement, 
then, is defined as military coercion targeted at a state or another main party of the 
conflict with the purpose of repelling or striking back an attack. Peace enforcement 
operations also differ from peacekeeping in that they are established without the consent 
of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, there is a mandate to use force as much as is 
necessary for meeting the objects of the operation.114 The difference between enhanced 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement is questioned by some MP’s in the parliamentary 
debate, but the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee sees that both are clearly 
defined and cannot be confused with each other.115 
 
Participation in peace enforcement is found unsuitable for Finland both by the 
Government and the parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee. 
Peace enforcement is seen as a task that belongs to great powers and military alliances 
and not to “small states like Finland”.116 A cautious approach on the new forms of 
peacekeeping is also observable in the title of the new peacekeeping act: ”peacekeeping” 
is not replaced by ”crisis management” at this stage (this takes place in phase III, see 
chapter 6). Furthermore, the UN and the OSCE are explicitly mentioned in the title. 
According to the Foreign Minister the Finnish approach is to follow the development of 
international crisis management and related processes in the context of the UN, NATO, 
WEU and the EU from Finland’s own starting points.117 
 
In the domestic discourse there are clearly contradicting political argumentations and 
different interpretations and ways for using concepts like ”Nordicness”, 
”Europeanness”, ”non-alignment”, ”national interest” as arguments in the debate on 
peacekeeping. The debate touches upon issues that define Finnish state identity as it 
concerns the ways in which Finland should participate internationally in the post-Cold 
War security environment. Disagreement appears on the issue of how to define and 
delimit Finland’s role in peacekeeping and international crisis management. In the 
                                                  
111 The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee supported the Government’s view by noting that the definition is 
“perhaps the clearest such document ever presented in international politics”. Paasio 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 3/1995. 
112 Defence Minister Taina 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
113 Foreign Affairs Committee Reports 12/1995, 21/1995 and 22/1995. 
114 Defence Minister Taina 31.10.1995; also Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government 
Report 1/1995. 
115 The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Paasio 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
116 The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Paasio 31.10.1995; Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995; follow-up 
debate on the Government Report 1/1995 
117 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.  
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Government’s view Finnish participation in IFOR is a logical continuation of the 
Finnish peacekeeping traditions. The Nordic dimension is presented as an additional 
factor that speaks on behalf of the continuity: as the Finnish troops are to be part of a 
Nordic brigade, the operation is also considered to be clearly connected to the traditional 
Nordic peacekeeping cooperation.118 The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee 
shares the Government’s view that the Finnish participation is a logical continuation to 
Finland’s aspirations to actively develop both the European security structures and 
Nordic cooperation (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 22/1995). However, there are 
also different conclusions on Nordicness and traditions. For example a number of MPs 
held that participation in NATO-led enhanced peacekeeping undermines Finnish 
peacekeeping traditions and might lead to a situation where Finland has to give up 
traditional peacekeeping totally.119 The Defence Committee’s statement 5/1995 concurs 
that there still is a continuing strong international demand for traditional peacekeeping 
and Finland’s good reputation and know-how in the area should thus be more visibly 
noted in the official documentation. 
 
The following excerpt from the parliamentary debate describes the issue tellingly. It 
designates how Nordic and Finnish peacekeeping traditions and the Finnish image in the 
eyes of other countries are given different interpretations and can consequently be used 
in opposing ways when debating the future of Finnish peacekeeping:  
Prime Minister Lipponen: ”We do not yet know if the Bosnia operation will 
take place, but if it does, what shall we say to Russia, the US, other 
European states, other Nordic countries and perhaps to the parties of the 
crisis who are asking Finland to participate? Would we stay out of the 
Nordic peacekeeping force, and leave our place to Poland? […] What would 
that look like in the light of Finland’s great peacekeeping traditions?  
Interjection by an MP: We should concentrate on traditional 
peacekeeping!120 
 
This clearly points to an emerging interplay of external and domestic expectations on the 
issue. On the one hand there is domestic pressures to safeguard the heritage of Finnish 
peacekeeping traditions. On the other hand, some external pressure is emanating from 
the international level. 
 
According to the Foreign Minister the status of Finland as a militarily non-aligned state 
brings in added-value to the IFOR operation particularly and crisis management in 
general: participation of the non-aligned countries Finland, Sweden and Austria – as 
                                                  
118 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
119 E.g. MP Saari 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
120 Prime Minister Lipponen, MP Pulliainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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well as Russia and Ukraine, Czech Republic, Poland – ensures that the operation is not 
implemented by NATO only. A purely NATO occupied operation might lead to “biased 
peacekeeping in that it would produce new divisions in Europe”.121 On the other hand 
the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment and participation in a NATO-led 
operation is also problematized in the parliamentary debate. The main opposition party 
sees the IFOR operation as an exception to the normal state of affairs. In the future 
Finnish participation in such enhanced peacekeeping operations is seen to require a 
Government report to the parliament and the consequent parliamentary handling every 
time.122 In the Government’s reading the implications of military non-alignment in the 
context of post-Cold War peacekeeping in Europe are not that radical. The Prime 
Minister acknowledges in the parliamentary debate that non-alignment makes Finland 
stand out from most of the other European countries. Yet, he emphasizes that military 
non-alignment does not mean that Finland would not have a responsibility to “contribute 
to European solidarity”.123 
 
According to the Government Report it is in the national security interest of Finland to 
gain peace and stability in the Balkans (Government Report 3/1995). A link between a 
potentially escalating war inside Europe and the stability of Finland’s neighbouring 
regions and the well-being of the Finns is acknowledged and not significantly contested 
in the parliamentary debate too:  
 
”The EU has its own mission of peace as the bearer of common European 
peace and stability. This is in the security policy interests of all the 
participating states, Finland included.”124  
 
Yet, contradicting political argumentation appears on what “European solidarity” 
implies in practical terms and how solid the linkage between it and national security 
interest is. Especially when it comes to Finnish soldiers and their tasks in Bosnia on a 
practical level the views become more hesitant. It is often highlighted that the real 
national interest and the main task of Finnish troops lie in national defence. 
Consequently, the conclusion is that the peacekeeping force should be withdrawn if the 
operation in Bosnia is transformed into a peace-enforcement operation. The view is that 
if the Finns are to fight, that should happen only on behalf of the motherland.125 A 
common view is that the Defence Forces should not be allotted other tasks than national 
                                                  
121 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
122 MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading). 
123 Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
124 E.g. MP Zyskowicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
125 MP Zyskowicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
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defence.126 At that time peacekeeping was organizationally handled under the auspices 
of the Defence Ministry.127  
 
Despite these differences in the interpretations, there appears to be a widely shared view 
on the changed nature of conflicts and the international security environment. The need 
for a new kind of peacekeeping under the changed circumstances is recognized even 
when emphasizing the continuing call for traditional peacekeeping and the related 
Finnish expertise and experience. Even though the IFOR operation is presented both as a 
departure from and continuity of Finnish foreign and security policy line, the Bosnia 
case is widely seen as an example of future conflicts to which the international 
community will have to react. Finland is regarded as a natural part of this international 
value community:  
”Finland cannot remain an outsider in a situation where new ways to tackle 
European and international problems in the spirit of mutual solidarity and 
cooperation are searched for.”128  
 
However, despite the emerging interplay between international and domestic norms and 
expectations, in the light of the Government Reports and parliamentary debate the 
political argumentation regarding IFOR and enhanced peacekeeping in Europe tends to 
build on a nationally-oriented perspective rather than on the adoption of and 
commitment to international values. This is to say that much emphasis is put on how 
Finland’s participation contributes to the creation of “cohesional security” in Europe 
which serves the national security interest of Finland. Moreover, although “European 
solidarity” is sometimes referred to,  references to EU membership and CFSP’s 
significance are sparse. The occasional more positive views in the debate on the EU’s 
role as a future security actor highlight the EU’s perceived mission as the bearer of 
European peace and stability. Additionally, the Balkan case is in some views presented 
as a lesson-to-be-learned which should result in the development of the EU’s security 
policy structures and tools.129 The Finnish participation in enhanced peacekeeping and 
the related amendment of legislation is not justified in the debate by common EU values 
and goals or commitment to CFSP’s development. The responsibility for Bosnia should 
be carried by the whole post-Cold War international community. Finland’s 
responsibilities originate from being part of this international value community, rather 
than from the EU membership. 
 
                                                  
126 E.g. MP Lamminen, MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading). 
127 Great symbolical value was put on this organizational solution as it implied that peacekeeping was not among the key 
tasks of the Defence Forces. MP Lamminen, MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first 
reading). 
128 E.g. MP Salolainen 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995.  
129 E.g. MP Zyskowicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
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All in all, the EU’s role in peacekeeping and crisis management was at this point 
considered to be rather modest. Concerning the EU’s role in the new type of 
peacekeeping it was simply noted by the Government that Finland was interested in 
participating in WEU’s developing crisis management action. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee spelled this out in more concrete terms: the Finnish status as an EU-member 
and observer member of WEU was seen appropriate for participation in future 
operations by the EU and WEU, provided they had a UN or OSCE mandate (Foreign 
Affairs Committee Report 22/1995). In the domestic debate the views on the EU’s future 
and preferred role in the international security system tend to be quite negative. It is 
seen, for instance, that the EU could not have limited the violence in the Balkans even if 
it had had other types of CFSP decision-making procedures or competences. Many 
addresses concur that the evolution of the EU or WEU into a security actor similar to the 
OSCE or the UN is unnecessary and unlikely.130 The Defence Committee states that 
although there can be crisis management operations mobilized by the EU in the future, it 
is important that the UN and the OSCE will remain the primary actors giving mandate to 
peacekeeping operations. The Committee also emphasizes that the new peacekeeping act 
has not changed the fact that Finland can participate only in operations that are decided 
on in the UN or the OSCE. The Government’s interest in participating in WEU’s 
developing crisis management does not strike a chord.131 Likewise, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee holds that with enhanced peacekeeping the purpose is not to connect Finland 
to the planned defence dimension of the EU – as was suspected by some MP’s. 
According to the Committee’s view Finnish participation in crisis management 
cooperation should be developed on the basis of requirements set by the international 
community rather than on the basis of the “solutions and choices that we may face later 
as results of [the forthcoming] EU intergovernmental conference” (Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s Report 22/1995132). Indeed, an additional explanatory factor for the lack of 
political argumentation relating to the EU is that the purpose of the Government was to 
keep the Government report on security and the new act on peacekeeping separated from 
the EU context. It was frequently repeated in the debate by the Ministers that any 
conclusions on the future directions of CFSP and its implications on Finland must be 
drawn after the EU’s intergovernmental conference (IGC) that was due to start 1996. 
The preparations for the intergovernmental conference were presented as a separate 
process. Therefore the Government Report 1/1995 more or less ignores any questions 
concerning the institutional aspects of CFSP.133  
                                                  
130 E.g. MP Tuomioja 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
131 Defence Committee Statement 5/1995. 
132 Also Foreign Affairs Committee’s chairman Paasio 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
133 In total, only half a page is dedicated to the intergovernmental conference in the Government Report 1/1995. 
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National preparations for the first intergovernmental conference 
 
 
Domestic views regarding CFSP become thus more observable in the parliamentary 
debate that deals with the national preparations for the forthcoming IGC. However, the 
debate is inevitably linked to the previously discussed issues since the preferred roles of 
crisis management and defence cooperation in CFSP became a major question in the 
discussions. Similarly, the clash between the traditional nationally oriented security 
thinking and the view that builds more on the perception of the responsibilities and 
benefits of Finland as a member of the international value community is observable here 
too. The parliamentary debate on the Government Report 1/1995 focused primarily on 
the changes in the international security environment, the new types of post-Cold War 
security threats and on how to respond to these new threat pictures (new crisis 
management, enhanced peacekeeping, operations implemented by other organizations 
than the UN, rapid reaction force). The broad security concept introduced in the 
Government Report was present in the debate. In this debate the European Union did not 
play a significant role. Other organizations, such as OSCE were considered as more 
decisive in restructuring the new European security architecture. The urgent question on 
Finnish participation in the NATO-led IFOR operation in Bosnia (and the necessary 
amendments in legislation in order to make Finnish participation possible) dominated 
much of the debate. This also contributed to shifting the focus from the EU into other 
international organisations and their changing roles in the post-Cold War global security 
architecture – NATO, PfP, WEU, the UN. The Finnish EU-membership is, however, 
seen as the unquestionable basis of the post-Cold War Finnish foreign and security 
policy, but this widely shared perception remains in the background in the debate. 
Therefore in order to locate primary material that directly and explicitly concerns CFSP 
and the Finnish attitude on it, one needs to look into the national preparation process for 
the IGC of 1996 (opened in Turin): the Government Report 1/1996 and the related 
parliamentary debates and Parliament Committee reports and statements (Foreign 
Affairs Committee report 7/1996, Constitutional Law Committee statement 6/1996, 
Grand Committee statement 2/1996).  
 
Concerning the Finnish position on CFSP and its further advancing, the official view 
was that Finland supported the developing of the EU’s capacity of action in the sphere 
of foreign and security policy as well as the full usage of the intergovernmental means 
based on EU treaties.134 Among the official starting points set by the Government for the 
                                                  
134 Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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IGC is that the EU is and would remain in its basic nature “an association of 
independent member states”. Furthermore, it is noted that CFSP complements, and not 
replaces, the national Finnish foreign and security policy. Thirdly, CFSP is seen to offer 
new means for Finland to carry through its national policies and also to strengthen 
national and European security. In practical terms that meant that in foreign and security 
politics Finland wanted to retain intergovernmentalism as the main form of cooperation 
(Government Report 1/1995, 57-59.) These points figured prominently in the domestic 
discourse regarding CFSP at that time.  
 
A key message regarding CFSP in the national parliamentary preparations for the IGC 
was that it is essential to have an CFSP that focuses on crisis management instead of 
defence cooperation. If a defence dimension is to be developed, it should have an 
emphasis on “strengthening the crisis management and peacekeeping capacity” 
(Government Report 1/1996). The intergovernmental nature of CFSP is supported by 
underlining the member states’ independent decision-making on participation in the 
operations and by opposing the establishment of the position of a EU “Foreign 
Minister”, i.e. the High Representative for CFSP.135 
 
Finland’s view as to the ”eventual framing of common defence” mentioned in the 
Maastricht Treaty is thus that under the current circumstances the development of 
defence dimension should mean the strengthening of crisis management and 
peacekeeping capacity. At the same token, a clear distinction is made between crisis 
management and ”actual defence”. The latter belongs fully to Finland as it is a militarily 
non-aligned state, but for those EU member states that are members of NATO it is a task 
of NATO. (Government Report 1/1996). The Parliament appears to largely share this 
view. The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee is content with the fact that no such 
issues are proposed on the IGC agenda that would ”question the security policy 
solutions of Finland and other militarily non-aligned EU members for instance by 
aiming at the implementation of a common defence” (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 
7/1996). Hence the Committee’s instructions to Finland’s action in the IGC are that 
Finland should constructively participate in the development of CFSP – but so that the 
intergovernmental nature will remain and the decisions made are not in contradiction 
with Finland’s military non-alignment and independent defence. Regarding the 
Maastricht Treaty emphasis is put more on the paragraphs of the Treaty which 
acknowledge the national security and defence policy considerations (and reservations) 
of the member states rather than the paragraph on the “eventual framing of common 
defence”. All in all the attitude towards the institutional development is quite hesitant: 
the political willingness of the major EU member states regarding CFSP is regarded 
                                                  
135 MP Paasio 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996; Government Report 1/1996.  
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more essential than its organizational structure or decision-making procedures. In case 
the common will is lacking, new institutional structures could only uphold wrong 
expectations and decrease the general confidence on the EU.136 The  implications  of  
possible changes in decision-making procedures are also discussed in the parliamentary 
debate. In case qualified majority voting method gained ground in CFSP, a possibility to 
opt out of the common actions should be granted if a country finds that necessary for 
securing vital national interests.137 The development of the CFSP on the practical level 
by increasing qualified majority voting becomes an issue which arouses significantly 
contradicting political argumentation in the domestic debate. The Government’s view 
was that qualified majority voting should be supported in issues that concern the 
implication of CFSP. However, this issue did not gain full support in the Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee: an objection concerning the issue is included in the 
Committee’s report (signed by the previous Prime Minister Esko Aho) (Foreign Affairs 
Committee Report 7/1996).  
 
In the background of the objection is the view that underlines the centrality of states in 
foreign and security policy making. In the context of CFSP it is seen that 
intergovermentalism secures the role of the state in this respect. This view is promoted 
particularly by the opposition in the parliamentary debate:  
“Decisions made on the terms of the core of the Europe are not automatically 
suitable for Finland, no matter if they concern national security or the well-
being of citizens which are the two fundamental tasks of the state. Therefore, 
also the starting point for cooperative security should be the recognition of 
each states’ difference and national interests. Nation and state are, 
undoubtedly, still the most significant and effective actors. Thus foreign and 
security policy in the EU should remain intergovernmental in nature.” (MP 
Aho 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995) 
 
 
A number of questions in the national preparation for the IGC concern the relationship 
between the EU and WEU: Should Finland aim for the “softening” of WEU or its 
further advancing as a tool for CFSP? What should be the militarily non-aligned states 
approach on WEU’s crisis management tasks or collective security and solidarity 
clause?138 Government’s view is that the WEU indeed should be an instrument of CFSP 
with which decisions made on military crisis management are implemented. The 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee shares this view in the sense that it finds that a 
                                                  
136 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996. 
137 E.g. MP Salolainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.  
138 MP Paasio, MP Salolainen, MP Pietikäinen, MP Pulliainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
1/1996.  
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closer relationship between the EU and WEU gives new opportunities to make the EU’s 
crisis management more effective. Yet it is seen that for Finland a full WEU 
membership is impossible due to the mutual defence clause included in the Article V of 
the WEU Treaty. (Hence the Committee proposes that the possibility of removing the 
Article V from the WEU Treaty should be considered.139) In the context of the IGC 
preparations these views are linked to more a general debate in which the federalist 
tendencies of the European integration process are criticised also in other policy areas 
than CFSP.140  
 
All in all, in the national debate on the future direction of the CFSP there is some 
indication of  an increased level of prominence of CFSP in national foreign and security 
policy: common European values and goals are accepted to have fundamental 
significance for Finnish foreign and security policy and the future development of CFPS 
is considered to be a significant factor in the Finnish perspective. Yet, at the same time it 
is widely agreed that Finland should call for the acceptance of national interests and 
reservations in CFSP. Thus, even though it is seen that that the value basis and goals of 
CFSP are in line with the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy, this does not 
imply that CFSP could replace national policies of the member states or that CFSP 
should be developed to a more communitarian form. Especially due Finland’s national 
reservations as a non-aligned country, CFSP should remain intergovernmental (Foreign 
Affairs Committee Report 7/1996, Government Report 1/1996). 
                                                  
139 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996. 
140 E.g. MP Jääskeläinen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996. 
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4.4 Consensus is dead, long live consensus. The initial politicization of national 
security policy. 
 
“In Finland we are used to keeping the fundamental line of foreign and 
security policy above daily disputes. In the background of this aspiration for 
wide consensus are well-known historical reasons. With the help of our 
experiences we Finns have realized that a condition of the survival of the 
nation lies in its unanimity. Many times we have been driven into situations 
where national consensus has been imposed by the national sense of self-
protection – a threat has unified us. But often consensus has been found in 
cases when we have been striving for something new. We have not been 
acting under external threat or pressure, but have searched for an 
advantageous line for us.” (Prime Minister Aho 1996, 10). 
 
 
Consensus in national foreign and security policy making was defined as an element of 
the small state identity. As was discussed in the previous chapter, it is a factor that faces 
change during the EU-membership resulting on one hand from general 
parliamentarization, and Europeanization on the other. These can be seen as intertwined 
processes which are fortifying each other. The former implies that foreign and security 
policy issues are more openly discussed in the parliament and the parliament is having 
more say in the decision-making. The latter means that due to the EU membership the 
European level decision-making began to increasingly intervene in the domestic 
decision- and policy-making and complicate it by bringing new levels to the process, 
thus making the preconditions of national consensus more complicated. A richer variety 
of new foreign and security policy issues were introduced to which Finland must take 
position. Additionally, there is the structural impact on the national decision-making 
process (e.g. regarding the roles of the President, Government and Parliament, as 
discussed in chapter 3.2). 
 
The first years of Finnish EU-membership are characterised by a lively domestic debate 
on national consensus and increasing signs of the erosion of consensus. Yet there 
appears to be a joint understanding on Finnish history in the sense that the necessity of 
consensus is seen to unquestionably derive from it. Furthermore, the continuity of 
consensus is found essential without exception in the parliamentary debate. The 
government parties acknowledge the right of the opposition to criticise and oppose 
Government’s proposals – but this is not seen to apply on issues that concern foreign 
and security policy questions regarding fundamental national interests. Such issues are 
considered to be beyond normal politics. Typically this approach is anchored in the 
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perception of Finland’s small state identity: both the government and the opposition 
consider national consensus and moving security and foreign policy beyond normal 
domestic politics imperative particularly for a small state. 141  
 
The need to conserve foreign and security policy beyond normal politics is sometimes 
found so pressing that any confrontational setting between the government and 
opposition in the parliamentary handling is regarded unwelcome. All MP’s ought to be 
in similar position and possess all the information needed to judge the issues at hand.142 
In the spirit of the Finnish consensus tradition, it is considered that once given the 
relevant facts, everyone arrives at the one and only correct conclusion. Foreign and 
security policy-making should remain clear of politicization, it should be politics 
without politics.143 When dealing with what are perceived as hot topics (such as the 
Finnish participation in IFOR) a joint responsibility should be “carried with dignity by 
all”144. Finnish participation in IFOR was considered an example of such a topic, and the 
Foreign Minister warned the MP’s against sidestepping responsibility in the issue.145 At 
the same time the MP’s of the opposition parties accuse the Government of breaking the 
consensus tradition and claims that the Government does not search for the widest 
possible mutual understanding for national foreign policy.146 The opposition finds that 
the Government is not as willing to engage in communication and cooperation with the 
opposition as has been the case previously. It is stated that the preparations of the 
amendment of the peacekeeping act took place in a more harmonious manner during the 
previous Government.147 The Government is accused of breaking the Finnish tradition of 
parliamentary consensus.148 At a more practical level the opposition heavily criticises 
the way the decision on Finland’s participation in the IFOR operation was taken. A 
related topic of remarkably strong criticism is the concept of enhanced peacekeeping. 
Both issues eventually result in written objections by a number of MP’s in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee’s Report.149 The Government parties’ reply is to accuse the 
opposition of “talking politics”150. 
 
The politicisation of foreign and security policy and the “death of consensus” become 
increasingly visible during the latter phases of the Europeanization process (see chapters 
                                                  
141 E.g. MP Zyskowicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; MP Aho 31.10.1995, follow-up 
debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
142 MP Tuomioja 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
143 E.g. MP Zyskowicz 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
144 Foreign Minister Halonen 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
145 Foreign Minister Halonen 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
146 E.g. MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
147 MP Aho (the former Prime Minister) 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading). 
148 E.g. MP Kääriäinen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
149 Foreign Affairs Council Report 21/1995. 
150 E.g. MP Kanerva 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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5 and 6). At the same time there is a growing tendency in the domestic discourse of 
views that reject the perception that it is possible to arrive at one single “correct” 
national solution in foreign and security policy issues. But at this phase there are mainly 
general bafflement and mutual accusations between government and parliament on the 
wearing away of national consensus. The possibilities for a “pragmatic” foreign and 
security policy are seen to have decreased. What were previously considered eternal 
truths in the field of foreign and security policy are now turning into issues that can be 
interpreted differently depending on the international situation.151 Only a few times this 
post-consensus gets a positive interpretation in which the politicisation is seen as an 
unavoidable and welcome result of the change that has happened in the political 
culture.152 The demystification of defence policy is actually welcomed by the Defence 
Minister who calls for open and thorough domestic debate on defence policy.153  
 
The erosion of consensus can be seen to relate to the emerging broader differences in the 
foreign and security policy thinking as well (see chapter 4.2). The policy of the 
Government at the time (led by Prime Minister Lipponen) is described in an address by 
a MP as striving for the European mainstream in foreign and security policy issues. In 
contrast to that the opposition often puts emphasis on the understanding of Finland as a 
distinct country in Europe.154  
    
                                                  
151 E.g. MP Puhakka 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995, 
152 MP Lamminen 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995.. 
153 Defence Minister Taina 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.  
154 E.g. MP Penttilä 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
During the time period analysed in this chapter the general misfit pressure caused by 
CFSP is lower than in the later phases, first and foremost due to the less-advanced state 
of CFSP as an EU policy. The CFSP had a strongly intergovernmental nature, and 
despite the Maastricht Treaty’s paragraphs on defence and WEU a common defence was 
clearly not in sight. Consequently it was possible to construct CFSP in the Finnish 
domestic discourse as being non-controversial to the national foreign and security 
policy; CFSP only complemented the national policy. This greatly reduced the urgency 
to radically change national foreign and security policy. There was no significant policy 
misfit between European rules and regulations on the one hand and domestic policies 
and national policy goals on the other.155 The only major exception to this was located in 
the preaccession phase when the European Commission referred to the problems arising 
from the Finnish policy of neutrality or “military non-alignment and credible 
independent defence”. The Commission questioned Finland’s possibility to commit 
itself to CFPS’s objectives that regard the safeguarding of the independence and security 
of the EU. Finland was also asked to clarify its position regarding the eventual framing 
of a common defence policy. The misfit was eventually solved by a declaration on CFSP 
attached in the EU-accession treaty and by other political statements by Finnish key 
politicians in the context of the accession negotiation process. However, the 
downgrading and redefinition of neutrality was found out to be not simply a reaction to 
external pressures emanating from the EU, but was seen to relate to broader post-Cold 
War international developments and to have earlier origins independent of the EU-
accession process. 
 
At this phase the evidence is rather limited and mixed on any significant thick 
Europeanization in the form of national adaptation. On one hand it can be concluded that 
particularly on the basis of the Government Reports that CFSP has achieved a role in 
Finnish foreign and security policy, especially in the sense that the EU-membership is 
understood to have security policy significance for Finland (in that it “will help Finland 
to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure” 
(Government Report 1/1995, 40). On the other hand, the parliamentary debates reveal no 
significant importance of the EU’s security institutions in the minds of national decision-
makers. Similarly, it can be concluded that any possible relaxation of national policy 
positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions is 
                                                  
155 The following chapters will point out that given advancing of CFSP, and particularly the emerge of ESDP, it is no longer 
possible to construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as compatible with the Finnish line as was in the first phase. In 
addition to the growing policy misfit pressure there is at the same time increasing institutional misfit as a by-product of 
participation in the daily business of European integration process and policies. 
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effectively shadowed by the widely-shared national political will to go against the EU 
mainstream and to prevent the development of the defence dimension of CFSP.  
 
A distinctive characteristic of the phase I is that there is a collective understanding in the 
domestic discourse that a new international and European security order is currently 
under construction and the new suitable means for the international community’s 
purpose are sought for (for instance regarding crisis management). The role given to EU 
security arrangements in that context is modest. Likewise, the pressure for the 
amendment of national legislation on peacekeeping is seen to result from the broader 
post-Cold War international development tendencies rather than from European 
integration. Yet, the EU is now considered the principal way in which Finland is 
connected to the international value community. In this sense there has been a change in 
the key foreign and security policy conceptions. The dominant discourse indicates an 
increasing and openly manifested attachment to the international value community as 
well as an understanding that being part of this international community is bound to 
have impact on the goals of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, being a member of 
the European Union is perceived to have fundamental security policy implications, 
regardless of what the more national detailed views on the CFSP and its preferred 
development trends are. Somewhat paradoxically the EU-membership is regarded as a 
principal point of departure for the national foreign and security policy line, but yet in 
practical terms the EU is understood as a source of cooperative “cohesive security” and 
mutual solidarity rather than having any hard security or defence policy significance.  
 
From the viewpoint of the Europeanization approach it can be argued that changes in the 
Finnish foreign and security policy in the first phase are not caused primarily by the 
European integration process. To a great extent, then, it is the deeper international 
transformation processes that are the principal causes of the change. The participation in 
and commitment to CFSP can rather be seen as an instrument by which the adaptation to 
the new international security environment can be implemented. The causes of the 
national foreign and security policy change are thus to be located in the broader 
transformation of the international system. In this sense the EU-membership and 
supportive stance on CFSP declared during the accession process are instrumental; they 
are used as proofs that should convince the international community that the 
reorientation of Finnish foreign and security policy is genuine and permanent. Tellingly, 
in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report many MP’s underlined that the 
FCMA-treaty no longer defines the international role and identity of Finland. It is 
replaced by the EU-membership, European values, non-alignment and independent 
defence.156  
                                                  
156 E.g. MP Penttilä, MP Salolainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.  
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Nevertheless, at the same time there are elements in the state identity reconstruction 
process that remain largely unchanged and draw on the traditional foreign and security 
policy concepts. Particularly the nationally widely shared view that CFSP should be 
about crisis management rather than defence cooperation stems from the perception of a 
continuous and traditional Finnish state identity defined by neutrality and non-
alignment. Likewise, when debating peacekeeping it is seen that peace enforcement is 
not suitable for Finland, ultimately because it is alien to Finland’s state identity. Peace 
enforcement is considered the task of great powers and military alliances but not for a 
state like Finland.157 By excluding peace enforcement from the list of international 
activities that Finland can commit a reference is made to Finland’s particular state 
identity. Abstaining from peace enforcement thus becomes a factor which contributes to 
the reproduction of Finnish identity. It supports and revitalizes the traditional state 
identity elements related to peacekeeping, which have their roots firstly in an 
understanding of Finland as a neutral party, a traditional peacekeeper, that does not 
serve as a judge but rather as a physician in international politics. Additionally, it was 
observed that non-participation in peace enforcement is justified with references to small 
state identity. Military coercion against a state is considered a task for great powers and 
military alliances, not small states.  
 
Despite this, in light of the new the peacekeeping legislation it can be concluded that the 
more internationally oriented approach and the concept of enhanced peacekeeping 
introduced in the Government Report 1/1995 gained more ground. Although military 
coercion was excluded, a step towards enhanced peacekeeping was taken, broadening 
the scope of Finnish peacekeeping beyond the traditional limits. In this respect the 
Finnish development follows a similar mode than many other European states: it is a 
question of adjusting the tools of security and defence policy to the post-Cold War 
security environment. The broad security concept that figures prominently in the 
domestic discourse also means putting emphasis on new international security threat 
pictures such as intra-state conflicts, non-state actors and terrorism. In the Finnish 
discourse the main reason for changing and enhancing Finnish peacekeeping is in this 
phase the need to adapt to the new international circumstances and supporting the UN’s 
role in it. Consequently, the primary cause of the amending of the peacekeeping act is 
not to be located in European integration. The crisis management operations (IFOR and 
SFOR) on which Finland must make a decision are NATO-led operations and therefore 
they cause no direct misfit between EU policies and the domestic level. However, it was 
shown in the analysis that CFSP (and WEU) were tied to peacekeeping and crisis 
management in political argumentation, and that there were differing interpretations as 
                                                  
157 E.g. Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995. 
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to the implications of the EU-membership and commitment to CFSP on Finnish 
peacekeeping. Additionally, it was observed that the decision concerning participation in 
the IFOR operation posed considerable time pressure for the national decision-making 
process.158 In the next phases the EU (military) crisis management turns into a very 
concrete and essential theme in CFSP, and is a prominent source of adaptational 
pressure for Finland (see chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Intense debating was observed on the question of establishing and training a rapid 
reaction force for the future purposes of the UN and the EU as well as on the more 
concrete issue of participation in IFOR crisis management operation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These issues raise passionate discussion in the parliamentary process 
because it is eventually a question of two clashing approaches on national security 
policy thinking. Furthermore, these issues also touch upon the relationship of national 
defence and international crisis management. Although it is in the end often a question 
of relatively small issues (sending a lightly armed building detachment to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and technical issues regarding national crisis management training) there 
are underlying grander themes embedded to them – which are significant from the 
perspective of the state identity reconstruction process. Thus these questions are 
ultimately linked to the shaping of Finland’s character and self-image as an actor in 
international politics.  
 
To sum up, it can be concluded that in spite of the new broad security concept and the 
degradation of the neutrality doctrine a certain construction of continuity is observable 
in the discourse in all the three main categories of identity production. Firstly, in the 
Finnish self-perception “military non-alignment” and “credible independent defence“ 
are perceived as a logical continuation to the Finnish foreign and security tradition. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that these concepts bring rationality and predictability as 
features that characterize Finland in the eyes of the other international actors. 
Domestically, the understanding of the continuity of the main line typically connects 
with a view that supports and finds feasible a “pragmatic” and consensual national 
foreign and security policy that rests on the analytical identification of the sole correct 
solution for each given policy issue. Secondly, concerning peacekeeping and military 
crisis management the analysis pointed a hesitancy towards over-enhancing the means 
of peacekeeping too far beyond the traditional form. It was widely seen as extremely 
essential to draw a line between peace enforcement and those activities that were 
considered inappropriate for Finland’s state identity. Thirdly, traditional state identity 
elements founded on small state appeared to be in place. Arguments building on the 
legitimate security interest of a small state, tied to Finland’s geographical position, were 
                                                  
158 This decision-making under time pressure becomes a frequent phenomena in the later phases, then caused by CFSP 
operations too. In the first phase any CFSP operations are not yet on the agenda. 
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visibly present in the debate – though they were also challenged to a certain degree by 
views that put more emphasis on international values as the basis of Finnish foreign and 
security policy. There were also repeated demands for consensus – seen as the lifeline of 
a small state – despite the irrevocable politicization of foreign and security policy that 
was partly caused by the diversified policy agenda and the new levels of decision-
making that the EU-membership brought with it. 
 
Yet, it can be concluded that an interplay of international and domestic expectations that 
is typical for a Europeanization process has evidently started. A number of cases of 
significantly contradicting political argumentation could be observed in the 
parliamentary debate. There were different understandings of the EU membership’s 
implications and requirements on Finnish foreign and security policy. European policies 
did exert some adaptational pressures on Finland, but the collective meanings attached 
to them varied. The closer analysis of the parliamentary debate uncovered certain 
heterogeneity and room for manoeuvre in the dominant discourse. An emerging clash of 
schools of thought in the national debate was observed, as there was a discursive battle 
on how national interest and security should be constructed, and what should be the 
roles of “European” and purely nationally defined security interests in it. On a practical 
level this appeared, for instance, as a debate on the need of special Finnish national 
reservations to CFSP. This shows how Finland became exposed to new structures of 
meaning which European institutions entailed. From the perspective of sociological 
institutionalist Europeanization this can be taken as a starting point for a process that 
might eventually result in Finland adopting a new set of preferences and a new state 
identity elements. 
 
Chapter 3 presented a number of ways in which the EU-membership has been seen to 
impact on the structures of Finnish foreign and security policy decision-making process. 
It was noted, for instance, that a significant number of the bilateral relationships with 
European states became part of the internal EU-cooperation and part of the EU’s 
multilateral communitarian system. Additionally, a significant part of the relations with 
the non-EU countries was incorporated into the EU’s external relations and CFSP. A 
central structural impact on Finland has been in the division of foreign policy into “EU 
policy” as the domain of the Prime Minister and “other foreign policy” belonging 
chiefly to the President. The development of CFSP has thus increased the Government’s 
role in foreign and security policy at the cost of the President (see chapter 3). In phase I 
this kind of Europeanization impact on the national decision-making system is, however, 
only at an initial stage. The question of the division of power becomes topical in a more 
concrete way in the later phases in the context of the EU’s crisis management operations 
and the further amending of the peacekeeping act and the Finnish Constitution. Then 
differential empowerment caused by Europeanization between the President, 
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Government and Parliament becomes stronger and almost “automatic”: when new issues 
are added in to the sphere of the EU’s common policies, they concurrently move from 
the President’s domain into EU-issues belonging chiefly to the competence of the 
Government (see chapter 6.3.2). In other words, the division of national decision-
making power is altered due to European integration. This feature becomes observable 
in phases II and III, but already during the first two years of EU-membership there are 
indications of an emerging national debate on how these external impacts should be 
interpreted and put into practice on the domestic level. Thus, although European 
integration causes pressures for domestic structural change, it is not in a given form but 
there is a national political struggle on how the Europeanization impact is to be 
nationally digested and implemented. There are contesting political views (and later 
juridical, too) on the interpretation of the national constitution in the face of the 
developing European foreign policy. 
 
In phase I this issue is well characterized by a question that relates to Finland’s status as 
an observer in WEU. The actual decision to become an observer in WEU does not raise 
considerable opposition, rather it is the procedure of how the national decision was 
made that causes strong criticism. The decision was informed to the Parliament through 
Prime Minister’s announcement, and thus received no parliamentary Committee 
handling or a Parliament’s decision.159 It was critically noted in the debate that this was 
an example of a EU issue that is in the grey zone regarding the division of power. It was 
found particularly noteworthy since the new practices on foreign and security policy 
issues that the EU-membership brought were not yet established. The rules that govern 
the division of powers between the Government and the Parliament were in creation. 
Different considerations on how to interpret the Finnish constitution’s paragraphs on the 
roles and competencies of the President and Prime minister during the EU-era were also 
linked to the issue of WEU observer status.160 It can be concluded that despite these 
pressures and impacts on the national decision-making procedures the consequences do 
not become visible at once but unveil themselves only gradually when carrying out the 
day-to-day EU politics and when certain developments in CFSP reveal and aggravate the 
problematic issue in the national system. It becomes evident in the following chapters 
that particularly the peacekeeping and crisis management operations serve as 
mobilisators of concrete Europeanization impacts in the domestic decision-making 
structures. 
 
                                                  
159 The Government’s view was that it was not a question of a international agreement, but rather a case in which based on 
the mutual political will of Finland and WEU an institutional arrangement was settled. Therefore there was no constitutional 
need or possibility for a parliament decision on the issue. Prime Minister Aho 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s 
announcement 2/1994. 
160 MP Pykäläinen, MP Tuomioja, MP Ukkola, MP Laukkanen 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 
2/1994. 
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Towards the second phase 
 
In moving from the phase I to the second phase in the Europeanization process of 
Finnish foreign and security policy the first intergovernmental conference is taken here 
as a watershed. Characteristically for the first phase the political goals set for the IGC 
are based on rather purely nationally defined interests free of any strongly perceived 
constrains or restrictions caused by solidarity towards EU policies or institutions. In the 
background of this appears a continuing traditional self-identification of Finland as a 
“small, northern and militarily non-aligned state”161. Contrast to that the second phase is 
increasingly characterised by reacting and adapting to the conceived realities produced 
by the IGC and the developing CFSP. A new framework for foreign and security policy-
making is increasingly taken on board. The next Government Report on security policy 
(titled “European Security Development and Finnish Defence”) focuses more on Europe 
than on the general post-Cold War security environment. For instance, casting aside 
neutrality is manifested and internalized more clearly: it is noted that “as a member of 
the Union, Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third 
party”, (Government Report 1/1997, 48). Additionally, whereas in the first phase there 
were no indications of any systematic attempts to export national ideas, preferences or 
models to the EU level to talk of, in the second phase we witness such national 
projection as Finland tries to affect and contribute to the development of CFSP. 
 
                                                  
161 MP Salolainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.  
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5. Second phase (1997-2002): “not impartial in a conflict between the Union and a 
third party” 
 
“Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party.” 
(Government Report 1/1997, 48.) 
5.1 Introduction: Main features of the second phase 
 
As was explained in chapter 3, considerable advancing in terms of treaties, political 
agreements, capacities and institutional build-up takes place in CFSP between 1997 and 
2002. The Petersberg tasks (of WEU) are incorporated in the EU, giving it the 
competence to deploy military resources in crisis management. The ESDP gets launched 
and the first steps are taken to enhance military capabilities for the purposes of the 
ESDP. For Finland, this implies that more focused domestic debate, position taking and 
decision-making are needed concerning both details of ESDP development and broader 
implications of the ESDP regarding Finnish non-alignment policy and peacekeeping 
traditions. It is no longer possible to follow a vague pro-integration policy and simply 
state that deeper integration, no matter what practical forms it takes in the sphere of 
foreign and security policy, is in line with the Finnish national security interests. The 
deepening integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy inescapably challenges 
some of the key concepts of Finland’s foreign and security policy. Consequently, 
compared to the previous phase there is a greater visibility of the EU in the national 
foreign and security policy discourse. 
 
Although there is a tendency to underline continuity in the official government texts of 
this phase, the following analysis of the broader domestic discourse, and the 
parliamentary debate particularly, will reveal a more diversified picture. A central 
feature in the domestic discourse in phase II is a growing understanding that Finland has 
arrived at a crossroads and has to, for instance, ”choose whether it will follow the 
European mainstream in security or opt out partially or fully from the European security 
policy cooperation”162. Finland is seen to be in a situation in which the yet unknown 
consequences of numerous simultaneously ongoing processes – such as NATO and EU 
enlargements, rearrangement of NATO-Russia relations, the EU and WEU merger, and 
the EU’s intergovernmental conference – are likely to influence Finland’s security 
                                                  
162 MP Kallis 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
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policy environment.163 The Kosovo crisis, transformations in Russia, and development 
of the EU’s common security and defence policy are seen to cause further acute 
challenges and pressures on Finnish foreign and security policy-making.164 
Consequently, Finland is seen to be faced with a situation in which it has to take a more 
consistent and committed stance on how it will eventually regard CFSP/ESDP and by 
what means it will participate in its development: to call for national reservations, or 
participate fully and actively. Furthermore, it is seen that as an implication of this 
Finland is impelled to define more clearly than before the meaning and limits of its non-
alignment. The intensified debate on Finland’s new position in Europe culminates in the 
question of the EU’s defence dimension that comes up in the EU’s intergovernmental 
conference. 
 
The following empirical analysis shows that in the second phase the two key elements of 
Finnish state identity production, that is peacekeeping/crisis management and 
neutrality/alignment are closely linked and intertwined. Any reforms in the way Finland 
practices peacekeeping are seen to have implications on the character of Finland’s non-
alignment – for instance through the mandate question (can Finland participate in crisis 
management operations not mandated by the UN or the OSCE?) or through the changes 
in the relationship of national defence and crisis management (e.g. does crisis 
management undermine or support national defence?). There appears to be an emerging 
understanding that Finland cannot remain outside the developing CFSP (including its 
defence dimension), and that this consequently implies a stronger alignment via the EU 
and an increasing redirection of national military capabilities towards military crisis 
management. Thus, although treated at first one by one below (chapters 5.2 and 5.3), 
when debating peacekeeping the issue of non-alignment is always present, and vice 
versa.  
 
In phase II there are two major policy issues that relate to the above-mentioned themes 
that call for an unambiguous and detailed national response and clearly cause 
adaptational pressures towards Finland’s foreign and security policy: Finland’s 
participation in the KFOR operation in Kosovo and the question of the EU and WEU’s 
relationship which becomes topical thanks to the ongoing EU’s intergovernmental 
conference. The development of the CFSP and especially its defence policy dimension is 
on the IGC’s agenda, forcing Finland to reconsider the compatibility of military non-
alignment and the EU defence cooperation. All in all, it will become evident in the 
following analysis that the EU is increasingly perceived as a factor that has impact on 
Finnish foreign and security policy: in addition to the obvious CFSP-aspect of the WEU 
                                                  
163 Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997, 4; MP Dromberg, 27.5.1997, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 1/1997. 
164 MP Jaakonsaari 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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issue, a growing tendency can be observed according to which Finland should “act like 
other Europeans” when it comes to crisis management. For instance when the KFOR 
operation and the new peacekeeping act are debated in the parliament, the ways in which 
Finland’s legislation differs from the crisis management legislation of many of the other 
EU members are frequently referred to.165 There also appears to be less emphasis put on 
the conception of Finland as a “different” state in Europe that has legitimate national 
reservations on security cooperation as well as security interests that are out of line with 
the other EU-members. The concluding chapter 5.4 will argue that these can be taken as 
a sign of new elements taking root in the state identity reproduction process.  
 
In the second phase the national responses to these issues appear both in the form of 
national adaptation and national projection. A new legislation on peacekeeping is 
introduced and the EU’s relevance to the amendment of the legislation is debated on in 
the Parliament. A notable issue in the debate is also the relationship between crisis 
management and national defence. National projection (bottom-up Europeanization) 
takes place as Finland together with Sweden try to direct ESDP towards crisis 
management rather than common defence by proposing that the so-called Petersberg 
tasks are included in the Amsterdam Treaty, thus making crisis management part of 
CFSP.  
 
The policy analysis and academic debate that took place at that time also referred often 
to that Finland was at a turning point and a fundamental decision was to be made 
regarding Finland’s general approach on CFSP and national foreign and security policy: 
either to take further steps in the integration of its security and defence policies or to 
stand outside the process. Auffermann suggested in 2000 that “the very quick 
development of a common European defence policy will necessarily lead in the very 
near future to a situation in which ties between the EU and NATO will be intensified in 
such a way that the difference between an EU member state which also belongs to 
NATO and a non-NATO EU member will be rather small. Finland would de facto lose 
its status as a non-aligned country.” (Auffermann 2000, 39). This is to say that it is the 
participation in the developing CFSP, rather than the NATO issue, that undermines and 
eventually terminates Finnish non-alignment. Tiilikainen saw that at that time Finland 
was seeking for its identity in the European unification project, and that the position 
taking for instance vis-à-vis CFSP’s institutional development and the crisis 
management and defence dimension of CFSP were elemental parts of that process 
(Tiilikainen 2000). Particularly the Finnish first EU presidency (1.7.-31.12.1999) “can 
be analysed as a Finnish effort of assessing its own identity in the [European] unification 
                                                  
165 According to the national legislation Finland can not participate in “peace enforcement” and the mandate of UN or 
OSCE is a prerequisite for Finnish participation in any peacekeeping/crisis management operations. (See further references 
in chapter 5.3 below.) 
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project” (Tiilikainen 2000, 27). According to Forsberg Finland’s participation in the 
NATO-led operations in former Yugoslavia intensified public debate over Finland’s new 
position in Europe. The official Finnish view that NATO’s military action in relation to 
the Kosovo crisis was necessary despite the fact that it violated the UN charter 
contributed also to this. Finland was “at the crossroads of Europeanism and neutrality” 
(Forsberg 2000, 41). Forsberg also located new frontlines that had emerged after Finland 
joined the EU: ”For the foreign policy elite, the crisis made it clear that Finland can no 
longer remain withdrawn in its shell. Rather it was understood that EU membership 
brings with it added responsibility for events in Europe.” Forsberg argued that the 
Kosovo crisis showed on one hand, that Finland had fully committed itself to the 
common foreign and security policy of the European Union and had increasingly 
emphasised human rights over national sovereignty. On the other hand he also saw 
indications of ”renaissance of neutrality thinking”. (Forsberg 2000, 41.) Ojanen et al. 
argued that there was a change in the general official approach on European integration 
after the intergovernmental conference (1996-1997): when preparing for the 
intergovernmental conference of 2000 the efficiency of the EU was emphasized more 
strongly than previously, “perhaps at the expense of the notion of the EU as an 
‘association of independent member states’” that was so prominent in the Finnish view 
earlier on.166 Ojanen concluded that the Finnish discourse and argumentation was in a 
state of flux as ”new whys and why nots for non-alignment” emerged. She noted that 
“new moral arguments about sharing responsibility, solidarity, and indeed, even 
preparedness to assist others by military means in return for their equivalent promise, are 
also presented.” (Ojanen 2002, 198-199).  
 
Notes on the key documents and events of the second phase 
 
The material analysed in this chapter consist mainly of the following documents and 
related debates. Firstly, there is the Report to the Parliament by the Council of State 
titled European Security Development and Finnish Defence (hereinafter Government 
Report 1/1997). The related reports and statements by the Parliament Committees are: 
Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997 and Defence Committee Statement 1/1997). 
This Government report presents inter alia Finland’s view on the strengthening of the 
EU’s effectiveness in foreign and security policy and on the development of the Union’s 
defence dimension. In addition to underlining the general security policy significance of 
the EU for Finland, the report contains a passage related to non-alignment noting that 
“as a member of the Union, Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union 
                                                  
166 Ojanen et al. also observed novel readiness for evaluating anew the use of majority voting in CFSP. They take as a sign 
of growing flexibility in Finnish positions the fact that in 1997 the Finnish government saw that the CFSP development 
should be decided by unanimity, whereas in 2000 unanimity is mentioned regarding defence policy only. (Ojanen et al. 
2000, 124.) 
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and a third party” (Government Report 1/1997, 48167). The Government Report 2/1999 
concerns Finland’s participation in the military crisis management operation (KFOR) in 
Kosovo. The Parliament’s Defence Committee gave a Report on it and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee issued a Statement. The Prime Minister’s announcement 1/1999 
deals with Finland’s EU Council presidency programme and announcement 2/1999 
concerns ESDP and crisis management during the Finnish presidency. Central 
documents in the debate on the new Act on Peacekeeping are the Government proposal 
(20/2000) and the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Report (4/2000; containing 
an objection signed by four Committee members) and the Defence Committee’s 
Statement (3/2000; containing two dissenting opinions). 
 
The second phase (1997-2002) begins with a defence policy white book (Government 
Report 1/1997) and ends with another: Government Report 2/2001 is titled Finland’s 
Security and Defence Policy. It is followed by a report by the Parliament’s Defence 
Committee (2/2001) and the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Statement (6/2001), both 
unanimous. Between the issuing of these two white books the establishment of ESDP 
takes place, including the European level political decisions, institutional build-up and 
capacity cataloguing (see chapter 3). From the viewpoint of Europeanization studies this 
offers an exceptional vantage point on how this development of the EU’s security 
arrangements is reflected in the national foreign and security policy discourse: how is it 
perceived and interpreted domestically, and what significance is given to it in national 
foreign and security policy? Furthermore, if a growing misfit is felt as the CFSP 
develops further, to what extent it is seen that the national policy must be reoriented to 
remove that misfit? In the previous phase the compatibility between Finnish and 
European policy was achieved mainly by redefinitions, and it is interesting to see if the 
discourse analysed here contains evidence of further redefinition of the same key 
concepts. On a more theoretical level this also offers a good change to look at the 
implications of this on state identity reproduction process. There is a same kind of 
temporal comparison opportunity  –“before and after ESDP” – also concerning the 
vehicles of identity production related to peacekeeping/crisis management: the 1995 
peacekeeping act can be compared to the legislation amendment of 2000.   
 
The selected methodological approach proves its usefulness in the analysis of the second 
phase too. Government texts construct an image of continuity of national foreign and 
security policy and present the changes that have taken place often as being minor or 
technical in nature. Moreover, the Government texts only very seldom refer to the EU’s 
impact whereas in the domestic debate this is a constant and highly visible theme. There 
appears to be a considerable unbalance between the Government’s official discourse and 
                                                  
167 The page numbers regarding the Government Report 1/1997 refer to the official English translation (second revised 
English version) of the document. 
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the political debate as to what extent and in what connections the EU’s impact on 
Finnish policy is dealt with. In the domestic discussion the Government texts are 
frequently “read between the lines”, and the overall picture given by the debates is well 
depicted by a MP during the parliamentary debate on the Government Report 2/2001: 
”there has been nothing but changes”168.  
 
                                                  
168 MP Jaakonsaari 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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5.2 Military non-alignment meets ESDP  
 
The preparation process of the Government Report ”European security development and 
Finnish defence” introduced new domestic procedures compared to the previous defence 
policy reports. There were changes in the way the parliament was involved in the 
process. When presenting the report to the parliament the Prime Minister noted that the 
new procedures strengthen parliamentarism in the preparation of national defence 
policy. The Prime Minister also underlined ”the broad significance of defence policy for 
Finland’s choices”. Yet, while declaring the Government’s commitment to the 
parliamentarization of defence policy the Prime Minister also called for consensus since 
it was a question of “a fundamental issue for national survival, securing of an 
independent and credible defence capability”.169 However, the main opposition party 
saw that the new procedures actually decreased the parliamentarism of the defence 
policy preparations.170 Consequently, instead of a broad consensus that the Government 
called for there was a wider array of views – and not only on procedural issues but the 
substance of the policy too, as will be pointed out below. 
 
The Government report stated that there is a notable connection between the 
development of national defence forces and the development process of European 
security arrangements. The presented reasons for the renewal of the armed forces seem 
chiefly to reflect the same conclusions as in many of the other EU-member states: 
modernization, mobility and rationalization were seen essential in the post-Cold War 
defence thinking. The report acknowledged that the EU’s focus is on prevention of 
conflicts and preparation for crisis management and the national armed forces and 
international military organizations are developing their capability to undertake 
peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. “The resources allocated for traditional 
defence have been reduced in several European countries”. It is also noted that “In the 
circumstances of Europe, no country can guarantee its security on its own.“ 
(Government Report 1/1997, 8.) The aim is to adapt Finland’s defence to the post-Cold 
War environment, to enhance national defence capacity (particularly by keeping up with 
the international advancing of the military technology), and to strengthen the ability to 
participate in military crisis management.171 In the end, the conclusions on changes 
required in the defence policy and national armed forces are not that far-reaching as in 
the European mainstream (cf. chapter 4.2). While it is stated that ”the development of 
                                                  
169 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, also Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997 preliminary debate on the Government 
Report 1/1997. 
170 MP Aho 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. On the procedures of national preparation of 
Finland’s defence policy see Visuri 2003. 
171 Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997, Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
1/1997. 
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the defence forces requires new policy definitions”, at the same token it is underlined 
that Finland “is not in a point zero as to its security policy. The breakdown of the 
European bloc division has not dropped the bottom out of our defence system (…) The 
basic line of defence thinking remains despite the changes that are needed in the defence 
policy and the defence system.” (Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997). In many ways the 
report thus stands as a peculiar combination of emphasizing continuity on one hand and 
the necessity of change on the other.  
 
Compared to the Government Report of 1995 a number of main principles remain 
unchanged in the Report. The key phrase “military non-alignment and independent 
defence” is repeated and the broad security conception defined and introduced in the 
1995 Report continues to define the main characteristics of the potential threat pictures. 
In the Post-Cold War environment, in which possibility to be engaged in a war is seen to 
be greatly reduced, the threats relate to issues like environmental catastrophes, 
uncontrolled migration, refugees, international crime, terrorism and drug trade.172 It is 
noted in the report that since the previous report no such changes have taken place in 
Finland’s security environment that would call for revision of the basic line of the 
security policy (Government Report 1/1997, 7). All in all, continuity is emphasized as 
the main character of Finnish security policy in the Report. Continuity is seen 
particularly important in the way the other international actors perceive Finnish actions 
and in respect to the expectations they have on Finland. The picture that the security 
policy gives to the other actors is considered vital. The Prime Minister stated that 
”adaptation” and ”active participation” to Europe’s change should be visible elements in 
this picture. A purpose of the security policy – and the defence policy report as a central 
element of it – is that the other international actors recognize the consistency and 
continuity of the Finnish line and respect the Finnish policy on military non-
alignment.173 In the parliamentary debate and the committee handlings the Government 
report is faced with criticism which taps into this contradiction between continuity and 
change. It is also argued that despite the broad security conception serving as the point 
of departure in foreign policy in the report, when it comes to defence policy and related 
threat scenarios there are elements resembling the concepts of Cold War era European 
power politics. Such a combination of old and new elements is seen illogical and leading 
to a lack of a consistent functional strategy.174 
 
The significance of the EU for the Finnish security policy is stated in the report more 
directly than before. According to the report the three basic factors in Finnish security 
policy are “military non-alliance, an independent defence and membership of the 
                                                  
172 Government Report 1/1997; also e.g. MP Kekkonen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
173 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
174 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997, 3; MP Aaltonen 27.5.1997. 
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European Union” (Government Report 1/1997, 47). The Government sees that the EU-
membership has an essential status in Finland’s security policy. The membership “has 
stabilized Finland’s position in the new Europe, and increases Finland’s security”.175 
According to the Foreign Minister the European Union is “in many ways maybe the 
most important reference group for Finland”.176 The Government report states that 
“Finland supports strengthening of the EU’s effectiveness in foreign and security policy 
capacity and is participating constructively in the development of the Union’s security 
and defence dimension” (Government Report 1/1997, 6). Nationally this is justified by 
emphasising that Finland can participate in CFSP development and its implementation 
without compromising military non-alignment; Finland stays the way it was when it 
joined the EU. Since the EU accession “Finland has been able to participate in this work 
[the creation and implementation of CFSP] as an equal and fully” and officially no 
changes in this respect are seen in the current situation (Government Report 1/1997, 47). 
Thus, while declaring the need to adapt the defence policy to the new circumstances, the 
Government report simultaneously highlights continuity and is careful not to refer to any 
policy misfit between the Finnish policy and CFSP.  
 
Likewise, ”constructive participation in the development of the EU’s security and 
defence dimension” (ibid, 6) is seen possible because decisions concerning it will be 
made unanimously by the member states and it is seen that interests of all the member 
states can be reconciled and that Finland’s national defence capacity will retain its 
significance in all situations. It is also specifically noted that Finland has made no 
reservations on the Treaty of the Union, including the articles according to which the 
eventual framing of common defence might lead to a common defence (Article J.4, see 
chapter 3). Furthermore, it is seen that any forthcoming agreement on EU’s crisis 
management role and affirmation on the goal of common defence will not have impact 
on Finland’s position as a military non-aligned state (Government Report 1/1997, 48). 
Since an unanimous decision is needed among the member states on the issue of 
common defence, it is felt that Finland has a chance to influence the CFSP development. 
(Government Report 1/1997, 47.) This is often noted also by the parliamentarians.177 
Yet, the Government’s generally approving position on CFSP is criticized in the 
parliamentary debate for instance on the grounds that it is seen that creating a crisis 
management capacity for the EU in practice means establishing an organization which 
can also implement common defence – which, in turn, is considered problematic for 
non-aligned Finland. Therefore the conclusion is that “No military capacity of any kind 
should be created for the EU, not even in the sense of the so called crisis management 
                                                  
175 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
176 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
177 E.g. MP Vihriälä, MP Kuosmanen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
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mentioned in the report.”178 Reacting to this the Foreign Minister reminds the parliament 
on “what has been agreed upon when Finland joined the EU” and how the Maastricht 
Treaty (and its articles on the eventual framing of common defence) bind Finland. 
Referring to the lack of any opt-outs the Foreign Minister notes that “the Maastricht 
Treaty has a totally different status for Finland than for Denmark or the UK”.179  
  
Increased prominence given to the EU in Finland’s security policy is visible also in that 
the rejection of neutrality in Finland’s foreign and security policy – on the grounds of 
Finland’s EU-membership – is expressed more clearly and manifestly than in the first 
Europeanization phase. The Government states that neutrality is not a suitable term for 
defining the Finnish policy. This is because as an active participant in CFSP Finland, 
together with the other EU member states, is jointly responsible for the status and 
security of the EU. There are no defence related security guarantees attached to the EU 
membership, but it is understood to bring with it indisputable additionally security.180 
The non-applicability of neutrality is declared in the Government report as follows: “as a 
member in the EU Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the EU and a third 
party” (Government Report 1/1997, 48). The fact that neutrality becoming obsolete is 
connected to the EU-membership is a clear indication Europeanization: the perceived 
impact of the EU on Finland’s security policy has grown. Yet, at the same time the 
Government emphasizes that the EU-membership is a logical part of the continuity of 
Finnish policy, and has thus not caused any radical alteration in the grand Finnish 
foreign and security policy line. This interpretation of the EU’s increased security policy 
significance to Finland as well as of the EU-membership’s repercussions regarding 
neutrality gains a relatively dominant position in the domestic discourse during the 
phase II. In the parliamentary debates, for instance, the Government’s view is 
questioned mainly in that it is asked if the security policy significance given to the EU 
(and especially the declaration of impartiality in a conflict between the EU and a third 
party) imply that Finland no longer considers itself possessing a right to independently 
define its position on a military crisis or war in its neighbouring area.181 Some concern 
and suspicion is also expressed over the ability of the EU to turn itself into a credible 
security actor and to establish a functioning European security and defence policy.182 
 
                                                  
178 MP Korkeaoja, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
179 Foreign Minister Halonen, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. Halonen also adds 
poignantly that since the issues in question were accepted by the previous Government in which the now critical MP’s own 
party held the Prime Minister post, the MP should be aware of the implications of the Maastrict Treaty. The connection of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the common defence is noted in the debate by other MP’s too, e.g. MP Hurskainen, MP Vihriälä 
18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. Denmark’s opt-outs concern EMU, ESDP, Justice and 
Home Affairs and the citizenship of EU; UK’s opt-outs concern EMU and the Schengen Agreement. 
180 Foreign Minister Halonen, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
181 Dissenting opinion by MP Laakso, Laine and Pykäläinen in the Defence Committee Statement 1/1997. 
182 E.g. MP Sasi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
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In the domestic debate there is a visible continuing appreciation of the value of military 
non-alignment, not only for Finland but also for European security. In the parliamentary 
debate on the Government Report 1/1997 it is stated, for instance, that 
“For a small state like Finland, non-alignment offers a chance to play an 
active role that is valuable from the viewpoint of other states too, and they 
should realize it.”183 
 
On a more practical level, it is seen that the participation of non-aligned countries 
increases the “political credibility” of peacekeeping operations in Europe, such as those 
in Bosnia (IFOR, SFOR).184 Finnish non-alignment is also seen to support the stability 
of Northern Europe.185 It is also appreciated that the Government Report presents 
Finnish defence as a contribution to EU’s security: “Finland’s credible independent 
defence capability supports the common security of the Union and its members” 
(Government Report 1/1997, 48). Reciprocally, a capable EU is seen to be in Finland’s 
security interests. 
 
Where the general security significance given to the EU is increasing, the emphasis put 
on the OSCE appears to be declining compared to the first phase. The Government 
Report notes that “the limits of the OSCE’s capability were highlighted during the crisis 
in former Yugoslavia” (ibid., 12). The OSCE is now presented more in terms like ”quiet 
diplomacy”, ”political crisis management, ”minority rights”, ”norms”, ”democracy”, 
“neighbourhood relations”. In the report’s general part on the European security 
development and Finland the OSCE is given only a very few references. When the 
report deals with the ”basic factors in Finland’s security environment” (ibid., 18-36) the 
OSCE remains in a marginal role. Yet, the OSCE continues to have visibility in the 
Finnish discourse, but the meanings attached to it are not that homogeneous and positive 
as during the previous phase. In the parliamentary debates the OSCE is once even 
labelled a thing from the past, and being on the wane in the current international 
politics.186 Concerning Finland’s take on NATO, NATO enlargement and NATO-
membership there is no significant change compared to the first phase. When presenting 
the Government Report 1/1997 to the Parliament the Prime Minister refers to the 
continuity of the policy defined in the white book of 1995 (Government Report 
1/1995).187  
                                                  
183 MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
184 E.g. MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
185 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
186 MP Tarkka calls OSCE “the most incapable security organization in Europe”, favoured by Russia with the purpose of 
downplaying NATO’s significance as a security organization in Europe. MP Tarkka 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the 
Government Report 1/1997.  
187 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. When the parliamentary 
debates touch upon NATO enlargement, a central issue appears to be Russia’s attitude towards it. E.g MP Holopainen, 
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The Government puts much effort on highlighting the general continuity of the Finnish 
defence policy thinking. At the same time, it is argued that Finland has “successfully 
managed to adapt its foreign and security policy to the new integrating Europe and to 
the global challenges”.188 This simultaneous emphasizing of “continuity” and 
“adaptation” is a typical feature in the Finnish discourse in this phase. What is also 
typical is that they are presented not as contradictory features, but as logically 
compatible with each other. In this light, a key purpose of the Government Report is to 
correspondingly adapt the defence policy to the altered European and global 
circumstances, while at the same time touting the continuity of the defence policy and 
showing that there is no break in the national defence policy. It is concluded that the 
previous “neutrality” and the current “military non-alliance” do not lead to different 
requirements for the national defence capability (such as showing credible defence, and 
a capability to repel violations of Finland’s territorial integrity).189 This is seen to offer a 
major justification for using the concept of continuity as the central trademark 
describing the Finnish defence policy. Likewise, traditional territorial defence retains its 
significance in security policy. The Finnish defence solution based on a territorial 
defence system covering the entire area of the country and general conscription remains 
relevant (the durations of the national service periods are, however, revised). On the 
other hand, the Government Report also talks of the “change in the structure of defence” 
(ibid., 84) and ”restructuring the defence system” (ibid., 86). It is seen that “the general 
development in Europe and the environs of Finland makes a reduction in the strength of 
wartime defence forces possible, provided the technical level of the remaining forces is 
raised.” Consequently, “the personnel strength of the Defence Forces will be reduced by 
in all 110 000 over the planning period [1998-2008]”. Additionally, three readiness 
brigades are to be created, which is seen a principal feature in the development of the 
wartime ground forces. Concerning Finland’s ability to participate in international crisis 
management it is stated that ”International military cooperation is a growing part of the 
security policy pursued by Finland” and that “[P]articipation in demanding international 
crisis-management operations strengthens the Defence Force’s capacity for military 
cooperation and thus aids the development of Finland’s own defence preparedness.” 
(Government Report 1/1997, 95.) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Jäätteenmäki, Tulonen, Kekkonen, Tennilä, Tarkka 17.3.1997; MP Siimes 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the 
Government Report 1/1997. 
188 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
189 “Finland’s policy of military non-alliance requires the country to maintain a defence capability that meets high demands. 
There must be an capability [sic.] to repel violations of her territorial integrity and in the final analysis attacks on the 
country.” (Government Report 1/1997, 52.) Also Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
1/1997.  
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National projection: Finland and Sweden’s joint initiative in the IGC 
 
The rearranging of the relationship between the EU and WEU was on the agenda of the 
ICG leading to the Amsterdam Treaty (signed on 2 October 1997). France, Germany, the 
Benelux countries, Italy and Spain proposed a full merger of these organizations. This 
would have meant importing the security guarantee clause of WEU into the EU treaties. 
Moreover, it was proposed that the forthcoming treaty would include a more precise 
reference to the aim of common defence and that the crisis management tasks would be 
mentioned as the first stage in the development of a common defence. Great Britain, 
Denmark and the non-aligned countries opposed the proposal. Together with Sweden 
Finland proposed a compromise which consisted of the inclusion of the Petersberg 
tasks190 in the Amsterdam treaty and into CFSP. This way, instead of merging WEU and 
the EU, WEU would become an instrument of the EU to carry through military crisis 
management operations. In Finland’s and Sweden’s initiative191 it was proposed that 
humanitarian and crisis management tasks in which military organizations are used 
would be written into the EU’s competence (Government Report 1/1997, 17). The 
memorandum was adopted, and the Petersberg tasks were transferred to the EU, but 
WEU’s territorial defence mission fell outside the arrangement as Finland and Sweden 
had wished. Military crisis management tasks were included in the EU’s competence in 
the Amsterdam Treaty. Crisis management became part of CFSP. (Sjursen 1998, 107; 
Tiilikainen 2007, 178; Graeger et al. 2002, 22; Ojanen et al. 2000, 128; Vesa 1998, 54-
57.) 
 
The initiative was presented to the other EU-members as a way to enhance cooperation 
in military crisis management and to clarify the cooperation between the EU and WEU 
(Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997)192. However, for the non-aligned Finland and 
Sweden the main aims with the joint initiative lied elsewhere. Firstly, they found it 
important to sustain the line between security and defence in CFSP, and not to let it get 
blurred by linking WEU closer to the EU (Graeger et al. 2002, 22). In order not to 
compromise their status as militarily non-aligned countries they wanted to keep common 
defence out of the EU (Ojanen 2007, 36). To this purpose they tried to direct the 
European discussions on EU’s defence policy towards crisis management instead of 
mutual security guarantees and other similar issues that were considered difficult to 
dovetail with their national policies and foreign and security policy traditions 
                                                  
190 The Petersberg tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peace-making. See chapter 3.1. 
191 The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension: Towards an enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management. Memorandum 
from Finland and Sweden, 25. April 1996. 
192 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
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(Tiilikainen 2007, 178). Secondly, Finland found it important that the non-aligned EU 
members do not become sidetracked in CFSP and that they can participate fully in the 
EU’s crisis management activities. Therefore they must have a chance to participate on 
equal footing in planning and decision-making within WEU on the EU’s crisis 
management operations (Government Report 1/1997, 17). Thirdly, the initiative was 
also presented as a proof of Finland’s readiness to participate constructively in the EU’s 
security cooperation (Prime Minister Lipponen)193. Finland wanted to avoid becoming a 
‘footnote country’; it wanted to show that a militarily non-aligned country does not 
hinder development in security affairs (Ojanen et al. 2000, 128). The need to safeguard 
the credibility of non-alignment came up often in the then domestic debate. Likewise, 
there were domestic concerns that a EU-WEU merger would threaten the foundations of 
Finnish non-alignment policy.194 Also it was feared that the “positive security policy role 
of the non-aligned countries” would not be properly understood and appreciated in the 
EU. 195  
 
The Petersberg case is the first case during the Finnish EU-membership where Finland 
clearly tries to reduce the perceived misfit between Finnish policy and CFSP by not just 
adapting the national policy but by actively striving to adjust the EU policies. In other 
words, it is an example of national projection196 in which the main motivation lies in the 
pursuit of nationally defined goals. The “uploading” of national goals was successful in 
the sense that a line between crisis management and defence was drawn, and the worst 
scenario for Finland – the merger of WEU and EU, incorporation of the WEU defence 
clause into the EU treaties – did not realize. Thus it was possible for Finland to argue 
that the development of the EU’s defence dimension actually meant strengthening crisis 
management and peacekeeping activities. With defence taken out of the defence 
dimension, CFSP was more suitable to the Finnish self-image as a non-aligned country 
with a long tradition of peacekeeping. Additionally, it implied that Finland was able to 
participate fully in CFSP. Misfit between CFSP and Finnish non-alignment policy was 
effectively removed for the time being.197 
 
However, Finland and Sweden did not achieve all their goals with their joint initiative. 
The EU’s Petersberg task list was eventually formed on the basis of the WEU’s 
Petersberg declaration, and thus included more far-reaching capacities than were 
                                                  
193 “Finland and Sweden’s joint initiative proves our preparedness to participate in the Union’s security cooperation.” Prime 
Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
194 E.g. MP Vihriälä 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
195 MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. 
196 Building on Wong (2006) national projection was defined in chapter 2 as promoting and exporting nationally defined 
policy models, ideas, goals and interests into the other member states and to the EU level. 
197 Concerning Sweden it has been noted in similar vein that due to the joint initiative’s success ”Swedish participation in 
future CFSP military cooperation could be more easily rationalised to the domestic participation as compatible with non-
participation in military alliances (Miles 2005, 266). 
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included in the Finnish-Swedish initiative. The Amsterdam Treaty refers to the ”tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management including peace-making” instead of “crisis 
management” as was proposed by Finland and Sweden (Tiilikainen 2007, 178-179.) 
Thus the initiative was only partially successful. It failed in limiting crisis management 
to something short of peace enforcement (Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). There 
were also some unintended side-effects that were out of line with the original aims of the 
Finnish-Swedish initiative. At the EU level the initiative and the inclusion of the 
Petersberg tasks was followed by a surprisingly rapid development of the European 
security and defence policy. After the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty a common 
understanding between France and UK that was achieved in St.Malo in 1998, and this 
added momentum to ESDP development (see chapter 3.1). Therefore, while Finland’s 
national projection was substantially successful (in that the stated aims were mostly 
achieved), it resulted, more or less directly, in further pressures to national adaptation. 
 
Initially Finland tried, and succeeded, to prevent the proposed merger of WEU into the 
EU and, consequently, to draw a clear line between crisis management and defence in 
the EU. Yet, thanks to these repercussions of national projection Finland got inescapably 
entangled in deepening integration in the area of security and defence policy. What 
enhanced that effect was that many of the decisions on ESDP development coincided 
with Finnish EU Council presidency. It became a task for Finland to carry on the 
development of the EU military crisis management and ESDP according to decisions 
made in the Cologne Council. Finland was asked to “practice what you preach” during 
the presidency 198, and was obliged to help in advancing further the defence dimension 
during the Finnish presidency, including inter alia the establishment of new institutions 
and a European military capacity to undertake the full range of the Petersberg tasks. The 
aim concerning the military capacities became to be known as the Helsinki Headline 
Goal. It implied that in terms of military capabilities the EU should be able, by the year 
2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, a rapid reaction force 
of up to 60 000 persons (see chapter 3.1). 
 
In the domestic debate the Government emphasized that this ESDP development was 
about the creation of crisis management capability and clearly tried to downplay the 
implications of the ongoing ESDP development on the EU’s defence dimension. Foreign 
Minister Halonen noted that the concepts of ”security” and ”defence” give possibilities 
for wide-ranging discussions, but that the Finnish purpose has been to delimit the scope 
                                                  
198 As Ojanen has noted the two countries’ active involvement in setting the scene led later on to the need also to be 
generous in terms of their own contributions to the EU’s developing crisis management capabilities.” (Ojanen 2007, 36.) 
Ojanen, Herolf and Lindahl have presented evidence that the rapid development of the defence dimension took the 
representatives of Finland by surprise (Ojanen et al. 2000; 130, 151). 
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of development into crisis management.199 The Prime Minister stated that the ESDP 
development is not about “harmonization of our defence systems or defence expenses” 
and such will not happen during the Finnish [EU Council] presidency”.200 The 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee supported these definitions and statements.201 
However, in the domestic debate there were concerns that such difference between 
“crisis management and common security and defence policy dimension” is not properly 
acknowledged in the Finnish and international media.202 
 
All in all, a consequence for Finland was that it became increasingly problematic to 
label ESDP domestically as “crisis management, not defence”. Secondly, internationally 
there was a need to clarify the non-alignment in the face of the developing ESDP in 
order to be able to credibly argue that Finland still was non-aligned despite the current 
ESDP development. The solution by the Government was to present to the domestic 
audience ESDP development merely as development of crisis management which had 
nothing to do with common defence: ”The Cologne European Council clearly delimited 
the development of common security and defence policy into crisis management and the 
so-called Petersberg tasks. (…) It is not a question of common defence, and common 
defence is not discussed herein.” (Prime Minister Lipponen 25.11.1999). Tellingly, the 
Prime Minister’s announcement to the Parliament on ESDP during the Finnish 
presidency was titled “The EU’s security and defence policy: crisis management during 
the Finnish presidency” (Prime Minister Announcement 1/1999), more or less 
suggesting that ESDP equates to crisis management. Furthermore, the Prime Minister 
began the announcement by underlining issues that remain unchanged and thus cause no 
adaptational pressures for Finland. It is noted in the announcement, for instance, that 
each EU-member state independently makes the decision to participate in any crisis 
management operation decided by the EU, and that the participation is not compulsory. 
It is also highlighted that the EU’s actions to promote international peace and security 
are in line with the UN Charter and the principles of the OSCE, and are made in 
cooperation with these organizations. Additionally, the “peace-making” mentioned in 
the original WEU’s Petersberg declaration and consequently in the Amsterdam Treaty is 
translated as “rauhan palauttaminen” [peace restoring], thus using a slightly softer 
term.203 The civilian aspects of crisis management (political, economic and humanitarian 
means) are also underlined. It appears to be important for many MP’s that there are no 
changes regarding Finland’s non-alignment policy and that Finland is not in a process of 
                                                  
199 Foreign Minister Halonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management. 
200 Prime Minister Lipponen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management. 
201 Foreign Affairs Council Statement 3/2000. 
202 MP Kekkonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management. 
203 Typically peace-making is in the Finnish debate defined as “restoring peace, by military force if necessary”. On the 
different domestic interpretations of “peace-making” see chapter 5.3 below. 
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building military forces for the EU.204 Therefore also greater visibility of non-military 
means in ESDP is repeatedly called for.205  
 
The voluntary character of ESDP and the EU’s crisis management is emphasized in the 
debate. The voluntary character is contrasted to the ”automatic” and “binding” nature of 
common defence and collective security guarantees that are seen typical for military 
alliances. The lack of any binding measures in ESDP is seen as a factor that 
differentiates ESDP from military alliances.206 Yet, it is noted often that other member 
states might see that in a different way than Finland does: for them crisis management is 
an intermediate stage in a process leading to common defence, and many MP’s see this 
as a likely source of problems for Finland and the Finnish non-alignment policy207 – 
despite the reassurances coming from the Foreign Ministry and the President that 
common defence is highly unlikely.208 Concerns that commitment to ESDP might in the 
near future come to compromise Finnish non-alignment policy are raised in the debate. 
The development towards deeper cooperation in security policy in the EU is seen likely 
to cause further national adaptational pressures. All in all, however, the Government’s 
view is generally shared in that it is seen that with a CFSP focusing on crisis 
management “it has been possible to relatively well dovetail the needs of the non-
aligned member states with the development of CFSP”.209 Nevertheless, the potential 
differences in how the concept of peace-making is interpreted by different EU-member 
states becomes a topic of discussion. It is seen that especially the big EU-member states 
that are NATO-members have a different view on what kind of tasks fall under the title 
of “crisis management”.210 It is also noted by some critics that by participating in 
international crisis management, such as the KFOR-operation the purpose of the 
Government is to direct Finnish security policy towards the common European defence 
policy and to secure Finland’s place in the core of the EU in this policy area too.211 
 
In the background of the debate there is the question of Finland’s state identity inside the 
EU: is Finland similar to the other EU-members, or is there a distinction in Finland’s 
foreign and security policy that sets Finland apart from the other members. On one hand 
                                                  
204 E.g. MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1999 (EU security and 
defence policy: crisis management during the Finnish EU Presidency). 
205 E.g. MP Vilén, MP Korkeaoja, MP Ojala 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1999. 
206 MP Kiljunen 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1999. 
207 E.g. MP Anttila, MP Ryynänen, MP Rauhala, MP Tennilä, MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s 
announcement 2/1999. 
208 “The European Union is not developing into a collective security organization.” President Halonen 31.8.2000 (Halonen 
2000). ”The EU currently has a common security and defence policy, but that it would logically lead to a common defence – 
that is just an idea thrown in by some member states, an idea that really does not look very topical.” Ambassador Inki, 
11.10.2000 (Inki 2000).  
209 MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1999. 
210 MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1999. 
211 MP Krohn 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
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we can conclude that European integration has entered the state identity reproduction 
process that takes place via foreign policy. On the other hand, these perceived 
differences that relate to neutrality/alignment play a role in the Finnish state identity 
reproduction process. I will come back to this question in the conclusions of this chapter. 
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5.3 Reconstructing the relationship between crisis management and national 
defence 
 
5.3.1 New peacekeeping legislation 
 
The Finnish peacekeeping legislation was again amended in 2000. In addition to the 
broader international development tendencies in the post-Cold War peacekeeping (as 
discussed in chapter 4.3) there were two topical policy issues that were in the domestic 
debate identified as the key driving forces behind the new legislation. Firstly, the 
preparations of Finland’s participation in the KFOR-operation212 were underway and the 
applicability of KFOR to the current peacekeeping legislation were questioned 
particularly in the parliamentary debate.213 Secondly, the above-discussed CFSP 
development made it topical to rethink the relation and the potential misfit between 
Finnish peacekeeping legislation and the definitions written into the Amsterdam Treaty 
on the EU’s crisis management. As will become apparent in the following analysis, the 
official government texts are careful not to mention any causal relation between CFSP 
development and the new national legislation, and the Ministers deny that the 
development of EU crisis management would have had any impact on the amendment. 
Yet, in the parliamentary debate on the new legislation the ESDP, EU crisis 
management development, Amsterdam Treaty and Petersberg tasks figure prominently. 
The significant role that peacekeeping continues to play in the Finnish state identity 
reproduction becomes apparent in the wide and heated domestic debate. Furthermore, 
changing interpretations of the vehicles of identity production that relate to neutrality 
and alignment are also observable in the debate. 
 
The domestic debate on peacekeeping and crisis management started already in the 
context of the IFOR-operation and the peacekeeping act of 1995. As was the case with 
the IFOR, Finland’s participation in the new crisis management operations in the 
Balkans impacts on the new peacekeeping legislation. In fact, the Government presents 
the problems that Finnish military commanders are having in the field in interpreting the 
                                                  
212 UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) with a peace treaty attached to it in June, authorised UN member states and 
concerned international organizations to form an international peace corps in Kosovo. Tasks include maintaining a threat in 
order to prevent hostilities from breaking out again and maintaining and where necessary enforcing a cease fire; securing 
the withdrawal of military troops, police forces and paramilitary organizations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army’s troops and other armed groups representing Kosovo Albanians, and securing a 
safe environment where refugees can return safely and where international civilian operations and humanitarian 
organizations can operate. The KFOR operation was preceded by NATO’s air raids which lacked a UN mandate. (UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244; Aro 2000, 56.) 
213 For a jurisprudential analysis on the Finnish participation in KFOR see Aro 2000.  
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1995 peacekeeping law’s paragraphs on peace enforcement as the overriding reason for 
the amendment. The Government also argues that the proposed new law does not entail 
any major changes regarding the substance of the legislation, but is rather a technical 
adjustment aimed at removing ambiguities in the current legislation. At the same time, 
in the domestic discourse the new peacekeeping act of 2000 is portrayed as the second 
phase in a transformation process that started with the amendment that took place in 
1995 (see chapter 4.3).214 Finnish participation in military crisis management becomes a 
topic of intense debating in the domestic level as it is seen to have repercussions both on 
Finland’s position as a militarily non-aligned state and on the relationship between 
national defence and international crisis management. (The new peacekeeping act 
implies, for instance, that the practical administration of peacekeeping forces passes 
from the Ministry of Defence to the Finnish Defence Forces; see below.) The following 
empirical analysis also shows that the reform of peacekeeping is linked in the domestic 
debate to the development of ESDP and Finland’s position in it – even though the EU’s 
crisis management operations are not yet in sight (they only start during the third phase 
of Finnish foreign and security policy Europeanization, see chapter 6). 
 
 
Government report on Finland’s participation in KFOR and the new Peacekeeping Act  
 
Finland’s participation in the KFOR operation was prepared in the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence administrations in spring 1999, based on the Rambouillet peace plan. As a reply 
to NATO’s call for preliminary information about PfP countries possible participation in 
the operation Finland announced in 1.6.1999 its preliminary readiness to take part in the 
operation with a 700-800 man battalion. (Aro 2000, 57.) The Government Report 
(2/1999) titled ”Finland’s participation in the military crisis management operation 
(KFOR) in Kosovo” was presented to the parliament in 15.6.1999. The Report noted that 
Finland’s participation in KFOR is in accordance with the regulations of the 
Peacekeeping Act firstly because the operation was authorised by the UN Security 
Council and it was seen not to differ significantly from the previous IFOR/SFOR 
operation. Secondly, the Government argued that it was not question of peace 
enforcement (which is not sanctioned by the 1995 peacekeeping act), since “the parties 
of the conflict are committed to the ceasefire and the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] is 
committed to disarmament” and because “initiative and unlimited use of force is not 
necessary in this operation“ (Prime Minister Lipponen 16.6.1999). 215 
                                                  
214 As was noted earlier, from the Europeanization perspective the comparison between these two cases is most suitable, 
because a significant development in CFSP, that is the source of adaptational pressure, has taken place between 1995 and 
2000. 
215 Prime Minister Lipponen 16.6.1999, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/1999. Peace enforcement was 
found unsuitable for Finland’s (small) state identity (see chapter 4.3) and was not sanctioned by the effective peacekeeping 
legislation. 
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The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee shared the Government’s view that Finnish 
participation is in line with the Finnish peacekeeping legislation, and referred to the 
same justifications as presented by the Government. The Committee saw that Finnish 
participation in the KFOR operation is in line with the fundamental goals of Finland’s 
foreign and security policy. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 5/1999; Jaakonsaari 
1999.216) The Committee added that it is not a question of traditional peacekeeping, but 
enhanced peacekeeping, meaning that there is a need for the readiness for reactive and 
restricted use of force. The Parliament’s Defence Committee noted in its statement that 
the Finnish concepts of peacekeeping tasks are still inconsistent with the corresponding 
international concepts. The Committee stated that in other countries the KFOR operation 
clearly falls under the category of ”peace enforcement” which does not have a matching 
counterpart in the Finnish legislation. Yet the Committee concludes that in the 
terminology of the Finnish legislation the KFOR operation does not meet the essential 
elements of peace enforcement. (Defence Council Statement 2/1999, 3.) Peace 
enforcement is seen to contain active and initiative use of military force, whereas the 
KFOR is about enhanced peacekeeping, that is reactive use of force, yet wider than self-
defence.217 In the parliamentary debate, however, the Government Report, and the 
definitions used in it, are faced with more critical response, as will be discussed 
below.218  
 
In unison with the KFOR planning, the preparations for amending the Peacekeeping Act 
were ongoing.219 In April 2000 the Government proposal was submitted to the 
Parliament, and the new Peacekeeping Act was approved in 21 June 2000. Compared to 
the previous peacekeeping legislation the main amendment was that the wording on 
peace enforcement, added by the Parliament in 1995, “or other operations that can be 
regarded as peace enforcement” was removed. When presenting the bill to the 
Parliament the Defence Minister referred to the problems that the current legislation had 
caused in the field during the SFOR and KFOR operations. The above-mentioned 
wording implied that the 1995 Peacekeeping act did not sanction Finnish participation in 
                                                  
216 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 5/1999; MP Jaakonsaari 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
2/1999. 
217 MP Kiljunen 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
218 The definitions of these concepts were topical in the jurisprudential discussion at that time, and particularly from the 
view point of national decision-making system: ”The problem is caused by situations that remain in the ”grey area” between 
war and traditional peacekeeping defined in section 33 [of the Constitution Act] conceptualised as “enhanced 
peacekeeping”, “wider peacekeeping”, “peace enforcement” or “conflict resolution” by legislators, researchers and legal 
officials. “Section 33 defines the handling of Finland’s foreign relations. According to this section, “decisions concerning 
war and peace shall be made by the President with the consent of Parliament””. “Enforcement actions that are decided and 
approved by the UN are affected by section 33. However, peacekeeping as a concept is based on the desire to avoid military 
action. (…)[T]his restriction has been included in § 1 of the Peacekeeping Act”. (Aro 2000, 53.) 
219 A working group left its report to the Defence Minister regarding amendments to the Peacekeeping Act in November 
1999 (Aro 2000, 50). 
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peace enforcement or in other operations that can be regarded as peace enforcement. 
Therefore, the Finnish commander in the field might be faced with a situation in which 
he has to decide if a task given to the Finnish troops during the operation meets the 
Finnish definition of “peace enforcement” and consequently abstain from implementing 
the task. The Minister notes that such political responsibility should belong to the 
Parliament and Government, not to the field commander. This is presented by the 
Government as the main reason why the peacekeeping act must be amended. 
 
Additionally, the Government aims to change the peacekeeping legislation so that 
Finnish troops can participate in a humanitarian operation on the official request of a UN 
agency, such as the UNCHR. The Government proposal mentions the Macedonia case as 
an example: Due to China’s veto in the UN Security Council the UNPREPED mission 
was not granted continuation in 1999. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees asked 
the Finnish peacekeepers to assist in the humanitarian operation in the area. Since the 
requested operation lacked UN mandate Finland declined the call for assistance. 
Therefore the Government proposes that “Finland could in the future consider 
participating in humanitarian operations with a military organization”.220 When 
presenting the proposal to the Parliament the Defence Minister highlights that the 
purpose of the new legislation was not to enable Finnish participation in operations that 
would be more demanding or difficult than previously; the nature and scale of the 
country's peace-keeping work would not be altered by the changes. Instead, the 
amendment of the legislation is justified by referring, firstly, to the international 
development that has been ongoing in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. In 
adapting to this development Finnish peacekeepers’ tasks are to be enhanced to include 
humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians.221 
 
The ongoing EU’s crisis management capacity development (see chapter 3) and its 
impact on the Finnish policies and legislation is not pondered upon in the Government 
proposal. The general preamble of the proposal contains only two brief passages on the 
EU and mentions the Petersberg tasks in passing. In fact, as was the case in phase I, the 
Government discourse does not establish any causality between CFSP and the changes 
in the Finnish legislation. Emphasis is put on the continuity of the Finnish foreign and 
security policy – and Finland’s membership in the EU is not constructed as a factor that 
would have caused disruptions in this continuity. Nor is the EU-membership seen as a 
source of external forcing that causes adaptational pressures on Finnish policies. The 
implicit argument is that the EU-membership does not play a role when the national 
legislation that concerns foreign and security policy is changed.  
 
                                                  
220 Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
221 Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
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It is simply noted in the preamble of the proposal that the WEU lacks the resources for 
military crisis management, and additionally that the EU’s concept for military crisis 
management was accepted in the EU summit in 1999 and that the EU can in principle 
launch a peacekeeping mission (Government proposal 20/2000, 6). The preamble 
continues to state that the EU ”acknowledges that the primary responsibility for 
international peace and security remains on the UN” (Government proposal 20/2000, 6). 
The only reference to EU crisis management is made when it is referred to the problems 
caused by the unclarity of the international concepts regarding peacekeeping: “In 
international parlance the concept of crisis management has become increasingly used 
along with peacekeeping. In the planning of the EU’s crisis management forces the term 
military crisis management in practice means peacekeeping activities” (ibid.,  8).  It  is  
stated that the diversity of concepts can cause uncertainty on which type of operations 
Finland can participate in. When presenting the Government proposal to the Parliament 
the Defence Minister does not mention the EU at all.222  
 
One could argue that there is a certain contradiction in that on one hand the Government 
declares that ESDP is not about common defence, but crisis management (see chapter 
5.2) and on the other hand it states that despite this ESDP does not play a role when the 
national legislation on crisis management is amended. Indeed, in the parliamentary 
debate there is no shortage of views that draw a connection between ESDP and the new 
peacekeeping legislation. The impact of the EU’s crisis management capacity build-up 
on Finnish foreign and security policy was debated extensively. The justifications of the 
amendment presented by the Government are questioned and the external pressures 
posed by the EU membership are seen to have contributed to the new legislation. 
Moreover, the new peacekeeping act is not regarded merely as a technical adjustment to 
the previous one, as the Government suggests, but often as a change that affects the 
whole Finnish foreign and security policy, and thus also has repercussions on Finland’s 
identity as an actor in the international system. The broad range and diversity of views in 
the domestic discussion on peacekeeping/crisis management is reflected in the different 
stages of the parliamentary debate, and materializes, for instance, as an objection 
statement in the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report and as dissenting 
opinions in the Defence Committee Statement.223 
 
First of all, there appears to be significant disagreement as to why the current wording 
on peace enforcement (“...or other operations that can be regarded as peace 
                                                  
222 Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. The Minister follows the 
same line also outside the parliamentary debate: when giving a speech on the same day in a seminar that explicitly deals 
with European crisis management he treats the amendment of the peacekeeping act and EU’s crisis management as separate 
and unconnected issues. (Enestam 2000.) 
223 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000; Defence Committee Statement 3/2000. 
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enforcement”) is found so problematic that it is to be eliminated. There are also different 
interpretations concerning the consequences of this amendment on the scale and nature 
of operations in which the Finnish troops can now participate in. The opposition, 
supported by two MP’s from a government party argues that the Government proposal 
“in reality gives a possibility to participate in operations that require more extensive use 
of military force than currently”.224 The EU crisis management development, Petersberg 
tasks and Amsterdam Treaty are repeatedly brought up in the debate, and it is seen that 
they cause increasing pressures towards standardization of national legislation in EU 
member states. There are different interpretations on what the reference to ”tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management including peace-making” in the Amsterdam Treaty 
actually means in relation to peace enforcement (see chapter 5.2 above). Therefore the 
Government’s reasoning that the amending of references to peace enforcement in 
Finnish legislation is only a technical one and does not change the nature of Finnish 
peacekeeping or Finland’s foreign and security policy is questioned. It is seen that 
Finland is responding to pressures caused by the EU-membership and the evolving EU 
crisis management and taking steps towards peace enforcement. Furthermore, it is 
argued that it is a logical and inevitable – if unwelcome – continuation to the change that 
was initiated by introducing “enhanced peacekeeping” earlier (in phase I). It is seen that 
this ongoing process is taking Finland away from traditional peacekeeping and eroding 
the identity of Finland as a credible and neutral peacekeeper. The most straightforward 
version of such a view finds this a clear case of the adaptation of national foreign and 
security policy as a response to a misfit between ESDP and Finnish legislation. 
According to this viewpoint, the crisis management capacity and institutions the EU is 
building require legislative changes in the EU member states, and one of these changes 
is that the Petersberg tasks are written into the national legislation.225  
 
Similarly, the incorporation of crisis management as a concept into the Finnish 
legislation is seen in some of the critical views as a sign of the EU’s increasing impact 
on Finnish foreign and security policy. In their objection statement some of the members 
of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee highlight that the concept of “crisis 
management” brings with it problematic connotations regarding military enforcement 
and tasks of combat forces and peace-making. Consequently, they argue that due to the 
ambiguities in the Finnish interpretation the whole concept of “military crisis 
management” should stay away from the new peacekeeping act.226 The actual 
Committee Report, however, takes military crisis management to equate with 
peacekeeping activities, in line with the Government proposal.227  
                                                  
224 Objection in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report 4/2000 by MP Kääriäinen, Kallis, Tennilä and Korkeaoja. 
225 E.g. MP Ojala, MP Laakso, MP Tiusanen 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
226 See note 219. 
227  Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000; Government proposal 20/2000, 14. 
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Despite the positive meanings already attached to the EU membership and its security 
policy significance to Finland (see phase I and the analysis of the Government Report 
1/1997 above) in this debate Finnish adaptation to the EU’s crisis management 
development is not promoted in a positive tone.228 It is only those who oppose the 
proposed amendment of the peacekeeping act that draw the connection between the 
peacekeeping legislation and ESDP. This points to the persistence of the vehicles of 
identity production that relate to the traditional peacekeeping conception and connect 
both neutrality and peacekeeping. In the Government texts the related revisions in the 
foreign and security policy are discursively constructed in a way that aims to preserve a 
certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements. 
 
Since the new peacekeeping act stems from the context of NATO-led crisis management 
operations, and the practical problems that the commanders in the field might have or 
have had there, there are accusations in the parliamentary debate claiming that with the 
new legislation Finland is purposefully brought closer to NATO. This is seen to 
endanger the credibility Finland’s non-alignment policy.229 It is only when countering 
these accusations that the Government refers to ESDP: the Defence Minister replies that 
”the EU is in process of building its own potential to carry out operations without 
NATO, and there will still be operations that are purely UN-led.”230 Therefore it is not 
merely a question of NATO, the minister concludes. Thus, although the EU crisis 
management development is not stated as a reason for the amending of the legislation, in 
the political argumentation it is referred to when there is a need to prove that the new 
legislation is not motivated by NATO-oriented thinking or targeted at enhancing 
interoperability with NATO. The mere possibility of future autonomous EU-operations 
is presented as a factor that softens the implications of the new legislation on non-
alignment.  In a way the Government is able to utilize the EU dimension in the crisis 
management debate with the purpose of keeping the controversial NATO-issue at a safe 
distance. 
 
                                                  
228 The single exception is provided by a MP who draws a connection between the using of the crisis management concept 
in the proposal and the EU’s crisis management system, and sees this as a positive development which helps Finland to 
adapt to the common European terminology and the ESDP. MP Kanerva 13.6.2000, debate on the Government proposal 
20/2000 (first reading).   
229 E.g. MP Neittaanmäki 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999; MP Laakso, dissenting opinion in 
the Defence Committee Statement 3/2000.  
230 Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
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The changing relation of national defence and crisis management 
 
In Phase I Finland’s participation in crisis management was presented as an essential 
part of the process in which Finland adapted to the Post-Cold War security environment. 
The IFOR operation was promoted as a practical proof of this adaptation. The EU’s role 
in peacekeeping and crisis management was at that stage considered rather modest and 
the evolution of the EU into a relevant actor in international security was found unlikely 
(see chapter 4.3). All in all, in phase I the justifications as to why Finland participates in 
crisis management – which in the then-debate was mainly tagged as enhanced 
peacekeeping – were not grounded on or connected to the EU or CFSP’s goals. Quite the 
contrary, the Government explicitly wished to keep the parliamentary debate on the 
1995 Peacekeeping Act separated from the debate on CFSP development (see chapter 
4.3). In the first phase the Government also stressed that Finland’s participation in 
international crisis management served the interests of Finnish national defence. Thus it 
was the nationally defined security interests, rather than any external expectations or 
international moral obligations that were presented to serve as the key justification for 
Finland’s participation in the new forms of peacekeeping.  
 
The debate on the relationship of crisis management and national defence continues 
during the second phase. The Government continues to promote the view that the 
enhancing of crisis management capability clearly supports Finland’s defence capability. 
International military cooperation is seen to directly serve the Finnish security interests. 
The crisis management operations give valuable experiences to the military personnel 
and, additionally, increase Finland’s capacity to receive external help if Finland 
becomes under an attack.231 The Government proposes that all the practical preparation 
and implementation tasks of peacekeeping are incorporated in the tasks of the Defence 
Forces. (So far the administration of peacekeeping was organizationally placed under the 
Defence Ministry.) Now the peacekeeping organization would become part of the 
Defence Forces. The Government presents this as a technical change which helps to 
rationalize the using of resources.232 In  the  objection  statement  attached  to  the  
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Report, however, it is seen that the 
organizational adjusting proposed by the Government might imply that peacekeeping is 
given an equal status as national defence. This is seen problematic since such an 
interpretation could cause confusion over the national defence as the primary task of the 
defence forces and as the primary target in resource allocation. Consequently, the 
signatories of the objection demand that the priority of national defence over 
                                                  
231 Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997, Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
1/1997; Government Report 1/1997, 45. 
232 Government proposal 20/2000. 
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peacekeeping should be clearly indicated in the legislation on the Defence Forces.233 
They stress the difference between national defence and peacekeeping, and see that the 
difference between these two should not be blurred by any organizational changes. The 
task of the Defence Forces should be national defence only, and not peacekeeping, 
which should be based on a different organization.234 In contrast to that the Government 
argues that the current system in which the international activities are kept separate and 
unconnected with national defence has caused problems. It has resulted in negative 
attitudes towards international activities in the Defence Forces and consequently caused 
difficulties in getting defence force personnel to apply for peacekeeping missions. 
Furthermore, it is seen that giving the Defence Forces the responsibility over the 
practical implementation of peacekeeping leads to increased synergy between national 
defence and international crisis management. It is thus seen that there is a need to 
highlight the benefit of the international activities to national defence by such a 
reorganization.235 
 
Concerning the relationship of national defence and peacekeeping – and how it is 
constructed in the national foreign and security policy discourse – phase II thus 
represents a watershed: although peacekeeping activities had been traditionally seen as 
an essential part of Finland’s state identity (via the self-image of a “peacekeeping 
superpower”), it was not manifested as a significant factor in national defence. Now a 
direct connection is constructed in the Government discourse between the defence of the 
motherland and peacekeeping activities abroad. It is stated that the national defence 
policy consists of a national and international dimension.236 At  the  same  time  the  EU 
enters the domestic argumentation on peacekeeping/crisis management, as the ESDP 
begins to cause more consistent external expectations and adaptation pressures, thanks to 
the institutional build-up that started after the St.Malo Declaration (see chapter 3). The 
question of political expectations and moral obligations coming from the EU figures 
more prominently in the domestic debate than in phase I. As crisis management is seen 
to have more direct benefit for the national defence, the relationship between national 
defence and crisis management is reconstructed in a way that allows for growing 
prominence of ESDP in the Finnish foreign and security policy. Thus, although ESDP is 
in the Finnish interpretation constructed as crisis management rather than common 
defence, thanks to the new national take on the relationship between national defence 
                                                  
233 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000, 9. 
234 MP Korkeaoja 16.6.1999, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
235 Government proposal 20/2000, 11. Defence Minister Enestam 30.1.2001 in the National Defence Course (Enestam 
2001). It is not argued here that this organizational change is a direct result of European integration. Nevertheless, it can be 
noted that the increasing prominence of national defence forces’ international crisis management capacity is in line with the 
mainstream development in the European states defence policies. The ESDP development can be seen to reflect the same 
trend (Howorth 2007, see chapter 3). Theoretical and methodological analysis on the problems of measuring 
Europeanization from a rationalist institutionalist perspectice was presented in chapter 2.3. 
236 Defence Minister Enestam, 30.1.2001 (Enestam 2001). 
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and crisis management, in the phase II the ground is prepared for ESDP – even when 
labelled as crisis management – to become more significant in Finnish foreign and 
security policy. 
 
In phase I with the help of the term “enhanced peacekeeping” Finland placed itself 
somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and full-fledged crisis management (which 
was seen to include peace enforcement). It become possible for Finland to participate in 
operations executed by other international organizations than the UN and the OSCE too, 
given that the operation has a mandate of either organization. Having national 
reservations was also seen as a significant factor contributing to the state identity 
reproduction. There were only very few notions that Finland should act similarly as the 
other EU members in this respect, and no significant Europeanization pressures 
stemmed from CFSP at that stage. This made it easier to cherish the idea of continuity in 
the national foreign and security policy, and enhanced peacekeeping was constructed as 
a logical continuation to the Finnish peacekeeping tradition and thus matching with the 
Finnish state identity. What serves the same purpose in phase II is the conceptually 
constructed difference between “peace enforcement” and “military enforcement” (or 
“military coercion”), the latter being something that Finland does not participate in and 
is simply unsuitable with Finnish foreign and security policy.237 This difference makes 
possible the perception that the new policy does not contradict with the still so 
prominent elements in Finland’s state identity, i.e. non-alignment and traditional 
peacekeeping. When these two are intertwined with each other, as in this case, they 
appear to constitute a particularly strong conservative dynamic.   
 
The persistence of the traditional peacekeeping as an identity element becomes clearly 
apparent in the domestic debate on the new peacekeeping act. The neutrality element is 
frequently connected to this, for instance by noting that it is a factor that gives special 
added value to Finnish peacekeeping compared to other countries: Finland’s activities 
are characterized by confidence building and conflict dissolution among the parties, 
whereas other countries put more emphasis on military force.238  Similarly, in the 
context of the Balkan operations the Finnish non-alignment is typically presented as a 
positive feature that enabled the work of President Ahtisaari as an arbitrator in the crisis 
and gave a good grounding for Finland’s participation in the crisis management 
                                                  
237 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000. Defence Committee Statement 3/2000. 
238 E.g. MP Ojala, MP Oinonen, MP. E.Lahtela, 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
Similarly, in Phase I it was perceived that non-alignment is not a problem but rather brings added-value to international 
crisis management operations such as IFOR. Participation in crisis management operation led by an defence organization, 
NATO was constructed compatible with military non-alignment with the help of /by introducing the category of enhanced 
peacekeeping. To some extent this construction was challenged in the domestic debate, but eventually gained the dominant 
position in the discourse. 
 156 
operation.239 The role of President Ahtisaari in the international negotiations on Kosovo 
is often perceived in the domestic debate as a model example of the significance and 
benefits of military non-alignment.240 It is also used as a justification for the claim that 
Finland should not shy away from its nation-state oriented security thinking and must 
keep its national reservations even in the face of the developing CFSP. In the 
parliamentary debates many MP’s see that as a non-aligned country Finland can give a 
more significant contribution to the building of a more secure and peaceful Europe than 
many other countries. Therefore it is concluded that CFSP and ”the eventual framing of 
common defence” must not jeopardize the status of the non-aligned EU-members.241  
 
This combination of traditional state identity elements does not easily match with the 
concept of military crisis management that is seen to have a more robust approach on the 
use of force. This view is well described by an address of a MP during the parliamentary 
debate: ”Finland is a peacekeeping superpower, but only when it comes to traditional 
peacekeeping.”242 Therefore it was also possible to locate in the Government 
argumentation various attempts to show that crisis management implies no deviation 
from the highly appreciated Finnish peacekeeping tradition. This was supported by 
underlining the difference between Finland’s and other countries approach on peace 
enforcement. Additional justifications for the revisions in peacekeeping policy were 
sought for by emphasizing more strongly than before the benefits of international crisis 
management to the national defence and national security interest.  
 
During the first phase (1994-1996) there was a widely shared understanding that Finland 
differs from the other EU-member states in its foreign and security policy premises. 
Regarding that there are now indications of an emerging change. The distinctive features 
of Finnish foreign and security policy (compared to the other EU-members and CFSP) 
are acknowledged but their role in the state identity reconstruction process is declining. 
Alongside the talk on the legitimate security interest of a small state and national 
reservations there is a growing current in the domestic discourse that underlines and 
calls for similarity between the security policy approaches of Finland and other EU-
                                                  
239 MP S.Lahtela 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
240 The advantages of non-alignment are promoted to the international audience too: Finnish policy of non-alignment and 
‘restrain’ in questions of NATO membership are frequently presented as part of Finland’s contribution to world stability and 
peace (Browning 2002, 62; Archer 1999, 57; President Ahtisaari quoted in Austin 1999, 81). Browning sees this as an 
indication of ”a re-inscription of the Cold War identity of Finland as a physician and bridge-builder in world politics” 
(Browning 2002, 62). 
241 MP Kallis, MP Aho 17.6.1999, debate on the Prime Minister’s Announcement 1/1999. 
242 MP Seivästö 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
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members – it is seen that Finland should be able to act equally with its partners in crisis 
management 243 
 
 
 
5.3.2 European crisis management in the Finnish defence policy 
 
“The importance of the European Union in relation to Finland's security interests and 
goals has continued to increase. A strong Union based on solidarity will enhance 
security, prevent crises from emerging and improve Finland's ability to cope with such 
situations should they arise. An improvement in the EU's ability to take action will 
remain a fundamental principle of Finland's policy on Europe. ” (Government Report 
2/2001, 4) 
 
 
According to the Government Report 2/2001 the three basic components of Finland’s 
security and defence policy are: maintenance and development of a credible defence 
capability, remaining militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions, and 
participation in international cooperation to strengthen security and stability 
(Government Report 2/2001, 4). Just like the previous defence policy white book – 
Government Report 1/1997 ”European security development and Finnish defence” – the 
Government Report 2/2001 focuses strongly on Europe (even thought the title of the 
report “Finnish security and defence policy” this time contains no reference to European 
security).244 The Government states that in the face of intensifying European integration 
the “EU is increasing its influence not only as an economic actor but in the sphere of 
foreign and security policy too, by acquiring new means for crisis management. The 
Union is also improving its capability to prevent security problems and to strengthen 
comprehensive security.” (Government Report 2/2001, 11.) There appears to be a widely 
shared understanding that the significance of the EU in carrying out Finland’s security 
policy interests and goals has increased.245 The Government’s argument that “By 
                                                  
243 MP Korhonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management; MP Kanerva 11.4.2000, preliminary 
debate on the Government proposal 20/2000; MP Kuosmanen 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
2/1999. 
244 In addition to the European security issues, the Government Report and the related parliamentary debate focuses on 
structural changes to be implemented in the Defence Forces. Particularly the programme to reduce the strenght of Defence 
Forces wartime troops cause discussion, as well as the plans to revise the territorial defence system. 
245 Government Report 2/2001, 33; Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 8; e.g. MP Ranta-Muotio 
19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. However, all the views on ESDP-development and its 
significance to Finland are not positive: the leader of the main opposition party states that “after the Laeken summit there 
are no high expectations. The Union did not show great ability to make decisions, nor appreciation of historical realities, but 
instead appeared to relapse into internal struggles and games which will not strengthen the Union in the eyes of citizens or 
as an international actor.” MP Aho 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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actively seeking to develop the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, 
Finland is able to strengthen its influence in international affairs and to further its own 
security objectives” is supported by the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee 
(Government Report 2/2001, 33; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 13).246 
 
The Government sees that “Finland’s membership in the European Union raises the 
threshold to exert pressure against Finland. It also offers Finland a means to resolve 
conflicts and increases the options available to receive assistance to repel threats.” 
(Government Report 2/2001, 36). Thus, it is seen that even without any specific military 
security guarantees the EU has a strong positive security policy significance to Finland. 
The EU-membership is seen to create protection and security through political joint 
responsibility. Additionally, it is seen that participation in EU crisis management 
strengthens Finland’s position in a crisis situation. This is because crisis management 
operations are seen to enhance mutual solidarity and military interoperability between 
the EU members. The Defence Minister concludes that Finland seeks for security in 
political alignment and cooperation instead of neutrality that would lead to isolation 
under the prevailing conditions.247 Therefore the Finnish Defence Forces are to have a 
capability for managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland’s borders. 
Consequently, regional crises with only an indirect effect on Finland become significant 
for Finnish security. (Government Report 2/2001, 43-44). 
  
The government presents the report merely as a recheck of the previous defence policy 
report from 1997, but in the domestic debate there are differing interpretations, some 
seeing the report representing a new policy.248 The Parliament’s Defence Committee 
notes that the concepts describing Finland’s security and defence policy have changed 
since to the previous defence white book. The Committee pays attention firstly to the 
following conceptual change: whereas the 1997 Report underlined credible national 
defence, the 2001 Report talks of “maintenance and development of a credible defence 
capability” – without a specific reference to the national or independent character of 
defence. Secondly, a conceptual change is seen in that the Government Report mentions 
that Finland remains militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions. (Defence 
Committee Report 2/2001, 8) 
 
                                                  
246 On the other hand the Committee also finds the European focus of the as a shortcoming in the report, because security 
policy impacts of globalisation would require more extensive analysis of the international development. Foreign Affairs 
Committee Statement 6/2001, 6. See also Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 4. 
247 Defence Minister Enestam 30.1.2001 (Enestam 2001). 
248 Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, MP Kanerva 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001; 
Justice Minister Koskinen 4.12.2001 (Koskinen 2001),. 
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Adapting to military crisis management, projecting civilian crisis management 
 
The Government Report states that “the international activities of the Finnish Defence 
Forces have been more extensive and have grown more rapidly than anticipated” 
(Government Report 2/2001, 6). The creation of the EU’s crisis management capability 
impacts heavily on how Finnish crisis management is developed. A Finnish rapid 
deployment force is offered to the EU for purposes of international crisis management. 
(The original total strength of the force offered was 1500 soldiers, and was increased to 
2000 soldiers in the EU’s capabilities improvement conference.) (Government Report 
2/2001, Parliament’s Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 13-14.) The Government 
Report refers to the decisions taken on the EU’s military crisis management capability at 
the Helsinki European Council in 1999, and notes that the required readiness will 
demand additional resources, and that Finland is involved in the development of the EU 
Member States’ collective capabilities. The Government affirms that Finland is taking 
an active part in the creation of the EU's military crisis management capability and also 
supports the set up of related operational politico-military structures. (Government 
Report 2/2001, 8, 59.) 
 
“Interoperability commensurate with European crisis management goals” is listed 
among the main objectives in developing Finland’s defence and its military crisis 
management (Government Report 2/2001, 46). The purpose is to make “personnel 
system and materiel, training and procedures internationally compatible as necessary” 
(Government Report 2/2001, 47-48). The Report states that “[t]he ability to make 
preparations, take decisions and implement actions rapidly, essential for crisis 
management, will be further enhanced. Decision-making procedures will be further 
developed, particularly with a view to the EU’s crisis management activities”, and that 
the “[d]evelopment of Finland’s rapid deployment force aims to maintain the readiness 
and capability to participate in EU-led crisis management operations.” (Government 
Report 2/2001, 34) These passages indicate that the needs of ESDP are a central baseline 
in developing the Finnish military crisis management. In contrast to the previous phases, 
EU’s crisis management activities – EU-led operations are mentioned now, too – are 
now considered relevant as guidelines for the Finnish approach to post-Cold War 
peacekeeping. The EU crisis management is perceived as a factor that sets the conditions 
and expectations for the future directions of Finnish peacekeeping. The difference is 
considerable not only in comparison to the phase I, but it is noteworthy that a year ago 
the Government discourse implied no causality between ESDP and the changes made in 
the Finnish peacekeeping legislation in the Peacekeeping Act of 2000 (see  chapter 5.3.1 
above). 
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Concerning civilian crisis management capacity there are yet not that many EU 
guidelines and common plans in existence, but Finland announces preparedness to 
follow and adapt to those as soon as such are established: “Finland is developing its 
civilian crisis management capacity on the basis of its national approach and is prepared 
to establish the capacity required particularly for developing the EU’s civilian crisis 
management capability.” (Government Report 2/2001, 8). Indeed, together with Sweden 
Finland continues to lobby for civilian means and non-military aspects of EU crisis 
management.249 During the Swedish EU Council presidency Sweden put forward a 
programme for crisis prevention, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management was established (Ojanen 2002, 170). The Gothenburg European Council 
decided that the EU must improve its ability to undertake the full range of conflict 
prevention and crisis management tasks, making use of military and civilian means. 
Targets were set for civilian aspects of crisis management which should be achieved by 
2003 through member states’ voluntary contributions (European Council 2001, 11). The 
Government Report states that “Finland is playing an active role in developing the 
civilian crisis management capacity of the EU. Finland is also developing its national 
capability in line with the EU's objectives, especially in four priority areas: police, 
strengthening the rule of law, and civil administration and civil protection.” This 
promotion of EU civilian crisis management capacity receives wide backing in the 
domestic debate. The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, for instance, sees that 
civil and military crisis management complement each other and supports the utilization 
of the broad range of EU crisis management tools, including civilian crisis management, 
and other political and economic means – and military crisis management when 
necessary.250 The Defence Committee shares this view and notes that the EU should 
create a crisis management system in which it is possible to simultaneously mobilize 
both civilian and military resources, and see that they contribute to the same goals 
(Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 14). 
 
However, there is criticism in the domestic debate that finds that civilian crisis 
management is not taken seriously enough by the Government. According to the 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, funds should be allocated to civilian crisis 
management in the state budget in the same way as in military crisis management. The 
Committee criticizes the lack of concrete estimations on the costs of the development of 
civilian crisis management. (Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 7). In the 
parliamentary debate this is seen as an indication of a greater deficiency and bias in the 
Government’s approach on crisis management: other than the military aspects of 
                                                  
249 See the joint newspaper article by Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers Lindh and Tuomioja in Helsingin Sanomat and 
Dagens Nyheter 30.4.2000. 
250 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 8-9 
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security policy often remain as phrases with no meaning.251 Similarly, there are doubts 
that civilian crisis management might not proceed in the EU as swiftly as expected and 
risks lagging behind the military dimension.252 
 
Yet, the meanings attached to the civil crisis management as a general concept in the 
domestic debate are positive. A dominant perception in the domestic discourse is that 
civilian crisis management bears significant resemblance to the ”Finnish” way of doing 
peacekeeping – in which for instance  confidence building between the parties and the 
so-called CIMIC-cooperation between military and civilian actors are seen as distinctive 
features. It is generally conceived that via civil crisis management it is possible to 
conserve and pay forward the heritage and know-how of Finnish peacekeeping.253 
Consequently, civilian crisis management is constructed as a way to preserve a certain 
resonance between the national collective understandings that relate to the traditional 
peacekeeping as a state identity element and the new more military-oriented features of 
international crisis management. The civilian dimension of crisis management helps to 
construct ESDP as being compatible with Finnish peacekeeping traditions. By putting 
emphasis on the civilian aspects of crisis management it is possible to bridge the gap 
between the domestic understandings that stem from the traditional state identity 
elements and the norms, expectations and adaptation pressures coming from the 
European level. In other words, underlining the civilian aspects of EU crisis 
management effectively reduces the perceived institutional misfit between European and 
domestic level. National projection in the form of promotion and supporting of the 
civilian crisis management in the EU-level also serves the same purpose. This process is 
enhanced by the fact that broad/comprehensive security is seen to be more embedded in 
the Finnish security and defence policy than before. The Foreign Affairs Committee 
notes that compared to the 1997 defence white book the current Government Report 
takes better notice on comprehensive security in its discussion of the defence system. 
The Committee also sees that the concept of broad security is presented as a foundation 
of Finnish security policy in a more consistent way than previously.254  
 
The domestic debate on the relationship between crisis management and national 
defence and on the possible benefits that crisis management capability gives to national 
defence (see chapter 5.3.1 above) continues in the context of the defence policy white 
book. The Government argues that developing Finland’s military crisis management 
capacity to accord with the objectives of crisis management will only benefit Finland’s 
                                                  
251 E.g. MP Ojala 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
252 MP Jaakonsaari, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
2/2001. 
253 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 10. Also e.g. MP Ojala 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government 
Report 2/2001. 
254 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 5. See also Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8. 
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national defence. (Government Report 2/2001, 46-47). It is seen that both the 
international compatibility and experiences accumulated in international crisis 
management reinforces the credibility of Finland’s national defence capability and 
strengthens Finland’s national defence resources (ibid., 57).255 
 
The main critical views in the debate stress that the development of the Finnish defence 
forces must be based on national values and on the “needs of defending the motherland”, 
and not on those of the European crisis management tasks. Participation in international 
crisis management should be subordinate to this basic function and should support it. It 
is argued that the Government Report fails to enunciate this adequately. The 
Government Report is seen to treat Finland’s defence and military crisis management 
equally important topics of development.256 It is also suspected that crisis management is 
built at the expense of national defence.257 The Government response to such criticism is 
to repeat that participation in international crisis management serves national defence 
and that there is no contradiction between these two issues.258 However, the respective 
roles of crisis management and national defence in the Government Report cause debate 
on whether the Report should be referred to the Parliament’s Defence Committee or 
Foreign Affairs Committee after the preliminary debate. Some argue that since the 
majority of the Report deals with ”general security policy, the changing environ of it, 
Finland’s general definition of security policy and the principles of defence” and 
”international crisis military and crisis management” it falls under the competence of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee (to which CFSP belongs according to the Constitution, as an 
MP notes).259 The opposite views argue that the Report is mainly about the development 
of defence administration and the defence system and thus belongs to the Defence 
Committee.260 Eventually, the Report is referred to the Defence Committee. 
 
On crisis management and non-alignment 
 
The increasing visibility and role of international activities in the official national 
defence policy causes debate on what is the impact of the changing security policy role 
of the EU and EU crisis management on Finnish non-alignment. Even neutrality, the old 
                                                  
255 Also MP Kekkonen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
256 MP Korkeaoja, MP Ryynänen, MP Nousiainen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
Ministers’ statements on the issue of helicopter procurement are presented as a concrete example case in which there is 
uncertainty on whether the plans are based on the needs of Finland’s defence or on the needs to improve the capacity to 
participate in internation crisis management. 
257 MP Ranta-Muotio, MP Vistbacka 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. This issue was visibly 
present in the domestic debate also during the phase I (see chapter 4.3). 
258 Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
259 MP Jaakonsaari, MP Kiljunen, MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
2/2001. 
260 MP Laitinen, MP Kummola 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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key concept of Finnish foreign and security policy and state identity, occasionally 
resurfaces in the debate, as the following excerpt from the parliamentary debate 
indicates: 
Defence Minister Enestam: ”Finland is no longer a neutral country, but 
politically allied and militarily non-aligned.”  
(Interception by a MP Korkeaoja: ”That is somewhat semantics!” 
Interception by MP Elo: That is semantics!”)  
Minister: “That is not semantics, that is a fact.”  
(5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.) 
 
All in all, the neutrality question is nevertheless dominantly considered a case closed: 
the common understanding remains that due to the EU membership Finland is no longer 
a neutral state in the traditional sense (see chapter 4.2).261 What causes active debating, 
however, are the varying interpretations on whether the EU-membership has enhanced 
Finland’s military non-alignment or made it more ambiguous. Some see that Finnish 
non-alignment has served as a balancing factor in the transformations that the European 
security structures have been going through and that the Finnish model is widely 
appreciated in Europe.262 Others argue that the ESDP development undermines military 
non-alignment, and that the forthcoming EU military operations will present a dilemma 
for Finland: Finland will have to choose between military non-alignment and its active 
role  in  the  EU.263 Contradicting views and contrasting ways to perceive CFSP and its 
significance and consequences for Finland are clearly present in the debate. Broader 
common ground is found, however, in the domestic debate on the benefits of non-
alignment, both for Finland and the EU: the Parliament Committees refer to the Finnish 
arbitrators work in Kosovo and North-Ireland, and to Finland’s activism in developing 
crisis management capacities in the contexts of the EU and NATO’s PfP-programme.264 
The nomination of Chief of Defence of Finland, General Hägglund as chairman of the 
EU’s Military Committee in March 2001265 is also mentioned as a proof of the fact that 
the benefits of Finland’s non-alignment status are appreciated in the EU.266 In the 
                                                  
261 Illustrative examples of this in the, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001 are MP Anttila, MP Kanerva 
5.9.2001;also MP Karpio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
262 MP Kanerva 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
263 MP Kuosmanen 19.12.2001, also MP Vilkuna, MP Jaakonsaari 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
2/2001 
264 Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 12. Also MP Anttila, MP Lax, MP 
Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001; MP Kallio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 2/2001. 
265 “The Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, represented in Brussels by their 
military representatives. The Military Committee gives advice and makes recommendations on military matters to the 
Political and Security Committee and provides military direction to the Military Staff. Duties of the Military Staff include 
early warning in relation to EU crisis management, situation assessment and strategic planning.” (Government Report 
2/2001, 18.) 
266 MP Sinnemäki 5.9.2001, MP Kuosmanen 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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parliamentary debate Finland’s national border control is added to this list. A frequently 
emphasized view in the debate is that by safeguarding the longest external border of the 
EU Finland directly contributes to the EU’s security policy goals defined in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, namely “safeguarding the integrity of the Union’s territory and 
peace and security in the Union’s outer borders”.267 A conclusion is that therefore 
Finland cannot be labelled a free-rider even it if did not participate in all EU crisis 
management tasks. Finland does its duty as an EU member and contributes to the EU’s 
security no matter what its status regarding military alliances is.268 The Government 
Report also refers to this connection between Finland’s border control and EU borders: 
“To maintain internal security, Finland must be able to carry out credible border control 
in a manner that fulfils the EU requirements.” (Government Report 2/2001, 10).  
 
All in all, debate on ESDP and its impacts on Finland concentrates chiefly on EU crisis 
management. In this respect the Government’s aim to construct ESDP as crisis 
management appears to have succeeded. The defence dimension of ESDP is largely cast 
aside in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report. The Defence Committee 
merely states that an evaluation on “how the binding of the EU’s defence dimension is 
and what are its implications on Finland” could have been included in the Government 
Report” (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8).  
 
The procedures in the domestic preparation of the Government Report 2/2001 are 
heavily criticized in the parliamentary debate.269 It is seen that the Report was prepared 
in a too exclusive manner, particularly compared to the wide consensus that has 
traditionally characterized Finnish foreign and security policy-making. The Defence 
Committee proposes that the next defence policy report be prepared in a more 
parliamentary way, and that the Parliament’s committees, civil society and research 
institutes would be better involved. (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 17). Many 
MP’s call for respect towards the tradition of strong consensus in Finnish foreign and 
security policy270 and the opposition demand better access to information and more 
inclusive parliamentary preparation in defence policy.271 To  a  certain  degree  the  
Government acknowledges the problems, though it finds that the “normal 
parliamentarism” applied did work and that the final output was “not too bad”.272 After 
                                                  
267 MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
268 MP Korkeaoja, MP Ryynänen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
269 The Defence Council was abolished in March 2000 and its duties were reallocated to the Government Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. A new Security and Defence Committee was set up, and was 
given the task of coordinating the preparation of the 2001 report. (Government Report 2/2001, 3.) 
270 MP Seivästö 19.12.2001. MP Katainen 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. MP Pekkarinen 
5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
271 MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2009, MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
272 Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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the Committee handlings of the Government Report the Defence Committee proposes a 
new model for future preparations of defence policy.273  
 
Compared to the previous defence policy white book the general view of the 
international environment remains basically unchanged. The Government states that 
“[t]he changes in European security put in motion after the end of the Cold War are both 
profound and lasting. The threat of a large-scale military conflict in Europe will remain 
low.” (Government Report 2/2001, 3). Thus, it is the potential local and regional 
conflicts that are seen to influence the European defence policies and guide the 
structural changes of armed forces in many European countries. International 
cooperation, crisis prevention and crisis management are understood as the key means to 
respond to such conflict scenarios. Additionally, the ”new security challenges” (such as 
international crime, environmental security, health issues, disasters) attached to the 
broad security concept used in the Report are seen to pose increasing requirements for 
the defence policy (Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001). Consequently, even though 
continuity is highlighted, the changes in nature of international security environment 
will have implications that touch upon Finnish territorial defence system too. The 
Government states that “the changes in the security policy environment and the crisis 
and threat scenarios” require the revision of the territorial defence system, and 
consequently a “reformed territorial defence system will be presented in the security and 
defence policy report to be submitted in 2004.” (Government Report 2/2001, 47). 
 
Another adjustment derived from the perceived changes in the international environment 
is that  military non-alignment is no longer presented as an eternal truth, but only a 
solution that is found most suitable under the prevailing circumstances, and thus may be 
subject to change. This is to say that Finland has entered an era of constant re-
assessment of its military non-alignment. The Government Report connects this issue 
with the developments in the EU: “Finland is constantly re-assessing its military non-
alliance and the functioning of crisis management and security cooperation in Europe, 
taking into consideration changes in the regional security environment and 
developments in the European Union.” (Government Report 2/2001, 32)274 This change 
is also acknowledged in the parliamentary debate, for instance by noting that citizens 
(parliamentarians included) should understand that “due to the changes in the security 
policy environment Finland’s non-alignment or alignment is no longer as critical and 
fateful a decision as it used to be.”275 However, some comment in a critical tone that the 
security and defence policy concepts used in the Government Report are basically 
                                                  
273 MP Kanerva, Chairman of the Parliament’s Defence Committee 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government 
Report 2/2001. 
274 See also MP Kanerva, MP Karpio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
275 MP Kalliomäki 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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familiar and accepted by all, but their meanings are stretched so that it is possible to 
implement new definitions of defence policy if so wished.276 Nonetheless, the perceived 
contradiction between continuity and change/adaptation is not as poignantly visible in 
the parliamentary discussion as before. The Government policy is not criticised from 
this perspective as vigorously as was done in the context of the Government Report 
1/1997 (see chapter 5.3.1 above). 
 
Concerning phase I (1994-1996) it was concluded that despite the emerging interplay 
between international and domestic norms and expectations, the dominating feature was 
the nationally-oriented perspective rather than an adoption of and commitment to 
international values. Furthermore, it was concluded that instead of CFSP, Europe or 
European values were overrun by “the international community” or “cohesive security” 
as reference objects. Similarly, although “European solidarity” was sometimes referred 
to, in phase I references to EU membership and CFSP’s significance were sparse. (See 
chapter 4.7.) Phase II presents a change in this respect, and particularly in the context of 
the second defence policy white book “a common European value base” is frequently 
referred to in the domestic debate. The defence policy report notes that European 
countries are “increasingly driven by a common value base and have similar social and 
economic frameworks.” (Government Report 2/2001, 10). Some MP’s even see direct 
congruence between the EU’s common values and Finland’s values, and underline that 
Finland is committed to defend the Union’s common values.277 All in all, compared to 
the previous phase, Finland is now constructed as being more similar to the other EU-
members than before.  
 
Yet, in the face of this, foreign and security policy is seen contain factors that 
differentiate Finland from the other EU-members. It is felt that the geographical location 
of Finland unavoidably sets its mark upon the way how Finland can relate to ESDP.  In 
the background of this understanding is that Finland is different than European countries 
with a favourable geostrategic position. The Government Report contributes to the 
reproduction of this state identity element by arguing that ”Changes in the military threat 
will have an impact on the resources and mechanisms for national defence, which will 
differ from one area to the next. In particular, in those European countries with a 
favourable geostrategic position, the defence policy has emphasized the development of 
mobile forces with a rapid reaction capability and other crisis management capabilities.” 
(Government Report 2/2001, 21). In the parliamentary debates the main opposition 
conclusions concerning Finland and ESDP (the latter perceived explicitly as crisis 
management) tend to build on this difference and argue that Finland should not 
participate in the all the activities of ESDP. This is because international crisis 
                                                  
276 MP Kääriäinen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
277 E.g. MP Kanerva 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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management is not as applicable to Finland as it is to the other EU-member states. It is 
concluded that international crisis management may increase the security of the other 
EU-members, but not Finnish security. Thus it is not question of “shared security”, and 
Finland must have its own divergent national policy. In this light it is seen that the 
Government’s view on Finnish defence policy and the way it aims to develop the 
defence system (revising the territorial defence system, purchasing helicopters, 
prevention of a strategic strike, participation in EU crisis management and plans on 
reducing the number of garrisons) is found problematic.278 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
278 MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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5.4 Conclusions on phase II 
 
 
During the period of the time analysed in this chapter the interplay between international 
and domestic expectations intensifies, and CFSP as the source of top-down 
Europeanization is more influential than before. Nevertheless, in the official 
Government discourse Finland’s participation in CFSP and ESDP continues to be 
presented as a logical part of the continuity of Finnish policy, thus having caused no 
radical alteration in the grand Finnish foreign and security policy line. In light of the 
above-presented analysis of the broader domestic discourse, the construction of 
continuity is challenged in many ways. Numerous cases were located where 
significantly contradicting political argumentation on the Finnish approach to and 
interpretation of CFSP could be seen. In the official discourse much emphasis is, for 
instance, put on what ESDP is not – and how it consequently does not require changes in 
Finnish foreign and security policy (a telling example in this respect was the Prime 
Minister’s Announcement 1/1999). This points to an intention to preserve, amid the 
changes, a certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the domestic debate revealed a growing inconsistency 
between the emphasis put on continuity in the official discourse and the simultaneous 
reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts. Indeed, in phase II it was 
no longer possible to construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as simply being fully 
compatible with the Finnish national foreign and security policy; the misfit between 
these two became so apparent, that a certain reconstruction of national foreign and 
security policy concepts and the meanings attached to them was inevitable. 
 
During phase II the EU is increasingly perceived in the Finnish discourse as an actor that 
is relevant in the sphere of foreign and security policy and has started to play a role in 
the international security policy environment. Contrast to what was the case in phase I, 
concepts like “European values” and “the common European value base” are put 
forward as factors from which the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy can be 
derived. The more integral embedding of the broad security concept in to the Finnish 
security policy (particularly in Government Report 2/2001) makes it also easier to stress 
the security policy significance of the EU. At the same time there is a considerable 
change in how CFSP’s meaning for Finland is constructed. Whereas previously CFSP, 
and the EU-membership in general, was mainly seen as an instrument for Finland, with 
which to prove the European state identity and the direction that Finland has taken in the 
post-Cold War environment to the other international actors (see 4.7), in phase II CFSP 
becomes a more internalised element of the national discourse. Consequently, CFSP 
begins to effectively play a role in the Finnish state identity production process that 
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takes place through foreign and security policy. Thus European integration in the sphere 
of foreign and security policy now represents both a tool for responding to the changes 
in the international security environment and a new means of self-identification. Whilst 
the CFSP development is given more relevance in the Finnish foreign and security 
policy thinking, the view on the international security environment and threat pictures 
remains basically unchanged (Government Reports 1/1997 and 2/2001 and Government 
proposal 20/2000 are similar to the key documents of phase I in this respect).279 This 
permanency of the national assessment of the international situation increases the 
relevance of Europeanization in explaining the changes in the Finnish foreign and 
security policy in phase II. The inapplicability of neutrality has gained a dominant 
position in the domestic discourse, and the official policy states more directly and 
unequivocally than before that this is because of the EU membership. Neutrality is now 
more widely in the domestic debate perceived as an inapt way to promote national 
interest. The implications of Finland’s political commitment to CFSP are more openly 
recognized and discussed in the national political debate. (This was evident, for instance, 
in the reactions to the rejection of the label “independent” when referring to the national 
defence in the Government Report 2/2001.) The traditional vehicles of identity 
production, that is the foreign and security policy concepts, are challenged by new 
perceptions – which, in turn, are more and more generated in the increasing interaction 
at the European level. In light of these findings the constructivist IR-theory’s argument 
that international interaction influences the way national interest and state identity are 
reconstructed (see chapter 2.4) seems to hold water. 
 
In phase I the expressed causes for changes in the Finnish approach on peacekeeping – 
and more specifically for amending peacekeeping legislation – were not primarily 
connected to European integration. Rather the change was constructed as a reaction and 
adaptation to the changed international environment. In Phase II the impact of European 
integration is visible when peacekeeping is reconstructed as crisis management. The 
definitions  used  in  ESDP  have  a  significant  impact  on  how  the  new  forms  of  
peacekeeping, and the division into civilian crisis management and military crisis 
management, are perceived nationally. It can be concluded that the conceptual shift from 
peacekeeping towards crisis management, and the related changes in the meanings 
attached to peacekeeping as a central state identity element, represent a case of top-
down, “thick” Europeanization. Thanks to EU-membership Finland has become exposed 
to new practices and structures of meaning that originate in ESDP. Furthermore, both a 
“supportive domestic discourse” and a “significant domestic policy change towards the 
                                                  
279 Similarly, the view concerning NATO-membership remains the same. OSCE’s role, however, is on the wane in the 
domestic discourse. In addition to the routine references to “UN or OSCE mandate” when discussing crisis management the 
references to OSCE have become sporadic at best. 
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European policies”280 were located in the analysis presented in this chapter. It was also 
shown that the issue of peacekeeping is unavoidably intertwined with the question of the 
character of Finland’s non-alignment. In the ongoing renegotiation of the Finnish post-
Cold War state identity the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy comprise 
an institution that have started to provide Finland with new understandings of what 
Finnish interests are and what the appropriate means may be to pursue these interests.281  
 
Yet, the analysis also pointed out persistent tendencies in the conceptual vehicles of 
identity production – but to a lesser extent than in the previous phase – particularly when 
they concern simultaneously both the issues of peacekeeping and alignment, as was 
often  the  case  in  phase  II.  When  it  comes  to  the  different  forms  of  military  crisis  
management, a limit which can not be passed due to national reasons is still raised up. 
Non-participation in military enforcement is constructed as a legitimate and justified 
national restriction that stems from the traditional state identity element of Finland as a 
neutral and credible superpower of conventional peacekeeping. Thus ESDP, which is 
mostly perceived as crisis management in the Finnish discourse, can potentially contain 
issues that may produce difference between Finland and the other EU member states. All 
in all, however, in light of the analysis of phase I and phase II it can be concluded that 
there appears to be a clear tendency towards more Europeanized foreign and security 
policy in which national preconditions and constrains for participation in CFSP are 
fading.  
 
Unlike in phase I, both directions of Europeanization, national adaptation and national 
projection were located in phase II. Together with Sweden Finland proposed the 
inclusion of the Petersberg tasks of WEU in the Amsterdam treaty and into CFSP. As a 
result crisis management became an important part of CFSP. On one hand the purpose 
with the initiative was to clarify the relationship between the EU and WEU and start 
developing the EU’s capacity and instruments to act independently in conflict 
prevention and crisis management. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden wanted to 
prevent the merger of WEU and the EU and keep common defence out of the EU and 
highlight crisis management in CFSP instead of the defence dimension. It was presented 
in the analysis that this was a clear case of national adaptation: Finland tried to reduce 
the perceived misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy by exporting nationally 
defined interests and goals into the EU level, instead of being reactive and making 
adjustments in its policy in compliance with the requirements of the EU. The ideational 
export in the case was successful in that the uploading led to the emergence of new 
policies and structures at the EU level. However, it was also unsuccessful in that 
eventually the Amsterdam Treaty came to refer to the ”tasks of combat forces in crisis 
                                                  
280 Schmidt 2002, 900. See chapter 2.2 on the facilitating factors of Europeanization. 
281 See chapter 2.2 on sociological institutionalisms. DiMaggio&Powell 1991, 11; Aspinwall&Schneider 2000, 9. 
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management including peace-making” instead of “crisis management” as was proposed 
by Finland and Sweden. Additionally, it was observed that despite its partial success the 
national projection resulted in unintended side-effects that were not in line with 
Finland’s original goals. The Amsterdam Treaty and the inclusion of the Petersberg 
tasks was followed by a rapid development of the European security and defence policy 
which eventually led to further pressures towards national adaptation. Especially during 
its EU Council Presidency Finland got entangled in deepening integration in the area of 
security and defence policy. In the domestic level this led to a situation in which the 
ESDP was open to redefinitions and to competing political argumentation on what 
ESDP is and what it is not, what are its impacts on Finland’s foreign and security policy, 
how it changes Finnish approach on peacekeeping and the new forms of crisis 
management (including peace-making), and to which extent it is compatible with the 
Finnish non-alignment policy.  
 
The national projection clearly stemmed from the traditional state identity elements that 
relate both to the categories of peacekeeping and alignment. In this context military non-
alignment served as the motivation for trying to change the assumed direction of CFSP 
development. But at the same time non-alignment was also constructed as a feature that 
brings added value to Finnish crisis management. In similar vein a Nordic element was 
still connected to the Finnish crisis management activities and is presented as a sign and 
an assurance of continuity. In addition to the joint initiative with Sweden, references to 
the successful Nordic cooperation in UN peacekeeping over the years282 in the official 
foreign and security policy served the purpose of preserving resonance with the 
traditional state identity elements. 
 
 
Towards the third phase 
 
In many ways the misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP becomes 
more obvious in the third phase of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security 
policy (2003-2007) to be analysed in the next chapter. For instance, national foreign and 
security policy, and the related legislation, is changed in order to enable the participation 
in the EU’s battle groups. Phase II witnessed changes in the relationship between 
national defence and international crisis management. The domestic discussion on the 
security and defence policy significance of the EU continues and becomes more intense 
in phase III, as issues like ESDP operations, European Security Strategy and the debate 
on ESDP’s defence dimension and EU security guarantees enter the stage.  
 
                                                  
282 For instance: “Well-established Nordic cooperation in peacekeeping” and ”experience of Nordic crisis management 
cooperation in conjunction with UN peacekeeping tasks” (Government Report 1/1997, 34). 
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As a part of the evolving self-identification as a fully politically committed and aligned 
EU-member state, the meaning of ”small stateness” is reconstructed more clearly in 
phase III than previously. Earlier the concept was chiefly used in referring to the 
legitimate security interest of a small state, which implied that Finland is something 
different from the others, and thus legitimately remains outside of some aspects of 
CFSP. In phase III small stateness begins to be increasingly defined in relation to EU 
integration, and small stateness as a state identity element is increasingly understood as a 
small EU member state identity. Instead of national preconditions and constrains this 
implies supporting issues like the external capacity of the EU, intergovernmentalism, 
equal right of participation, regulation of flexible integration in the second pillar, and 
jointly decided goals and timetables. It is seen that it is in the foreign and security policy 
interests of a small member state to promote the EU as a strong international actor and 
this way to use the EU to increase national influence in the world. 
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6. Third phase (2003-2007): “Neither neutral nor non-aligned” 
 
“As a member of the European Union, Finland is neither neutral nor non-aligned; 
rather Finland is committed to the Union’s objectives and activities.” (Prime Minister 
Vanhanen 4.4.2004)283 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
During the previous phase, between 1997 and 2002, a build-up of treaties, political 
agreements and institutions regarding CFSP took place, and ESDP was declared 
functional in 2001. In the third phase ESDP proceeds on a very practical level as the EU 
crisis management operations begin. European troops are deployed for the first time 
under ESDP in Macedonia in 2003, and Finland participates in this first EU military 
crisis management operation (Concordia) with a small contingent staff of nine officers. 
The rapid reaction force – EU battle groups – are set to be in call by 2007, and Finland 
decides to participate in two units. Moreover, common defence policy becomes more 
visible in the EU agenda: European Convention’s proposal for the Constitutional Treaty 
includes among other things a mutual defence article and solidarity clause. Thus, 
compared to the previous phases significant novel features now emerge in CFSP which 
impact its character as the source of Europeanization pressure. The analysis presented in 
this chapter shows how ESDP challenges the national policy instruments used to achieve 
policy goals, and the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment with the developed 
ESDP becomes an increasingly questioned issue in the domestic debate. Different views 
surface as to the way how national interest is to be defined and promoted as a (small) 
EU member state. Moreover, a growing misfit is perceived between EU crisis 
management and Finnish peacekeeping legislation. Invoking non-alignment identity 
amidst the rapid ESDP development appears in the form of a national projection as 
Finnish groups together with the neutral and non-aligned member states (Ireland, 
Austria, Sweden) during the IGC of 2003-2004 and opposes any provisions containing 
formal binding security guarantees as they are seen to be inconsistent with Finnish 
security policy. Soon after that, however, the Government Report on Finnish security 
and defence policy implies that Finnish policy is adapted to the new features of ESDP. 
Full commitment to ESDP is reconstructed as being in the security interests of Finland. 
 
                                                  
283 Prime Minister’s Review of Foreign and Security Policy (Vanhanen 2004). 
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The following empirical analysis shows how military crisis management turns into an 
established and less contested concept in the Finnish foreign and security policy 
vocabulary, and eventually appears in the title of the new peacekeeping legislation. In 
contrast to the previous phases, it is clearly manifested that it is the ESDP and Finnish 
participation in EU civil and military crisis management operations and battle groups 
that necessitate the amending of the Finnish peacekeeping policy and legislation. At the 
same time, other indications of Europeanization are also observed in phase III, as the 
perceived importance of CFSP and ESDP for national foreign and security policy 
increase.  
 
Such features of thin Europeanization and national adaptation as “bureaucratic 
reorganization”, “constitutional change”, and “differential empowerment” (see the 
theoretical discussion in chapter 2.3) are also observable in phase III. It will be described 
in the following, for instance, how the nascent issue regarding CFSP’s impact on the 
national division of power turns into an open political dispute – a “constitutional crisis”, 
as it is labelled in the domestic debate – between those supporting the President’s power 
and those more in favour of handing all ESDP decisions to the Prime Minister and the 
Government. This dispute becomes topical due to a “Europeanization automation”: as 
European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy deepens, issues that 
traditionally belonged to the President are turning into “internal” EU affairs that 
according to the constitution belong to the Prime Minister and the Government. 
Consequently, conserving the President’s standing in foreign and security policy would 
require changes in the national political interpretations. However, there are different 
views in the domestic debate as to whom CFSP issues and decisions on EU crisis 
management actually belong to, and whether it is a question of foreign policy or EU 
policy. 
 
All in all, there are plenty of signs of a transitional stage taking place concerning the 
way in which ESDP is perceived and used in political argumentation in the domestic 
level. As an MP summarizes in the parliamentary debate, the Finnish security and 
defence white book (Government Report 6/2004) “represents a turning point or 
transitional phase in the Finnish foreign and security policy. We are no longer making 
foreign and security policy alone but together with the EU. This is a particularly difficult 
change for Finland, which is reflected in the conceptual uncertainty [of the report].”284  
 
 
                                                  
284 MP Cronberg 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
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Notes on the main material  
 
The material analysed in the third phase centres around three key themes in the domestic 
debate. The first bulk of material relates to the national parliamentary debate on the EU 
Convention and the Constitutional Treaty’s aspects regarding EU defence policy. The 
Convention’s proposals were discussed in conjunction with the national preparations for 
the following IGC. The related main documents include the Government Report 2/2003 
(Government Report to Parliament on the outcome of the work of the European 
Convention and on preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference) as well as the 
Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report 4/2003 and Defence Committee Statement 2/2003. 
The ad hoc cooperation among the neutral and non-aligned countries takes form as a 
letter by the Foreign Ministers of Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden to the Italian 
European Council Presidency, on the subject of “IGC 2003 and European Security and 
Defence Policy, 5 December 2003. Additional material on the topic is provided by the 
related speeches by the Finnish Foreign Minister. 
 
Secondly, there are the documents and discussions that relate to the Finnish security and 
defence white book, that is the Government Report titled Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy (Government Report 6/2004). A central theme of the related parliamentary 
debates and Committee reports and statements (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 
Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004) is the ESDP development’s impact on 
Finnish military non-alignment. Thirdly, Finland’s participation in the EU’s crisis 
management operations and in the EU battle groups is handled in various Government 
Reports (3/2003, 5/2004, 8/2006 and 2/2007) and the related Committee reports and 
statements as well as parliamentary debates.  
 
Finally, the process of amending the crisis management legislation provides interesting 
material which touches upon the so-called constitutional crisis in Finland – an event in 
which the Government was prepared to amend the Constitution after the Parliament’s 
Constitutional Law Committee’s critical statement (54/2005) regarding its first proposal 
for the crisis management law (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis 
Management). Eventually the Government decided to use other means and the new law 
is passed as a so-called exceptive act of permanent nature (Government proposal 
5/2006). From the Europeanization perspective it is highly interesting to note that the 
EU’s perceived impact on the national foreign and security policy is in the very heart of 
this issue: a key question and the source political disputes was the domestic division of 
power in issues relating to ESDP (see chapter 6.3.2). Additional material in the third 
phase relate for instance to the law on civil crisis management, delineation of threat 
modes, and Finnish positions on the European Security Strategy (2003) (Government 
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proposal 206/2004, Government Decision 27.11.2003, Council of State’s Account 
15/2003, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 2/2003). 
 
 
6.2 Reconstructing non-alignment and committing to ESDP 
6.2.1 National projection: The misfit between security guarantees and non-alignment 
 
The European Convention on the future of the European Union drew up a proposal for a 
European Constitution that served as a starting point for the Intergovernmental 
Conference of 2003-2004.285 The proposal contained issues that related to the 
development of a common security and defence policy, including a solidarity clause and 
an article of mutual defence. The mutual defence article was rewritten during the IGC so 
that it would introduce within the sphere of Union an obligation to provide mutual 
military assistance. For Finland this meant that regarding ESDP merely as crisis 
management became more difficult, and Finland was forced to formulate and speak out 
its approach on common defence policy on a more concrete level than previously. 
Indeed, the Finnish Government stated that security and defence policy was an essential 
issue in the Convention’s proposal and the consequent ICG.286 The Prime Minister noted 
that there were three key issues in the proposal from the Finnish perspective: 
establishment of European Defence Agency, new common defence formulations, and 
structural cooperation. Additionally, the Government Report 2/2003 and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee’s Report 4/2003 draw attention for instance to the solidarity 
clause.287 Eventually, the two most visible issues in the domestic debate on the European 
Convention’s work on ESDP were the structural cooperation and mutual defence 
clause.288 On both Finland adopted a negative stance and set the national goal that both 
                                                  
285 According to the Laeken Declaration (2001) the aim of this Convention was to examine four key questions on the future 
of the Union: the division of powers, the simplification of the treaties, the role of the national parliaments and the status of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The inaugural meeting of the Convention was held on 28 February 2002, and it 
concluded its work on 10 July 2003 after reaching agreement on a proposal for a European Constitution. The proposal 
served as the starting point for IGC of 2003/2004. The Constitution was signed on 29 October 2004. France and the 
Netherlands rejected the Constitution in 2005, and a new Reform Treaty was drawn up by ICG of 2007. The Heads of State 
and Government of the 27 Member States of the European Union signed the Treaty of Lisbon on the 13th of December 
2007. (Government Information Unit 2002.) 
286 Prime Minister Vanhanen 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
287 Article 42 (Solidarity clause) of the Convention’s draft treaty stated that: ”The Union and its Member States shall act 
jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The 
Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member 
States, to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; to protect democratic institutions and the civilian 
population from any terrorist attack: assist a Member State in ins territory at the request of its political authorities in the 
event of a terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a 
disaster.” (European Convention 2003.) 
288 Convention’s proposal on the establishment of European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency is 
largely accepted, but it is added that the increasing of military capabilities should not be included in the treaty as it is “not 
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structural cooperation and mutual defence clause should be removed from the 
Constitutional Treaty draft during the IGC, since they are not in the Finnish interest.289 
 
To this purpose Finland convened the other non-aligned countries, Austria, Ireland and 
Sweden, to formulate a common stand on the issue. They objected structural cooperation 
and a mutual defence clause within the EU and proposed a less automatic and more 
voluntary wording for the common defence clause: “If a member state is victim of 
armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance 
by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the U.N. 
Charter” (Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to the IGC, 5 December 2003, 
emphasis added). Justifications that the neutral and non-aligned countries presented in 
support for their proposal centred on the issue of unity and openness of CFSP. They 
argued that a division of members into different categories – those not able to participate 
in all defence cooperation (i.e. non-aligned countries) versus others – should be avoided. 
Otherwise there is a risk that the mutual defence clause results in splitting the Union and 
weakening the CFSP.290 However, the wording proposed by the non-aligned countries 
was not accepted in the IGC. Instead the Treaty text came to state that the member states 
had an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, and adding a 
reference that can be seen to point to the neutral and non-aligned countries: “this shall 
not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States” (Article I-41, paragraph 7).291 (van Eekelen 2006, 170; Ojanen 2007 37-38.) 
 
Compared to the previous phases this case is exceptional in the sense that Finland 
openly invoked to its non-alignment and presented CFSP potentially contradictory with 
it. The four foreign ministers straightforwardly stated that ”provisions containing formal 
binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy or with our 
constitutional requirements”.292 This ad hoc-cooperation among the neutral and non-
aligned countries represents an interesting case of bottom-up Europeanization, that is to 
say national projection in foreign and security policy. The attempt to solve the misfit 
                                                                                                                                                                           
appropriate for the nature of a constitutional treaty” (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003, Defence Committee 
Statement 2/2003, Government Report 2/2003). 
289 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003; Government Report 2/2003; 
Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee Chair notes that it may well be that 
Finland will fail in this (MP Jaakonsaari, Foreign Affairs Committee chair, 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government 
Report 2/2003). 
290 See also Foreign Minister Tuomioja in the Financial Times 28.10.2003: “Europe needs to work as a whole on defence”. 
Tuomioja and the Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds in Dagens Nyheter 11.11.2003. Tuomioja’s speech in Paris 
2.12.2003: “For a genuinely European defence.” 
291 The referenda in France and the Netherlands delayed and complicated the Constitutional Treaty process. However, in 
Finland the process proceeded on the basis of the IGC results towards the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Government Report on the Treaty was presented to the Parliament in 25.11.2005 and the Finnish Parliament eventually 
ratified the Treaty in 5.12.2006. 
292 Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to the IGC of 5 December. 
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between CFSP and national foreign and security policy is not done by reactively 
adapting to the demands of the evolving CFSP. Instead, Finland is trying hard to 
influence the EU-level and promote nationally defined goals and ideas that better 
resonate with the domestic norms and collective understandings that stem from the non-
alignment element in the Finnish state identity. This was the first time such a group of 
neutral and non-aligned EU countries acted together. By identifying itself to such group 
Finland underlined the different character of its state identity compared to the other EU 
member states. Thus it is not a surprise that despite the official stated reasons for the 
national projection (openness and unity of CFSP) the domestic debate in Finland 
focused on the question of Finnish military non-alignment and ESDP’s impact on it. 
This shows that it is the question of compatibility between military non-alignment and 
mutual defence plans where the actual misfit pressure stems from.  
 
The Prime Minister explained to the parliament that the key problem in structural 
cooperation is that participation in it would not be open to all, but those already 
participating in it would be able to decide if any latecomers are accepted. The Prime 
Minister concluded that this goes against the principles of the Union that stress unity.293 
The government’s official objective was that ESDP is developed so that it enhances the 
unity of the Union.294 Therefore, it is found unwanted that a smaller group of member 
states could decide on the mutual defence clause to be included in the Constitutional 
Treaty.  Additionally, it is argued that the mutual defence clause would be problematic 
since it created partially overlapping commitments with NATO’s articles. 295 Although 
the Government’s argument on openness and EU unity touched a chord in the Finnish 
parliamentary debate,296 the domestic debate centres around the relationship between 
Finnish non-alignment and the defence clause. The Prime Minister also refers to the 
problems in combining a traditional conception of non-alignment with all the aspects of 
the solidarity clause (including using military resources in natural catastrophes and 
antiterrorism).297 Yet, the Prime Minister concludes that Finland will hold on to non-
alignment and seeks for a solution in the IGC that suits the non-alignment countries 
too.298 At this stage non-alignment determines the way Finland approaches the 
developing of ESDP. 
 
                                                  
293 Prime Minister Vanhanen 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 3.9.2003 preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003 and 1.10.2003, follow-up 
debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
296 E.g. MP Kiviniemi, MP Hautala 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003; MP Takkula, MP 
Kiljunen 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
297 Prime Minister Vanhanen 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
298 Prime Minister Vanhanen 27.11.2003 
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From the early stages in the Constitutional Treaty process Finland had a negative stance 
on the common defence dimension of the ESDP.299 The government Report on the 
outcome of the work of the European Convention and on preparations for the 
Intergovernmental Conference (Government Report 2/2003) found that writing the 
common defence clause into the Constitutional Treaty is not in the Finnish interest. This 
view was supported by the Foreign Affairs Committee which noted that the mutual 
defence clause would mean incorporating an element that is typical for defence alliances 
into the EU.300 This argument is also brought forward in the parliamentary debate.301 A 
number of MP’s point to the perceived incompatibility of mutual defence and military 
non-alignment. According to them Finland’s response should build on Finland’s non-
alignment identity and Finland should act together with Sweden and the other non-
aligned member states.302 They find that Finnish military non-alignment would be 
invalidated if a mutual defence clause was included in the Constitution Treaty. This 
theme was highlighted also by an objection statement in the Foreign Affairs Committee 
Report as well as by a dissenting opinion in the Defence Committee Statement.303 On the 
other hand, the usefulness of non-alignment in securing Finland’s position in the 
changing Europe is also questioned in the parliamentary debate (mainly by the main 
opposition party). As the threat pictures have changed, the argument goes, it might well 
be that non-alignment is outdated and thus no longer the best tool for Finnish 
interests.304 Consequently, it is concluded that Finland should find its way to the EU’s 
core in defence and security policy too.305 Nevertheless, the Defence Minister states that 
military non-alignment means not that Finland would be passive or isolating itself, but 
rather that Finland is willing to cooperate in the EU and actively looks for cooperation in 
the EU. He finds that military non-alignment fits in the picture since the EU is not 
becoming a military power of military alliance.306 However, the Defence Minister adds 
that a reflection and debate on the pros and cons of non-alignment and alignment will 
take place in the context of the forthcoming Government Report on Finnish security and 
defence policy next year.307 
 
As was the case with the national projection that related to the Petersberg tasks (see 
chapter 5.2), the Government’s declared reasons in this case are substantially different 
                                                  
299 Council of State’s EU Secretariat 20.12.2002. 
300 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003. 
301 MP Siimes 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003, Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003. 
302 E.g. MP Kauppila 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
303 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003, Defence Committee Statement 2/2003, MP Siimes, MP Ojala 1.10.2003, 
follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
304 MP Vilén, MP Katainen (National Coalition Party)) 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003; MP 
Sasi (National Coalition Party) 27.11.2003, question time: EU’s common defence. 
305 MP Kuosmanen, MP Vilén 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
306 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003. 
307 Ibid.. 
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than those on which the domestic debate focuses. The actual reasons initiating the 
national projection point to the persistence of the non-alignment element in the Finnish 
state identity. The key reason why the national projection attempt took place clearly 
relates to the perceived misfit between the Finnish military non-alignment and the 
direction ESDP appeared to be heading in light of the IGC negotiations. The dominant 
domestic discourse constructs momentarily almost an existential mismatch between the 
Finnish policy of military non-alignment and the EU mutual defence clause: both cannot 
exist at the same time. However, this construction proves out to be rather short-lived. As 
will be discussed below, as the national projection fails, Finland is forced to rethink and 
reconstruct the meaning of (military) non-alignment. In the official interpretation 
military non-alignment is reconstructed as a more technical and less political qualifier 
that refers mostly to the way in which national defence is organized and implemented in 
practice. This reconstruction enables a stronger commitment to all dimensions of ESDP.  
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6.2.2 Adapting military non-alignment to ESDP 
 
The unsuccessful bottom-up Europeanization attempt of the neutral and non-aligned 
countries resulted in a situation where a misfit between non-alignment and ESDP was 
highlighted and produced to the EU’s political agenda but was not solved the way these 
countries proposed. Thus the question of how to tackle this misfit remained on the 
Finnish domestic agenda after the ICG too.308 There was a need to find other ways to 
remove the perceived misfit in the relationship of Finnish military non-alignment and 
the developing ESDP. Consequently, further Europeanization via national adaptation 
followed, and military non-alignment and ESDP remained a visible topic in the domestic 
debate when the Finnish security and defence policy white book (Government Report 
6/2004) was prepared and discussed. The Finnish non-alignment was further 
reconstructed to comply with the EU-level norms and expectations and a new 
interpretation of Finland’s non-alignment concept and policy was introduced: military 
non-alignment was reconstructed as a less political and more technical concept which 
referred to the way how national defence was organized (meaning simply that Finland is 
not a member of a military alliance) and which did “not describe Finnish foreign policy 
in any broader sense than that”.309 Calls for casting off the whole concept of military 
non-alignment were also presented in the parliamentary debate. 
 
In light of the Government Report 6/2004 and the related parliamentary debate the EU’s 
overall security policy significance for Finland is domestically considered significantly 
greater than in the previous phases. This perception appears to be based on two factors. 
Firstly, many addresses concur that the deepening of integration within the EU has 
increased the stability of Finland’s near environs. A view that has gained ground is that 
the EU forms a “security community” and the most important security and defence 
policy framework for Finland.310 The Defence Committee states that significant progress 
has taken place in the EU’s security and defence policy since 2001 and the previous 
Finnish defence policy report. The Committee refers to Headline Goal 2010, the crisis 
management operations executed in Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the establishing of the European 
                                                  
308 Another topic in the debate causing contradicting political argumentation was the question what actually was the 
Government’s policy during the IGC and how the Government’s policy had changed afterwards. Different views were 
presented as to did Finland really try to prevent the binding EU security clause (e.g. MP Katainen, MP Tiura 28.9.2004, 
preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004) or was it question of negotiation tactics which helped to formulate 
the articles into a more specific and better form (Foreign Minister Tuomioja 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the 
Government Report 6/2004). 
309 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 29.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004, Prime Minister Vanhanen 
20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
310 Government Report 6/2004, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, MP Jaakonsaari 28.9.2004, preliminary 
debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
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Defence Agency.311 Secondly, there is now a widely shared and increasingly visible 
view that in the changing global environment, security threats extend beyond national 
borders and Finland is more vulnerable to the “new” security threats than before. The 
EU is regarded capable of tackling such threats and this consequently increases the 
significance of the EU and its capacity for action for Finland’s security.312 The Defence 
Committee draws a connection between the European Security Strategy (2003) and the 
Finnish defence policy and regards “the Finnish threat and crisis scenarios as a justified 
application, on the regional level, of the threat scenarios defined in the strategy 
concerning all of Europe”.313 Indeed, many of the “new” security threats described in 
ESS – such as terrorism, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, as well as global and cross-border security problems – have been 
included in the Finnish white books since the Government Report 1/1995 (Security in 
the Changing World, see chapter 4). Therefore the ESS in itself is not felt to cause any 
particular misfit pressures towards Finnish policy, but is rather perceived compatible 
with the Finnish foreign and security policy. The references to civil crisis management 
in ESS are highlighted and found coherent with Finnish views.314 Furthermore, for 
instance the Foreign Affairs Committee had found the nature of the Strategy to be 
general and non-binding, and concluded that the Strategy can thus only serve as general 
basis for the preparation of the Finnish security and defence policy white book.315  
 
Yet, despite the growing consensus on the EU’s security policy significance for Finland, 
there are different views as to how deeply Finland should be committed to ESDP, 
particularly when it comes to practical issues. The debate centres on issues such as EU 
battle groups and mutual defence guarantees and military crisis management operations, 
and their implications on military non-alignment. The ESDP development included in 
the Constitutional Treaty is now found welcome by the Government, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Defence Committee. This is because they now find that the solidarity 
clause, the agreement on the provision of assistance, the structural cooperation and the 
European Defence Agency strengthen the EU as an international actor and belong to the 
logical progress for strengthening the Union’s capability to function. Similarly, the 
European Security Strategy is supported on the basis that it strengthens the EU as a 
security community and an international actor.316 In this respect a key message of the 
                                                  
311 Defence Committee Report 1/2004. 
312 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 3, 6; also MP Jaakonsaari 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 6/2004, Defence Committee Report 1/2004. 
313 On the other hand the Committee also feels that “the differences of the European Security Strategy threat scenarios 
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314 Prime Minister Vanhanen 27.11.2003, question time: EU’s common defence, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 
2/2003. 
315 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 2/2003. 
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Report appears to be that Finland is fully committed to ESDP, including those issues 
that were during the IGC and Convention perceived inconsistent with Finnish non-
alignment. It is now stated that Finland ”participates fully in developing and 
implementing the common security and defence policy. Finland is developing its 
capability and readiness to participate in the EU’s civilian crisis management activities 
and military crisis management operations, including rapid response forces. (…) Finland 
contributes to the forming of permanent structured cooperation and takes part in the 
Union’s capabilities cooperation and the activities of the European Defence Agency.”317 
 
It is also stated that the EU now has impact on the way Finnish defence is developed: 
”Military defence will be developed so that Finland will be able to serve as an active 
member within the security community formed by the European Union and allocate the 
necessary military resources for actions required under Union obligations. (…) Finland 
is developing adequately trained and equipped troops who can be dispatched rapidly to a 
crisis area and are capable of undertaking demanding action.”318 The Report also states 
that ”the preparedness to support other authorities as required by the European Union 
solidarity clause will be taken into account in defence planning.”319 Yet, at the same 
time the Government Report states that Finland develops its defence capability as a 
militarily non-allied country.320 The Foreign Affairs Committee actually notes that the 
report is “partly structurally inconsistent. For instance, the relationship between the 
description of the security environment and the lines of action is inadequately 
portrayed.”321 
 
The way the Finnish approach on ESDP is presented in the Government Report 6/2004 
indicates that the purpose of the Government is now to reduce the misfit between the 
future ESDP and Finnish foreign and security policy by national adaptation rather than 
by national projection. Issues for which changes were sought in the context of IGC 
together with the other neutral and non-aligned countries are no longer constructed by 
the Government as inconsistent with Finnish non-alignment. This is done firstly by 
emphasizing in the domestic debate that the EU is not a military alliance but rather “an 
unique international actor” possessing a wide range of tools for tackling the current new 
security threats.322 The Defence Committee shares the Government’s view in that it sees 
that the European Union cannot be regarded as a military alliance, since no decision has 
                                                  
317 Government Report 6/2004, 6. 
318 Government Report 6/2004, 7. 
319 Government Report 6/2004, 102. 
320 Government Report 6/2004, 5. 
321 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 6. 
322 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
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been made that the EU member states will enter into common defence.323 Furthermore, it 
is argued that the build-up of EU capacity for more demanding tasks and rapid response 
is a continuity to military crisis management, and thus in line with the kind of ESDP 
development that Finland has always supported. It is underlined that the development is 
also based on EU policies, and treaties that already exist and have been agreed upon 
previously, and thus cause no problems for Finnish involvement.324 Concerning the 
Constitutional Treaty’s solidarity clause (Article I-43) and provisions relating to 
common security and defence policy (Article I-41) it is argued that they both contribute 
to the political solidarity of the EU and consequently strengthen Finnish security. They 
make the EU a political solidarity community that will not leave a single member state 
alone in a state of emergency.325  
 
Yet, in the parliamentary debate it is questioned what the agreement of assistance in the 
event of an attack actually means in practice. It is asked for instance how the security 
guarantees would apply to militarily non-aligned member states, and how the solidarity 
clause and the mutual defence clause affect Finland’s security policy situation.326 A 
“conceptual battle” on these questions as well as on the quality of Finnish non-alignment 
takes place in the context of Government Report 6/2004. A conclusion gaining ground in 
the domestic debate is that the increasing commitment to ESDP implies that Finland is 
inescapably Europeanized to such a degree that the credibility of the concept of military 
non-alignment begins to falter. The main opposition party (National Coalition Party) 
sees that non-alignment as a concept is no longer applicable since Finland takes part in 
the EU security policy, including the military security clause: 
”The EU can be characterised not only as a security community but as a 
defence community, too. We have received security guarantees from the 
other  member  states  and  we  are  committed  to  assist  others  in  a  case  of  an  
emergency. (…) Therefore Finland can no longer be considered a militarily 
non-aligned country in the traditional sense.”327 
 
This view is supported by MP’s from other parties too.328 In the end, the Parliament 
votes on the interpretation of Finnish non-alignment: contrast to the Government Report 
the main opposition party proposed that since Finland is committed to the EU and the 
solidarity clause and security guarantees, Finland can not be considered a militarily non-
                                                  
323 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 20; also e.g. MP Lankia 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
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aligned country in a traditional sense. Those arguing that Finnish commitment to ESDP 
development renders the non-alignment concept inapplicable pointed to the military 
assistance included in the EU’s mutual security guarantees. They also state that it is 
obvious that EU members shall not remain neutral in conflicts that involve another EU 
member. Additionally “the EU’s rapid action battle groups” are referred to and labelled 
as a national defence issue (see more on this topic in chapter 6.3 below).329 
Consequently, it is argued that the term should be removed, also because it only causes 
unnecessary confusion and disagreement in the domestic debate on the political, 
economical and military dimensions of non-alignment.330 It is also highlighted that the 
majority of the other EU members consider non-alignment as a relic from the Cold 
War.331 All in all, although the justifications presented in the debate vary, a repeated 
conclusion is that Finland should cast aside the outdated concept of military non-
alignment.332 Moreover, the main reason for this originates from the European 
integration: Finland’s foreign and security policy is considered to have been 
Europeanized beyond military non-alignment. 
 
Eventually 42 MPs supported the proposal, 149 voted against it and thus supported the 
Government Report and its interpretation of non-alignment.333 However, compared to 
the previous phases, the Government’s interpretation also implies a reconstructed non-
alignment concept. The Government states that Finland maintains and develops its 
defence capability as a militarily non-allied country and monitors the changes in its 
security environment.334 The Government admits that the definition of non-alignment 
has become narrower – the term now refers only to the way how Finland organizes its 
defence: “Finland is not a member of any military alliance, and thus develops its own 
national defence as a non-aligned country.”335 The Prime Minister emphasizes that 
military non-alignment does not describe Finnish foreign policy in any broader sense 
than that.336 The Foreign Minister adds that military non-alignment is ”merely a 
technical statement, not a manifesto”.337 As an MP summarizes in the parliamentary 
debate,  the  view  is  that  since  Finland  is  not  a  member  of  NATO,  this  makes  Finland  
militarily non-aligned, whereas EU membership implies that Finland is politically and 
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economically aligned.338 As to the EU battle groups’ implications on Finnish military 
non-alignment the Government’s reply at this stage is that they concern merely crisis 
management and are not valid for territorial national defence and do not relate to 
common defence at all.339 
 
It is worth noting that despite this debate and the vote on the status and relevance of the 
military non-alignment concept, the Prime Minister calls for consensus in foreign and 
security policy and finds it an essential principle for a small country like Finland.340 The 
view supported by the MPs who still find that unanimity not only should, but still does 
reign when it comes to the fundamentals of Finnish security and defence.341 This 
highlights the persistence of the consensus thinking in Finnish foreign and security 
policy – it is referred to even amongst visible disagreements on the quality of Finnish 
non-alignment. The main opposition party, though, notes bluntly that the option to 
disagree on foreign and security policy is part of the present-day modern democracy.342 
The politicization of national security policy that initially started in the first phase 
(1994-1996, see chapter 4.5) has continued and reached a point in which consensus is no 
longer found that essential and necessary an element of a small state’s foreign and 
security policy. An additional factor that also affects the diversification of the domestic 
debate is the parliamentarization of foreign and security policy. When the Government 
Report 6/2004 is discussed many MPs note that the Parliament’s influence on foreign 
and security policy has increased.343 Post-consensus and parliamentarization seem to go 
hand in hand. 
 
New views as to the implications of small state identity for Finnish EU policy become 
evident in the debate in other ways too. A trend that was observed already in phase II 
gains strength: an effective EU in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy is 
constructed as an advantage for a small state like Finland. The ESDP is seen as the most 
effective means for a small state to influence its own security. Consequently, an 
increasing number of the MPs see that it is in the Finnish interest to fully commit itself 
to ESDP and support its goals.344 Together with this perception a new meaning for small 
stateness is emerging in the domestic discourse. In this reading small state as an element 
of Finnish state identity increasingly refers to a “small EU member state identity” and is 
less characterised by qualities such as “marginal” or “border state” or “small 
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population”. Consequently, this type of new small state identity should now also form 
the basis for national foreign and security policy thinking. This is to say that solely 
national thinking should be replaced by activism inside the EU: Finland should 
formulate and promote security policy goals for the EU. The reconstructed small state 
identity entails that as a small state Finland should be active in supporting further 
integration in the sphere of CFSP. Furthermore, mere technical adaptation in the 
domestic level is not sufficient but the small state should profile itself as a dynamic 
initiator. The small state can be an active and competent member of the security 
community EU, and can also ”upload” its national policies and use the EU in achieving 
national foreign and security policy goals.345 This is to say that despite military non-
alignment national security policy is not to be carried out by national tools only, but also 
by the common European instruments. Although more traditional conclusions on small 
state interests are far from being extinct in the debate,346 a reconstruction process has 
clearly started in which “small state identity” is increasingly interpreted as ”small 
member state identity”. 
 
However, a significant factor contributing to the persistence of the traditional small state 
identity ensues from geographical considerations. A difference between Finland and 
other EU members is still often reproduced by emphasizing that Finland possess the 
longest  eastern  border  of  all  the  EU  members347 and thus Finnish threat pictures are 
different than those of the rest of the Europe. Finland’s geographical position is also 
seen to differ for from those of the other Nordic countries, and when Finland’s unique 
geographical position is highlighted this way, the conclusion typically is that Finland 
cannot focus on international crisis management operations and implement major 
structural changes in its defence system in the similar way the other EU members – as 
well as the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark – do.348 Therefore, despite 
the continuing strengthening of broad security and reinterpreted small state identity in 
the domestic discourse, the geographically oriented threat pictures remain significant 
and are used in the domestic debate when such aspects of Finnish defence policy as the 
territorial defence system and general conscription are discussed.349  
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Yet, this construction of difference and related traditional self-identification is 
increasingly challenged by the increasing emphasis on broad security conception. The 
“new” threat perceptions stemming from broad security are not that directly linked to 
geography, and thus do not contribute to the reproduction of difference between Finland 
and the other EU members the way the traditional threat pictures do. The Government 
Report is in fact criticized for containing a mixture of traditional and new threat 
perceptions: while the international environment has changed, the starting points of 
Finnish defence presented in the Government Report have remained unchanged.350 It is 
noted in the parliamentary debate that the Government Report does not take broad 
security into consideration in its conclusions or practical recommendations. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee finds that the new security threats, international interdependence and 
the rapid development of the EU call for a more strategic thinking and reporting where 
the Finnish priorities regarding these issues are manifested.351 Additionally, it is noted in 
the parliamentary debate that besides national defence, attention should be drawn to 
development issues, human rights, environmental cooperation, cooperation in education 
issues, public health, and civil crisis management.352 Many addresses concur that in the 
current-day world the boundary between internal and external security is no longer that 
clear, and many new threats in the Finnish security environment, such as international 
crime and terrorism, actually concern internal security.353 The Government replies by 
stating that internal security is present in the Report better than in any of the previous 
ones, and that the topic is likely to become more visible in the future reports.354 The 
Foreign Trade and Development Minister mentions that crisis prevention, crisis 
management, humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation are 
interconnected issues, and should thus be better coordinated together.355 A related topic 
that comes up in the debate is the division of labour between civil and military crisis 
management as well as between internal and foreign affairs. The Foreign Minister states 
that these two can be successfully combined in the Finnish approach.356 The Defence 
Minister finds that more ministries ought to participate in the cooperation in crisis 
management, not just Defence Ministry and Foreign Affairs.357 The former Interior 
Minister’s response is that despite the introduction of broad security conception the 
                                                  
350 E.g. MP Rajala 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
351 Foreign Affairs Committee chair MP Jaakonsaari 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
352 E.g. MP U.Anttila, MP Sirnö 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
353 E.g MP Väistö 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
354 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
355 Foreign Trade and Development Minister Lehtomäki 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
356 Foreign Minister Kanerva 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2007. 
357 Government Report 6/2004, Defence Minister Häkämies 13.11.2007, also MP Haavisto 13.11.2007, preliminary debate 
on the Government Report 2/2007. 
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position of the Defence Ministry has become over-emphasized lately at the cost of the 
Ministry of the Interior in foreign and security policy-making.358 
 
All in all, in phase III the connection between Finnish defence and international military 
cooperation in the EU is more clearly manifested. The Prime Minister states that crisis 
management increases national security, creates the capacity for international 
cooperation and makes it easier to receive assistance in a state of emergency.359 The 
Government notes that international military cooperation is an essential part of Finland’s 
security and defence policy, and it supports Finland’s own defence.360 Developing 
Finnish crisis management capability is justified more visibly than before as part of 
Finnish defence policy. The Government presents this as a change that is necessary 
because of the “changes in the operating environment” which requires the adoption of 
new modes of operation. Finland’s military capability will be developed in line with 
changes in the operating environment, which will require the adoption of new modes of 
operation.361 In practical terms this means that Finland’s international crisis management 
capacity will be developed by taking into account the EU troops requirements, the 
performance requirements in NATO’s Partnership for Peace planning and assessment 
process, and Nordic crisis management cooperation.362 The Report states that Finland is 
making a full contribution to the development and implementation of the EU resource 
and materiel cooperation, and to the creation of new troops with greater capabilities.363 
This also implies that Finland will participate in more versatile and more demanding 
crisis management which requires “greater flexibility faster response and continuous 
adjustment to the changing security situation”.364 This materialized eventually in the 
Finnish participation in the EU battle groups, a topic analysed in the following. 
                                                  
358 MP Rajamäki 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007. 
359 Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.  
360  Defence Minister Häkämies 12.12.2007, MP Haavisto 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2007. 
361 Government Report 6/2004. 
362 Government Report 6/2004. 
363 Government Report 6/2004. 
364 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 28. 
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6.3 From peacekeeping to military crisis management. 
 
6.3.1 The impact of ESDP operations and battle groups on Finnish peacekeeping 
legislation 
 
Pressure for change on Finnish peacekeeping legislation was not directly issued in the 
context of the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy (6/2004), but 
the Government had decided to present the amendment of the law as a separate process 
which takes place alongside the preparation of the white book.365 The EU crisis 
management operations and EU battle groups heavily influenced the amending of the 
peacekeeping act. The EU military crisis management operations started with the 
Concordia operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2003 and 
Finland participated also in the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
December 2004.366 After hearing the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee the 
Government presented the issue to the President who made the decision to participate in 
the Concordia operation. Because the operations included more demanding rules of 
engagement than in traditional peacekeeping367 a handling at the parliament’s plenary 
session was required according to peacekeeping legislation (see chapter 5.3.1).368 The 
Government saw Concordia as the first practical test for the EU’s military crisis 
management and a positive example for future operations. At the same time the 
Government presented Finnish participation in it as a natural continuation to the Finnish 
commitment to the stabilisation of the West-Balkans.369 The Foreign Affairs Committee 
briefly noted that participation supports the goals of Finnish foreign and security 
policy.370 In the parliamentary debate the operation in Macedonia is conceived as a sign 
and example of new, deeper cooperation in CFSP to which the EU is committed. In 
contrast to the Government’s perception, the operation is seen to represent a significant 
change and is connected to the European Convention and the debate on the EU’s 
constitution, as well as to the potential implications of ESDP-operations on Finnish 
peacekeeping legislation.371 The Foreign Minister, however, replies that participation in 
                                                  
365 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
366 Finnish troop contribution in Concordia was 9 participants and in Althea c.200 participants. 
367 Government Report 3/2003, Foreign Minister Tuomioja 14.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
5/2004. 
368 However, since the Parliament was on recess, it was not possible to organize a plenary handling on Concordia operation, 
and the issue was handled in the parliament later on. 
369 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003; MP Lindqvist 14.9.2004, 
preliminary debate on the Government Report 5/2004. 
370 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 3/2003. 
371 E.g. MP Brax, MP Nepponen 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003. 
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Concordia will not pose problems under the current peacekeeping legislation.372 
Nevertheless, as is it understood that Concordia will be followed by other EU crisis 
management operations, a view gaining ground is that amending the national 
peacekeeping legislation is inevitable. Additional pressure to that direction is caused by 
the plans concerning the EU battle groups, as it is decided that Finland will take part in 
two battle groups (Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian and German-Dutch-Finnish 
units).373  
 
Both the EU crisis management operations and the battle groups are a significant source 
of top-down Europeanization in phase III. It was widely perceived in the domestic level 
that particularly the Finnish participation in the EU’s rapid response force require re-
evaluating the Finnish Act on Peace Support Operations. Compared to the previous 
phases (peacekeeping legislation was previously amended in 1995 and 2000, see 
chapters 4.3 and 5.3.1) it is more openly stated that it is the EU that causes pressure for 
change in Finnish foreign and security policy in this respect. A purpose of the new law 
on crisis management is to renew the legislation so that Finland can participate in the 
EU battle groups. In phase II the Government carefully avoided linking CFSP and 
changes in the national legislation (see chapter 5.3.1), but this time the Prime Minister 
draws a clear connection between EU crisis management and battle groups and the need 
to amend Finnish peacekeeping legislation.374 This argumentation is widely used in 
different official documentation related to the legislation process375 and EU crisis 
management is also frequently presented in the parliamentary debate as the main reason 
for the amending of the peacekeeping legislation.376 It is also seen that since “military 
crisis management” as a term describes the EU’s crisis management tasks better than the 
term “peacekeeping”, it makes sense to change the title of the Finnish law so that instead 
of peacekeeping it refers to military crisis management  (the official title being Act on 
                                                  
372 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003. 
373 In May 2004, the [rapid response] force was adopted as a part of the new overall target of the EU’s headline goal, which 
forms the basis for developing crisis management (Headline Goal 2010).” (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 29). Finnish 
contribution to the German-Dutch-Finnish battle group contained i.a. 120-160 military police, medical company, electronic 
reconnaissance. In the Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian battle group i.a. 180-220 combat support, staff officers, 
protection, reneissance, military police. Contributions to the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 consisted of a rapid reaction 
capability: 2000 mechanized infantry battalion, a headquarters and signal company, and engineering battalion, units 
specialized in CIMIC, a medium truck (transport) company, a minelayer, staff officers, military observers. Government 
Report 8/2006;  Government Report 2/2007. 
374 Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.   
375 See Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 2005 [memorandum by the working group on the amending of 
the peacekeeping legislation], Defence Committee Report 1/2004, Government proposal 110/2005, Government proposal 
5/2006. 
376 E.g. MP Lehti 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004; MP Siimes, MP Jaakonsaari, 14.9.2005, 
preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005; MP Kekkonen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government 
proposal 5/2006. 
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Military Crisis Management).377 Furthermore, it is argued that as military crisis 
management is an established concept internationally, it should be incorporated in the 
Finnish legislation.378 Thus, a characteristic feature in phase III military is that military 
crisis management is turning into a less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and 
replaces peacekeeping in the title of the law. Consequently, although generally seen as a 
continuation to the previous debates on enhanced peacekeeping, peace enforcement and 
military coercion, it appears not to cause as strong and controversial political 
disagreement in the domestic level as was the case in the previous phases when the 
peacekeeping concept was redefined and enhanced.379 The way the concept is defined 
rests strongly on the definitions of the EU. The Defence Committee, for instance, finds 
that the EU possesses unique civil and military capabilities for intervening in crises.380 
The way peacekeeping – one of the key elements in the Finnish state identity – is 
reconceptualised is clearly influenced by European integration and ESDP. 
 
In the background of this reconceptualisation lies two types of misfits between the 
European and Finnish level. On one hand it is felt in that the national procedures and 
decision-making structures must be revised so that the mobilisation of a rapid response 
force for the needs of the EU operations and battle groups becomes possible.381 There is 
a common understanding in the domestic debate that the EU battle group concept 
required a new kind of preparedness from the Defence Forces as well as more lubricant 
national decision-making.382 The Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee 
saw that since the troops should be deployable in the area of operations within ten days 
of the Council decision to launch the operation, the Finnish Parliament must be engaged 
considerably earlier than before when forming Finland’s position prior to the Council’s 
decision on an EU operation.383 On the other hand, it is felt that in addition to the 
decision-making system and military capacity, the Finnish approach on peacekeeping is 
to be adapted so that it is in harmony with that of the EU.384 Comparisons are also made 
to the other EU member states and their approaches on military crisis management and 
                                                  
377 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30; Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 2005 [memorandum by the 
working group on the amending of the peacekeeping legislation]. 
378 E.g. MP Pentti 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; Defence Committee Statement 
8/2005. 
379 However, there is a dissenting opinion in the Defence Committee Statement, according to which the term military crisis 
management is unclear, and military crisis management might also include acts of war. Defence Committee Statement 
1/2006, MP Laakso. 
380 Defence Committee Statement 8/2005. 
381 See e.g. Government proposal 5/2006, 20. 
382 Government Report 8/2006. Defence Minister Kääriäinen 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
8/2006; MP Jaakonsaari 22.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 5/2004; MP Katainen 28.9.2004, 
preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
383 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30. 
384 E.g. MP Kettunen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
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rapid reaction forces.385 A typical conclusion is that the Finnish approach on crisis 
management must be compatible with those of the other EU members, so that Finland 
can equally participate in preparations and the implementation of forthcoming tasks and 
missions.386 In that sense an additional “horizontal” Europeanization pressure seems to 
prevail. 
 
As was the case in the previous phases when peacekeeping legislation was amended 
there is direct time pressure for changes, in this case caused by the need to have the EU 
battle groups ready for deployment and for being on call in the beginning of the year 
2007. Time was also needed for the national recruitment and agreeing on the conditions 
of employment. The Prime Minister told the parliament that “our political system has the 
responsibility for arranging the national decision-making procedures so that it will be in 
order by that time.”387 These external time pressures dictated the schedule of the whole 
legislatory process from preparatory work to parliament and committee handling.388 The 
eventual outcome is an exceptionally multi-phased political process in which the 
Government decides to withdraw its first proposal for the new peacekeeping legislation 
(Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management) after the 
Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee Statement (54/2005), and plans to amend 
the Constitution instead. Eventually the new law is passed as a so called exceptive act of 
permanent nature in the spring 2006, based on Government proposal 5/2006 (see chapter 
6.3.2 below). Hence crisis management is debated repeatedly and in many different 
occasions in the parliament and the committees. 
 
National adaptation to ESDP and EU crisis management appears particularly in the form 
of casting aside the previous national preconditions and constrains for participation in 
international crisis management operation. A common conclusion in the domestic debate 
is that when Finland operates in EU battle groups, as well as in other multinational crisis 
management constellations, the Finnish troops must possess similar rules of use of force 
as the other participating nations do. The Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence 
Committee note that differences in national rules of engagement are harmful for the 
credibility, functioning and security of the troops.389 As it is the EU battle groups that 
dominate the domestic discussion on crisis management, the misfit is seen to exist 
specifically between the EU and Finland’s crisis management practices. In contrast to 
the previous phases national restrictions are now seen as a hindrance and problem rather 
                                                  
385 E.g. MP Pentti 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
386 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; see also Government 
proposal 5/2006, 19-20 on the crisis management legislation of some other EU member states. 
387 Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution. 
388 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
389 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 1/2006, 13; Defence Committee Statement 1/2006. Also e.g. MP Nepponen 
14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
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than distinctive character of the Finnish peacekeeping traditions that secures and 
reproduces Finnish state identity (cf. chapter 5.3.1 and 4.3). 
 
However, while military crisis management is incorporated into the Finnish 
peacekeeping approach, the civil crisis management dimension of ESDP is at the same 
time highlighted. The Defence Minister, for instance, refers to the improving of EU civil 
crisis management capability as a strengthening factor. He also states that linking 
civilian and military elements together in EU crisis management ensures that it is not a 
question of “war politics, but something completely different”.390 The Foreign Minister 
presents the coupling of military and civilian actions as an unique feature in EU crisis 
management, making the EU a responsible crisis management organization instead of “a 
warring military alliance”.391 The EU’s significance for Finland as the central 
international actor in the development of civil crisis management was also emphasized 
when the new law on civil crisis management was handled in the parliament.392 Even 
though there is a widely shared concern in the domestic debate that the development of 
civil crisis management is too slow393 much emphasis is put on the civilian dimension of 
EU crisis management in the discussions. Civil crisis management is a welcomed theme 
that is seen somehow naturally particularly suitable for Finland.394 It is used to soften the 
overall picture of  EU crisis management. By frequent references to the EU’s plans to 
develop and improve the civilian dimension of crisis management it can be argued that 
Finnish participation in EU crisis management does not imply a drastic departure from 
the traditional Finnish peacekeeping approach and the related state identity element. 
 
Another question widely discussed in the parliamentary debates on the peacekeeping 
legislation concerned the issue of UN mandate, as the EU’s guidelines do not require an 
absolute UN Security Council mandate for its operations. Of the 25 EU member states 
only Finland and Ireland have a special mention in their legislation on a UN mandate 
that prevents participation in operations implemented without UN Security Council’s 
authorisation.395 The necessity of a UN mandate is now questioned in the domestic 
debate. Those arguing that there is no need for a UN mandate note that the political 
climate prevailing in the UN Security Council varies and refer to the Macedonia 
operation back in 1999 and China’s veto in the UN Security Council (see chapter 
                                                  
390 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
391 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
392 Law on civil crisis management, Government proposal 206/2004. Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 5/2004. 
393 E.g. MP U.Anttila 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005; MP Lapintie 15.3.2006, debate 
on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading); MP Kankaanniemi 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 
5/2006 (second reading); MP Salolainen (Foreign Affairs Committee chair) 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 2/2007. 
394 E.g. MP Räsänen 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading). 
395 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 31; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 7. 
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5.3.1).396 This is opposed by views according to which a UN mandate should be 
obtained for all EU operations397 because otherwise the UN’s prestige and ability to 
function in the future is undermined. Furthermore, it is argued that without the UN 
mandate the EU’s crisis management operations will erode international justice and 
undermine the EU’s status as a promoter of justice. It is also seen that EU operations 
without a UN mandate might lead to a situation where resources are removed from UN 
operations into EU operations.398 
  
The Defence Committee saw that it might be impossible to always obtain the UN 
Security Council’s mandate for the employment of the EU’s rapid response force, for 
instance due to an operation’s urgency or a conflict of interest between permanent 
members in the Security Council. Yet, it finds impossible that the EU will use force 
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter.399 The Foreign Affairs Committee points 
out that the European Security Strategy and TEU both refer to the UN Charter. 
Therefore it is also seen that the EU rapid response forces support UN crisis 
management.400 Indeed, the “principles of the UN Charter” becomes a phrase frequently 
referred to in the parliamentary debates. The phrase is used in order to position Finland 
somewhere between yes and no in the question of UN mandate and EU operations. A 
consequent issue then is how this position is to be written into the military crisis 
management act.401 
 
A new feature in the peacekeeping debate is that the need to become part of the 
European mainstream is used in the argumentation of those who are critical towards the 
Government’s proposal to amend the peacekeeping legislation. It is argued that the 
wording of the Finnish legislation should be similar to those of the other EU member 
states in that it follows the phrasing of ESS regarding the UN Charter and UN principles 
in military crisis management402 and does not include specific reference to the 
possibility of dismissing the UN.403 This implies that compared to the previous phases, 
ESDP is more embedded in the national discourse and is used in political argumentation 
in a variety of ways. Referring to EU norms and policy goals is no longer the habit or 
exclusive right of those generally supportive to the EU. Instead it is more freely and 
                                                  
396 MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
397 E.g. MP Siimes 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. Initially the President too supported 
keeping UN mandate. 
398 Objection statement in Defence Committee Report 1/2004, MP Laakso. 
399 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30. 
400 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 8. 
401 MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
402 MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
403 MP Siimes and MP U. Anttila, dissenting opinion in the Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006; MP Siimes 
21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; MP Siimes, MP U.Anttila 15.3.2006, debate on the 
Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading). 
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diversely used in domestic political argumentation. This is a sign of growing general 
prominence of the EU security arrangements on the national level, and shows that ESDP 
has become more internalised in the national political thinking and the political 
interpretations attached to it have become more diverse. Therefore, although the 
Government proposals for the new crisis management act refer to operations 
implemented by the UN and other international organizations or group of countries, the 
EU now dominates the debate on peacekeeping. 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the EU crisis management has become a key reason 
when the national restrictions in participating in international crisis management (UN 
mandate and limitations as to the use of force) are given up. The aim is to rid of any 
national preconditions that would hinder Finnish participation in the EU rapid action 
operations and crisis management. The government directly refers to the UN Charter 42 
Article and how it can be problematic for Finnish “participation in the EU rapid action 
forces and the full scale of the Petersberg tasks”.404 Finnish legislation is now regarded 
by the Government exceptionally restrictive compared to the other EU member states, 
and seen that this is a problem that needs to be solved by amending the national 
legislation.405 The Foreign Minister warns that being an exception among EU members 
would have negative impacts on the Finnish position and overall influence in the EU.406 
Thus, whereas the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were 
previously seen as a positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and 
small state elements of Finnish state identity, it is now to a lessening degree understood 
to provide material for Finnish state identity reproduction. Instead it is now seen as a 
policy misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU 
members when it comes to crisis management.407 
 
The dominant conceptualisations of peacekeeping traditions, a small state’s role in 
peacekeeping and the self-perception of a peacekeeping superpower are now open to 
reinterpretation. The meanings attached to them are no longer that fixed, but all these 
issues can be, and are, utilized in different ways in the domestic political argumentation. 
They are, for instance, used both in supporting and opposing Finnish participation in EU 
military crisis management. Similarly, military crisis management can be presented on 
one hand as a logical continuation to Finnish peacekeeping traditions, and as a break 
with the traditions in the other. The Defence Minister sees the new legislation on both 
civil and military crisis management as a continuation to the five decades of Finnish 
                                                  
404 Government proposal 5/2006, 23. 
405 Government proposal 5/2006, 23. 
406 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading). 
407 E.g. MP Nepponen 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading), 14.9.2005, preliminary debate 
on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
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peacekeeping – traditional missions continue while civil and military crisis management 
offer new tools to respond to more demanding crises.408 Consequently, participation in 
the development of crisis management, rapid response and the EU battle groups 
included, is seen to suit Finnish peacekeeping traditions.409 Yet, the Defence Committee 
admits that “participation in the rapid response force is a significant change in the 
practical implementation of Finland’s international crisis management.”410 In some 
cases, Nordicness is also used as an argument to highlight the continuity in the Finnish 
peacekeeping and crisis management policy.411 The Government Report on the Swedish-
Finnish-Estonian-Irish-Norwegian battle group and the related Foreign Committee 
Report, however, do not seize on the Nordic element, but rather approach the topic in the 
same way as the German-Dutch-Finnish unit.412 Compared to the previous phases, 
drawing a link between peacekeeping traditions and participation in military crisis 
management has become less contested. 
 
At the same time it is possible to draw totally different conclusions and argue that the 
battle groups and the discarding of the requirement of a UN mandate constitute a critical 
break with the Finnish peacekeeping tradition. Many MPs refer to the Finnish state 
identity of a “peacekeeping superpower” as well as the good reputation and international 
appreciation that is built on the neutral status of Finland and of the Finnish peacekeepers 
and on UN mandated operations. Therefore military crisis management is bound to have 
negative consequences to Finland’s “peacekeeping image”.413 It  is  seen  that  the  
departure from the traditional Finnish approach on peacekeeping is taking place due to 
the pressure coming from the EU.414 Thus some MPs see that a requirement for a UN 
mandate would act as a counterforce to the Europeanization pressure.415 In the domestic 
debate traditional Finnish peacekeeping is thus presented as contradicting with the 
expectations and norms originating in the EU level. The debate touches upon the two 
vehicles of identity production – peacekeeping/crisis management and 
neutrality/alignment – and the EU is incorporated in the state identity reconstruction 
process. 
 
                                                  
408 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
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In the previous phases the relationship between national defence and international crisis 
management raised heated debate (see chapters 4.3 and 5.3). Now this issue remains less 
confrontational. It is generally seen that crisis management supports Finnish defence and 
security416 and this conclusion is challenged to a lesser degree than previously. In the 
previous phases the Government used to justify Finnish support to EU crisis 
management with references to national defence. In phase III this kind of reasoning 
plays a significantly smaller role, partly because ESDP has been reconstructed as an 
unquestionable security interest for Finland. The contribution of military crisis 
management to Finnish security is perceived more significant than previously, as 
illustrated by the following extract from the parliamentary debate on the new crisis 
management legislation: 
“However, EU crisis management and the participation in EU crisis 
management operations may become significant for Finland. (…) In the 
future military crisis management may have a greater impact on the safety of 
citizens than has been previously estimated.”417  
 
This also implies that the broad security concept is better embedded in the national 
security policy thinking, and the foreign and security policy discourse has changed so 
that it is possible to convincingly link issues like geographically remote conflicts, 
political and economic instability abroad with the defence and security of Finland.418 
 
Although the Government does not justify the participation in the EU battle groups with 
direct references to national defence – the Prime Minister underlines that the battle 
groups are unsuitable and irrelevant for territorial defence419 – the Defence Committee 
Statement, for instance, notices the benefit of the battle group concept to the 
development of national defence. Especially the cooperation within the German-Dutch-
Finnish battle group was considered valuable in this respect.420 This means that despite 
the hesitancy to openly link the EU battle groups with national defence, an argument 
gaining more credibility in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse is that 
Finnish security can be increased by actions that take place geographically far from the 
national borders.421  
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Consequently, the issue of using military assets to international operations instead of 
focusing only on national defence (i.e. territorial surveillance by Air Force Hornet 
fighters, starting in 2008, transport helicopters to be used in international operations) is 
also discussed.422 However, when it comes to such practical issues and the defence 
budget, crisis management and national defence often become constructed as competing 
elements. Typically it is seen that a proper balance between them is that credible 
international action is to be based on credible national defence,423 or as the Foreign 
Minister puts it, national defence comes first, then crisis management.424 There is also 
some criticism that the battle groups inevitably slim the funding of national defence.425 
The Foreign Affairs Committee’s view, however, is that military crisis management and 
national defence use mainly the same resources and support each other as tasks of the 
Defence Forces.426 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
422 E.g. MP U.Anttila 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the Government Report 8/2006; MP U.Anttila 7.12.2006, follow-
up debate on the Government Report 8/2006. She asks if Finland could allocate more resources from the defence budget 
into the crisis management. The responses mainly note that it would endanger the defence budget. 
423 E.g. MP Kerola 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007. 
424 Foreign Minister Kanerva 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007. 
425 E.g. MP Soini 7.12.2006, MP S.Lahtela 7.12.2006, follow-up debate on the Government Report 8/2006. 
426 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 11/2007. 
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6.3.2 ESDP and the “Constitutional crisis”  
 
As was discussed in chapter 3.2, the main purpose of this study is to see beyond 
structural changes such as bureaucratic reorganization and constitutional change, 
adaptation of domestic structures, and focus on thick Europeanization instead. However, 
the rationalist institutionalist view that Europeanization leads to domestic change for 
instance through differential empowerment of actors describes the so-called 
constitutional crisis that is brought to a head during the third phase. The questions of the 
division of power between the Prime Minister and President in CFSP affairs have since 
remained sensitive issue in Finnish domestic politics.  
 
The EU crisis management became a source political disputes regarding the domestic 
division of power in foreign and security policy. A key question was how the national 
decision to send out EU crisis management troops and battle groups is to be made. As 
was discussed in chapter 3, according the Constitution the starting point in the Finnish 
decision-making system is that foreign policy is directed by the president “in 
cooperation with” the Government. However, all EU matters belong to the Government. 
Yet, there was room for interpretation as to who decides on the participation in ESDP 
operations, since it was not fully clear if they were to be considered “foreign policy” or 
“EU affairs”.427 This resulted in a situation that was labelled a “constitutional crisis”, in 
which the parliament was divided between those supporting the President’s power and 
those more in favour of handing all ESDP decisions to the Prime Minister and 
Government.428 The deepening of European integration in the sphere of foreign and 
security policy was effectively moving issues that traditionally belonged to the President 
into “internal” EU affairs and thus into the domain of the Prime Minister and 
Government. This demonstrates how Europeanization might result in a conflict of 
authority and change the power relationship between the key foreign and security policy 
decision-makers. Consequently, conserving the President’s standing in foreign and 
security policy against this “Europeanization automation”429 requires changes in the 
national interpretations. The Prime Minister argued for ensuring the President’s powers 
in military crisis management and underlined that when sending Finnish troops abroad 
the President must be included in the decision-making, as has been done since the first 
peacekeeping operation 50 years ago.430 The Government’s aim is to repeat and 
                                                  
427 MP Sasi, Chair of the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 
(first reading). 
428 E.g. MP Siimes, MP Räsänen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. On the jurisprudential 
aspects of the issue see Niskanen 2006. 
429 MP Sasi 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
430 Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution. The majority of 
expert opinions submitted to the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee also support this view (Niskanen 2006, 256). 
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regularize the decision-making method that was used in the first two EU operations in 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapter 6.3.1 above): the Government 
prepares, the Parliament handles and the President makes the final decision.431  
 
The Government’s view is widely contested in the domestic debate, and it is argued that 
preserving the President’s role in the issue is unnecessary.432 It is also seen that the 
current “constitutional crisis” offers as a good chance to further parliamentarize foreign 
and security policy-making.433 Particularly the Parliament’s Constitutional Law 
Committee (which interprets the constitution) advocated the view that ESDP operations 
should be decided by the government and not by the President. The Committee’s Chair 
argues that the Government’s interpretation results in a situation where ”for the first 
time the powers of the Council of State are limited in EU matters”434. The Committee 
highlights that the sphere of authority extends to all EU matters, CFSP included. This 
means that since i.a. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and battle groups’ 
tasks in crisis management belong to CFSP according to the Treaty on European Union, 
they are EU matters and fall into the domain of the Government.  
 
The Government decides to withdraw its first proposal for the new peacekeeping 
legislation (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management) after 
the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee Statement, and plans to amend the 
Constitution instead.435 This surprises many of the MPs (as well as Finnish constitutional 
law experts436). The new law is passed as a so-called exceptive act of permanent nature, 
based on Government proposal 5/2006, which states that the President will decide on 
Finnish participation in operations on the basis of the Government’s proposal, and the 
Government will hear the Parliament before making the proposal. Similarly, the 
President also makes the decision on setting the EU battle groups into high readiness 
status and sending the troops on a mission.  
 
The ESDP issue is loaded with many politically contentious questions in the domestic 
debate such as the preferred roles of UN and EU in crisis management, interpretation of 
the constitution, division of power, parliamentarization of foreign and security policy, 
party politics, the President’s traditional position as the Commander-in-chief of the 
Defence Forces, as well as the nearing presidential elections. Different interpretations as 
to whom the EU affairs and CFSP belongs to have appeared during the whole Finnish 
                                                  
431 Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, Finance Minister Heinäluoma 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position 
on the Constitution. 
432 E.g. MP Hautala 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
433 MP Zyskowicz 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution. 
434 MP Sasi, Constitutional Committee’s chair, 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution.  
435 Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution. 
436 Edilex 2.12.2005. 
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EU-membership era, and largely due to the difficulties in drawing the line between 
foreign policy and EU affairs.437 This ambiguity has materialized as a co-called two-
plate policy, or dual presentation in EU summits, which means that Finland often sends 
both the President and Prime Minister to European Council meetings. Though the 
constitution states that the Prime Minister is in charge of EU policy it leaves room for 
interpretation on who will represent Finland in EU summits as it states that the president 
leads the foreign policy in cooperation with the Government.438  
 
All in all, the constitutional crisis clearly shows that although European integration 
causes pressures for domestic structural change (as rationalist institutionalism suggests), 
it is not in a given form but there is national variation – and in the Finnish case an 
obvious national political struggle on how the Europeanization impact is to be nationally 
digested and implemented. In the Finnish case this becomes particularly visible because 
of contesting political and juridical views on the interpretation of the national 
constitution in the face of the developing CFSP. Additionally, a number of domestic 
conditions (such as the President’s traditional role in foreign policy, demarcation 
between foreign policy and EU affairs in the new constitution, nearing presidential 
elections, certain features of party politics439) affect the impact of European integration 
thus causing national variation in the way the EU-membership structurally impacts 
national foreign policies. As was noted in chapter 3, these have been well documented in 
the previous studies and are in this study considered to be only of limited relevance from 
the viewpoint of SI-oriented thick Europeanization. 
                                                  
437 E.g. MP Kankaanniemi, MP Sasi, MP Kiljunen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
Some saw this coming already in the first year of EU membership when the Government Report 1/1995 is handled in the 
parliament and the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia are discussed. MP Ojala 20.12.1995, MP Wahlström 31.10.1995. 
438 “The battle of plates” has resurfaced from time to time, especially after the Lisbon Treaty entered force in 2009. New 
amendments to the constitution have also been under drafting. 
439 ”During the broad coalition governments of Prime Minister Lipponen, the parties in opposition – the Centre Party and 
the Christian Democrats – were critical [about the ESDP] but since  2003 the Centre Party has in government been more 
positive to security political developments, and the opposition, the National Coalition Party [in opposition until 19.4.2007], 
has been very positive towards the Europeanization of Finnish defence policy (Tiilikainen 2006, 213).” (Ojanen 2008, 72.) 
See chapter 3 for further references. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
The role given to the EU security arrangements in Finnish foreign and security policy 
became significantly more prominent during the time period analysed in this chapter. 
The EU was now clearly regarded as the most important security and defence policy 
framework for Finland. The EU was perceived as being capable of tackling the new 
security threats in the changing global environment, to which Finland, and states in 
general, have become more vulnerable than before. The European Security Strategy and 
the threat scenarios defined therein were widely regarded as being in line with the 
Finnish ones. Additionally, the EU operations and battle groups now dominate the crisis 
management debate. The impact of the EU extends to the sphere of defence policy: the 
Government openly stated that the EU influences the way in which the Finnish military 
defence is developed. The purpose was to develop Finnish military defence so that 
“Finland will be able to serve as an active member within the security community 
formed by the EU and allocate the necessary resources for actions required under Union 
obligations.” (Government Report 6/2004, 7) 
 
Since 2003 there were significant changes in the nature of the sources for 
Europeanization, as the EU crisis management operations, battle groups and the 
solidarity clause and mutual defence article entered the CFSP agenda. The general misfit 
pressure towards Finnish foreign and security policy is greater than in the previous 
phases. Top-down Europeanization, that is to say continuing national adaptation 
characterises the Finnish foreign and security policy in the third phase. Full commitment 
to ESDP is announced, including the defence plans, solidarity clause, civil and military 
crisis management and the battle groups. Yet, while it is officially declared that Finland 
participates fully in the executing of the EU’s security policy, a strong perception 
dominating in the domestic discourse is that the EU is not a military alliance, but rather 
contributes to Finnish security by other means, such as political solidarity and by 
providing a “security community”. All in all, a comprehensive reassessment and 
eventual redefinition of the nature of Finnish non-alignment due to the deepening 
European integration was to be observed. A typical feature for phase III was also that it 
is more openly stated and more widely perceived in the domestic debate that changes 
taking place in Finnish foreign and security policy are caused by the ESDP. 
 
In phase II there were heated domestic political disputes on the compatibility of non-
alignment policy with ESDP. As in the two earlier phases, in the first years of the third 
phase there was a widely-shared will to go against the EU mainstream and to prevent the 
development of the defence dimension of the CFSP. In the context of the ICG 2003-
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2004 this tendency manifested itself in an attempt for bottom-up Europeanization, that is 
to say national projection that clearly stemmed from a traditional reading of Finnish 
non-alignment identity. When ESDP appeared to take a turn that was perceived too 
defence oriented, Finland convened with the other non-aligned and neutral EU member 
states in order to counter that development. However, all in all phase III represents a 
change in this respect, since after the national projection proved unsuccessful, the 
institutional misfit between the Finnish approach and ESDP was tackled by defining 
anew the military non-alignment concept. This can be taken as a clear indicator of 
Europeanization, as it is a question of the relaxation of national policy positions in order 
to accommodate the progress of the EU policy and institutions. The Finnish 
interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible with ESDP’s evolving defence 
dimension, including the solidarity clause and the mutual defence article that the 
Convention and the consequent IGC brought along. This was done by redefining 
military non-alignment as a technical concept that refers to the way in which the national 
defence is organized, instead of a concept that would describe Finnish foreign and 
security policy in any broader sense. Despite this official redefinition, ambiguity 
concerning the exact meaning of non-alignment remained in the domestic discourse. It 
was possible to challenge the feasibility and credibility of the concept of military non-
alignment and argue that Finland can no longer be considered militarily non-aligned in a 
traditional sense due to the commitment to ESDP. This debate culminated with the 
parliament voting on the interpretation of Finnish non-alignment. 
 
Concerning the relationship between Finnish peacekeeping and EU crisis management it 
was now perceived and stated more openly than before that it is necessary to amend 
Finnish legislation in order to rid of the misfit between the Finnish and EU approaches. 
In the domestic debate the battle groups are widely understood and explicitly articulated 
as the reason why the changing of peace-keeping legislation takes place. Concerning the 
national preconditions and constrains for participation in CFSP it was concluded in the 
previous chapter that during 1997-2002 a tendency towards more Europeanized foreign 
and security policy in this respect had begun. Yet, a tendency to highlight “neutral” 
conventional peacekeeping and the non-participation in military enforcement that stem 
from traditional state identity elements was then still observed. In phase III military 
crisis management is turning into a less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and 
has even replaced “peacekeeping” in the title of the law. The dominant discourse 
indicates that an understanding gaining ground is that Finland should participate equally 
in  ESDP and  the  same  rules  should  apply  to  Finland  as  to  other  EU members.  It  has  
become a more widely accepted argument that Finland must try to avoid being an 
exception among EU members. This concerns also the issue of the UN mandate. 
Previously the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were seen as a 
positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements 
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of Finnish state identity. In 2003-2007 such difference between Finland and other EU 
members in this respect is no longer constructed to the purposes of identity production. 
Rather, some of the traditional features in the Finnish approach were now regarded as a 
policy misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU 
members when it comes to crisis management. 
 
The new meanings attached to peacekeeping have implications on the Finnish state 
identity reproduction. For instance, it became possible to more credibly link 
peacekeeping traditions with participation in military crisis management domestic 
discourse. When debating peacekeeping in the two previous phases, peace enforcement, 
for instance, was deemed unsuitable to Finland, because it was perceived somehow alien 
to Finland’s state identity. In the previous phases abstaining from peace enforcement or 
from military coercion against a state and other such unsuitable forms of peacekeeping 
also served as a factor that contributed to the reproduction of Finnish state identity. In 
phase III there is growing domestic support for casting aside the national preconditions 
and constraints for participation in international crisis management. It was typically 
highlighted that it is necessary to eliminate differences in the national rules of 
engagement for the sake of the credibility and security of Finnish troops in military 
crisis management operations and EU battle groups. In the previous phases the domestic 
discourse was not supportive of this type of argumentation. 
 
Also the meanings attached to small stateness have changed and a new meaning is 
emerging in the domestic discourse. An effective and unified EU in the sphere of 
foreign, security and defence policy is constructed as an advantage for Finland, 
specifically since Finland is a small state. In the parliamentary debate the new “small 
EU member state identity” is pitted against the traditional small state identity that is still 
observable in the debates. The traditional small state self-identification is also 
challenged by the growing significance of the broad security conception in the domestic 
discourse. The “new” threat perceptions make CFSP more suitable for the needs of 
Finnish security. Furthermore, they enable the construction of a more European state 
identity where the issues like remote geographical location, small population or borders 
with the neighbouring countries do not serve as the key elements in state identity 
reproduction. 
 
Compared to the previous phases, consensus and its perceived value in Finnish foreign 
and security policy-making have decreased in importance. Where it used to be 
understood as the lifeline of a small state and an essential factor for small states in the 
previous phases, now it is far less often referred to in the domestic debate. It has become 
more difficult to credibly maintain such a construction of continuity that was observed 
in the discourse in the previous phases in all the three main categories of identity 
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production. For instance, the view that the military non-alignment concept brings 
rationality and predictability to the Finnish policy in the eyes of the other international 
actors was questioned in the domestic debate, and is no longer the dominating view in 
the domestic discourse. Politicization of foreign and security policy continued. As the 
ESDP advances it contains more and more potential for causing domestic political 
disputes, thus rendering impossible to maintain the perception of pragmatic and 
consensual national foreign and security policy that rests on the analytical identification 
of the sole correct solution for each given policy issue. 
 
Particularly concerning the first phase it was concluded that it is the post-Cold War 
deeper international transformation processes that are the primary causes for the changes 
in Finnish foreign and security policy – and that CFSP played only an instrumental role 
in that change (see chapter 4.7). Where EU membership and supportive stance on CFSP 
were then used as proofs of the reorientation of Finnish foreign and security policy, the 
EU membership now serves as an important element in the state identity reconstruction 
process, which impacts the way the central state identity elements are understood. 
Consequently, new issues emerge from the domestic discourse: minimalist reading of 
military non-alignment, alignment to the EU, peacekeeping increasingly understood as 
active participation in crisis management as defined by the EU, small stateness 
determined by EU-membership and recast more and more as “small member stateness”. 
The ESDP has become an internalized element of the domestic discourse and 
increasingly serves as a means of self-identification. 
 
In phase III the domestic discourse was observed to be more supportive than before 
towards the introduction of practices and structures of meaning that originate in ESDP. 
An increasing interplay between domestic and external expectations and understandings 
typical for Europeanization processes were observed taking place in phase III. This has 
resulted in the redefinition of some of the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security 
policy and a strengthening understanding in the domestic discourse was that the 
Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy serves the national interest. 
These findings regarding thick Europeanization further support the conclusion drawn in 
the analysis of the phase II (see chapter 5.4) that in the ongoing renegotiation of Finnish 
state identity CFSP comprises an institution that provides Finland with new 
understandings of what Finnish interests are and what the appropriate means may be to 
pursue these interests. 
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7. Conclusions: Europeanization of Finnish state identity 
 
 
 
This study set out to examine how Finnish foreign and security policy has been 
influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
whether this change has been profound enough to have impact on the key concepts of 
national foreign policy – and thus alter the Finnish state identity. The main findings 
concerning each phase (1994-1996, 1997-2002, 2003-2007) were presented in the 
conclusions of the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6. The empirical analysis revealed that the 
key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy have undergone a considerable 
change. New meanings have been attached in the domestic discourse to non-alignment, 
peacekeeping and small stateness. Moreover, it was shown that the redefinition of 
concepts was heavily influenced by the European level processes, that is to say the 
development of EU crisis management and the EU’s defence policy. This chapter 
aggregates the main findings and discusses their implications on the Finnish state 
identity. It is concluded that European integration has had increasing impact on the 
Finnish state identity reproduction by bringing in more Europeanized interpretations of 
the key foreign and security policy concepts. 
 
A key theoretical argument in the background of the study was that collective 
understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic 
understandings, cause adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead 
to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This meant that 
Europeanization was principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the 
theoretical framework of the study built on the Europeanization research literature and 
constructivist IR theory. The “constructivist turn” in IR was identified as one of the 
three major theoretical turns in the background of the Europeanization approach, the 
other two being the relaunch of Comparative Political Science in EU Studies and the 
institutionalist turn. With the help of constructivism foreign and security policy was 
defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and 
security policy concepts were seen as the vehicles of identity production. It was shown 
that the mechanisms of change to which the Europeanization literature refers to in the 
case of foreign and security policy are reminiscent of those that constructivism 
discusses: interaction, learning and socialization. The rationalist and sociological 
institutionalist roots of different Europeanization approaches were examined closer and 
a reconceptualization of Europeanization was presented. It was argued that identity 
reconstruction should not be seen as a separate category from national adaptation and 
national projection. Rather, there are two interconnected dimensions in this process: 
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rationalist institutionalist “thin” Europeanization and sociological institutionalist “thick” 
Europeanization. Adaptation and projection, then, where defined as the directions in 
which both rationalist institutionalist and sociological institutionalist Europeanization 
can happen. 
 
In light of the Finnish case the reconstruction of directions and dimensions of 
Europeanization appeared useful. Both national adaptation and projection, and thin and 
thick Europeanization were observed in the empirical analysis. Concerning the question 
of rationalist versus sociological institutionalism, it can be concluded that the 
sociological variant proved to be more suitable for studying the Europeanization of 
national foreign and security policy. The conclusion on the basis of the analysis of the 
Finnish case is that the rationalist approach is capable of providing a general picture of 
the structural changes in the politico-administrative system, but risks missing deeper 
changes in the national foreign and security policy thinking. The origin of such changes 
is clearly outside the grasp of the rationalist approach: they emerge because European 
integration has the potential to change the way interests and identities are constructed. 
 
The introduction of constructivist state identity theory was also presented as a way to 
solve the problems found in the Europeanization literature’s view on the too 
straightforward connection between individual level identity change and national level 
foreign and security policy change. The constructivist views on state identity were used 
in moving attention from the identity reconstruction at the individual level to the level of 
state identity reconstruction that can be approached by analyzing the national foreign 
and security policy discourse. State identity was defined as a collective level social 
construction that is produced by the domestic foreign and security policy-making 
process and in interaction with the international environment. On the other hand, it was 
found welcome that the Europeanization approach adds a more empirically oriented 
approach to the more ontological constructivist social theory. On the basis of this study 
it can be concluded that the framework in which Europeanization was conceptualized as 
state identity reconstruction has been fruitful in being able to identify relevant changes 
in the Finnish case. 
 
The methodological implications of the theoretical framework were explained in chapter 
2. The parliamentary debates were considered to provide particularly useful primary 
research material for the purposes of this study. In light of the empirical analysis it can 
be concluded that while the official foreign and security policy often emphasized 
continuity over change, the closer analysis of the parliamentary debate indeed managed 
to uncover certain heterogeneity and room for manoeuvre in the dominant discourse. By 
looking closer into the parliamentary debates divergent interpretations and 
understandings of the EU’s security policy significance for Finland were located. Had 
 209 
the analysis concentrated solely on the official outcome of the foreign and security 
policy-making process, the “post-consensus” trend or the problematic relationship 
between traditional peacekeeping and military crisis management, for instance, would 
have most likely remained uncovered. The analysis showed that the Government texts 
often constructed an image of continuity of national foreign and security policy and 
presented the changes that have taken place often as being minor or technical in nature. 
Moreover, the Government texts seldom referred directly to the EU’s impact whereas in 
the domestic debate this was a constant and highly visible theme. For instance, 
concerning ESDP’s impact on the new peacekeeping legislation of 2000 the analysis 
revealed a considerable unbalance between the Government’s official discourse and the 
parliamentary debate. The Government declared that ESDP played no role when the 
national legislation on crisis management was amended. In the parliamentary debate, 
however, the impact of the EU’s crisis management capacity build-up on Finnish foreign 
and security policy was debated extensively, and the justifications of the amendment 
presented by the Government were questioned. The external pressures posed by the EU 
membership were seen to have contributed significantly to the new legislation. 
Moreover, the new peacekeeping act was not regarded merely as a technical adjustment 
to the previous one, as the Government suggests, but as a change that affects the whole 
Finnish foreign and security policy, and thus also has repercussions on Finland’s identity 
as an actor in the international system.  
 
Similarly, it was shown that the Government presented the security and defence report 
of 2001 merely as a recheck of the previous defence policy report from 1997, but in the 
domestic debate there were differing interpretations, some seeing the report representing 
a totally new policy. This indicates that the domestic discursive structures were under 
change. In light of the theoretical framework it is important to recognize the different 
tendencies in the domestic discourse and the meaning structures attached to them 
because they form the context in which certain policies become possible. By including 
the parliamentary debates in the research material it was possible to see better how the 
domestic foreign and security policy discourse is influenced by the meanings and 
understandings at the European level.  
 
By building on secondary sources it was shown in chapter 3 how CFSP constitutes 
adaptational pressures towards the member states. Furthermore, it was also shown how 
the adaptational pressure caused by CFSP has increased during the Finnish EU 
membership era because of the deepening of European integration in security and 
defence policies. This was argued to have resulted in a growing interplay and misfit 
between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic 
expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. Misfit proved to be a practical 
conceptual tool when doing the empirical analysis. It made possible to grasp the 
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differences between the domestic and European level, and shed light on those issues that 
set the Europeanization process in motion. Certain cultural understandings and structural 
conditions were identified as the mediating factors that increase the proneness of Finnish 
foreign and security policy to Europeanization. These included the Musterknabe attitude, 
lack of NATO membership, cultural understanding of the centrality of security policy, 
and small stateness. These were seen as factors that made Europeanization proceed more 
smoothly in the Finnish case, even when there certain persistent traditional identity 
elements were at play. A main finding concerning the domestic structural conditions that 
affect the impact of European integration in this study has been that in the Finnish case 
the cultural understandings serve as the main mediating factors. This is to say that the 
cultural understandings, rather than any particular group of norm entrepreneurs, 
influenced the degree to which misfit between the European and Finnish level and the 
need for national adaptation are felt (cf. Börzel & Risse 2007, 492). Rather than singling 
out particular norm entrepreneurs, the analysis showed that each consecutive 
Government generally advanced the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security 
policy. 
 
Chapter 3 also looked at the findings of the previous studies from the viewpoint of thin 
and thick Europeanization and it was concluded that the studies have often concentrated 
on what can be classified as thin Europeanization, such as structural consequences 
concerning the division of power and competence of foreign policy actors. In the few 
cases when the previous studies apply a more sociological institutionalist approach, the 
conclusions concerning the Finnish case tend to have been that no significant 
Europeanization has taken place. In light of the present work, it can be concluded that 
they have underestimated or failed to acknowledge the role played by CFSP in 
redefinition of the key foreign and security policy concepts. 
 
 
Assessing the main findings and their implications on Finnish state identity 
 
Before Finland joined the EU, the European Commission pointed at the potential 
problematic effects of Finnish policy of military non-alignment and credible, 
independent defence. Firstly, the Finnish policy “might stand in the way of a full 
acceptance of the Union’s external policies” (European Commission 1992, 22). 
Secondly, it was asked if Finland “can fully share some of its objectives, such as the 
safeguarding of the independence and security of the Union” despite the great emphasis 
Finland lays on ”the capability of defending the national territory” (ibid., 22) On the 
basis of this study it can be concluded that military non-alignment has not stood in the 
way of full acceptance of the Union’s external policies and its objectives. Since the 
1990s the EU has aimed at creating ”a European we” in the sphere of foreign and 
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security policy, with the goal of being able to speak with one voice at the international 
level (see chapter 3). The analysis indicated that this development has been reflected in 
the Finnish discourse to a growing degree. The EU has played an increasing role in the 
post-Cold War reconstitution of “Finland”. The main conclusion of this study in this 
respect points to a transformation process. In the first years of the EU membership 
foreign and security policy and CFSP are domestically seen to provide elements that 
separate Finland from the EU mainstream and from the other member states. Later on, 
however, CFSP turns into a positive identity element: European integration in the sphere 
of foreign and security policy begins to represent both a tool for responding to the 
changes in the international security environment and a new means of self-identification. 
CFSP offers Finland shared values, threat pictures and gives meaning to the positions, 
interests and interactions of the self and the other in the international system (cf. Doty 
1993). Yet, the Finnish case shows that while adapting to CFSP it is still possible to 
maintain distinctive national interpretations of CFSP and its implications at the domestic 
level. This way it is possible to preserve certain resonance with the traditional state 
identity elements while adapting to new European policies and the meaning structures 
they carry. This latter finding gives further credence to the Europeanization literature’s 
views on national variation in the impacts of Europeanization. The national 
interpretations on CFSP and the changes it requires on the domestic level can vary from 
member state to member state. 
 
The empirical analysis suggested that ESDP and deepening European integration in the 
sphere of security policy have played a significant, albeit in some cases indirect, role in 
a number of transformations in the Finnish security policy that have taken place since 
1995. These include changes for instance in the national position on the use on military 
force abroad (the rules of peace-keeping/military crisis management), in the 
interpretation of non-alignment, the relationship of national defence and crisis 
management and their profiles as the tasks of the National Defence Forces; and the 
division of power among the primary national foreign policy decision-makers, that is to 
say President and the Prime Minister/Council of State, and also the Parliament. 
 
As to the second dimension of Europeanization, that is the attempts of projecting 
national interests on the European security policy agenda, it was concluded that they 
mainly relate to the issue of military non-alignment and to the compatibility of the 
potential development of ESDP’s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-
alignment. It was shown that the cases of national projection have their roots in the 
Finnish tradition of neutrality. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security 
policy discourse when Finland joined the EU, the analysis showed that its impact 
continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. 
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This also goes to show that some conceptual vehicles of identity production are more 
persistent to change than others.  
 
The first years of Finnish EU-membership were characterized by a constant monitoring 
and assessment of national foreign and security policy and the changes in the 
international security environment. In phase I the role of the EU as a security policy 
actor on a practical level was regarded rather limited and the significance given to the 
CFSP and its instruments was modest. The EU-membership was mainly associated with 
“cooperational security”, and the role of the EU as an international organization was 
seen to build on its broad economic assistance programmes. The dominant interpretation 
in the domestic discourse was that the EU’s security policy significance to Finland 
depended on Finland’s own activity and contribution, particularly since the EU is not a 
military alliance or an independent actor in the field of defence. Concerning military 
security the view was that it remains Finland’s own responsibility but the EU 
membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert 
political pressure.  
 
The analysis of the years 1994-1996 revealed a significant tension in the domestic 
debate on how national security interest should be defined, and what is the relationship 
between European and national goals and values in it. The analysis showed a collective 
understanding in the domestic discourse that a new international and European security 
order was under construction and the new suitable means for the international 
community’s purpose were sought for. Two competing main lines were observed in the 
domestic discourse as to what kind of threat pictures Finnish foreign and security policy 
should be based on. The traditional approach highlighted that the main threat picture is 
military and territorial by nature, and the security policy tools must be maintained, 
developed and prioritised accordingly. The underlined factors that define Finland’s state 
identity were according to this view the geographical location, smallness, history and the 
permanency of geopolitics. This view was challenged by an approach that emphasized a 
more value-based broad security concept and the interests of the post-Cold War 
international and European value community. The corresponding threat picture was 
based on a combination of political, societal, economic, environmental and military 
problems that might escalate and cause regional and international instability. 
Consequently, it was underlined that international conflict prevention and crisis 
management are essential for the new Finnish foreign and security policy and more 
commitment to the emerging European security system is required. The debate 
culminated with the question of the compatibility of international crisis management 
with the “legitimate security interest of a small state”. In light of the theoretical 
framework it was concluded that the two simultaneously prevailing trends in the 
domestic discourse implied that certain vehicles of state identity production had opened 
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for re-definition in the political process in phase I. It was also noted that the end of the 
Cold War had provided a ”situation of strong uncertainty” where the previous 
foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy had to be rethought (cf. Marcussen et 
al. 2001, 102; Checkel 2001). 
 
Concerning phase I it was concluded that the changes in the Finnish foreign and security 
policy were not caused primarily by the European integration process. A view that 
emerged from the discourse was that the participation in and commitment to CFSP were 
merely an instrument by which the adaptation to the new international security 
environment could take place. The conclusion drawn concerning the years 1994-1996 
thus comes close to Rieker’s thesis on instrumental adaptation, according to which no 
“learning” or “socialisation” has taken place in the Finnish case.440 However, the 
analysis showed that an interplay of international and domestic expectations that is 
typical for a Europeanization process had already started, and there was a discursive 
battle on how national interest and security should be constructed, and what should be 
the roles of “European” and purely nationally defined security interests in it. Moreover, 
the analysis of the years 1997-2007 indicated deeper Europeanization than many of the 
previous studies suggest. 
 
The analysis of the second phase (1997-2002) pointed to a greater visibility of the EU in 
the national foreign and security policy discourse than in the previous phase. A widely 
shared understanding in the domestic discourse was observed that the significance of the 
EU in carrying out Finland’s security policy interests and goals has increased. Finland 
had arrived at a crossroads and had to choose whether it will follow the European 
mainstream in security policy or opt out partially or fully from the European security 
policy cooperation. A main finding in this respect was that less emphasis was put in the 
domestic discourse on the conception of Finland as a “different” state in Europe that has 
legitimate national reservations on security cooperation as well as security interests that 
are out of line with the other EU-members. Additionally, it was concluded that new 
elements were taking root in the state identity reproduction process. Typical feature 
located in phase II was the simultaneous emphasizing of “continuity” and “adaptation to 
the new circumstances” in the official foreign policy discourse. 
 
The analysis showed that there were different domestic interpretations prevailing on 
what kind of changes in Finnish foreign and security policy the EU-membership and 
CFSP actually require and how strong the adaptation pressure is. Yet, a widely shared 
view was observed in the discourse that the development towards deeper cooperation in 
security policy in the EU is seen likely to cause further national adaptational pressures in 
                                                  
440 Rieker’s conclusion also means that there has been no identity change and no (social) institutionalisation of the change 
into a part of national thinking. See chapter 3.2. 
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the future. Concerning phase II it was concluded that it was no longer possible to 
construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as simply being fully compatible with the 
Finnish national foreign and security policy. As the misfit between these two became so 
apparent a certain reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts and the 
meanings attached to them was inevitable. The analysis of the domestic debate revealed 
a growing inconsistency between the emphasis put on continuity in the official discourse 
and the simultaneous reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts. 
Nevertheless, the intention to preserve, amid the changes, a certain degree of resonance 
with the traditional state identity elements was also observed. In phase I CFSP, and the 
EU-membership in general, were mainly seen as an instrument for Finland, with which 
to prove its European state identity and the direction that Finland has taken in the post-
Cold War environment to the other international actors. Contrast to that in phase II it 
was observed that CFSP became a more internalised element of the national discourse. 
Concepts like “European values” and “the common European value base” were put 
forward in the domestic debate as factors from which the goals of Finnish foreign and 
security policy can be derived. It was concluded that CFSP had started to evolve into a 
new means of self-identification for Finland. 
 
This development continued in phase III (2003-2007). The analysis pointed to a 
transitional stage concerning the way in which ESDP was perceived and used in political 
argumentation in the domestic level. The EU’s overall security policy significance for 
Finland was identified to be significantly greater than in the previous phases. A 
strengthening view emerged in the domestic discourse according to which, firstly, the 
deepening of integration within the EU has increased the stability of Finland’s near 
environs, and secondly, that in the changing global environment, security threats extend 
beyond national borders and Finland has become more vulnerable to the “new” security 
threats than before. The EU was regarded capable of tackling such threats better than 
any other international organization. The analysis also showed that an understanding 
gaining ground was that Finland should participate equally in ESDP and the same rules 
should apply to Finland as to the other EU members. It had become a more widely 
accepted argument that Finland must try to avoid being an exception among the EU 
members when it comes to foreign, security and defence policy. 
 
To structure the empirical analysis three key categories of vehicles of identity 
production were defined in chapter 3. In the following the main findings of each 
category are discussed from the viewpoint of Finnish state identity reconstruction. 
 
Due to the nature of ESDP as the source of Europeanization pressure, a topic dominating 
much of the empirical analysis was “crisis management” (whether in the form of 
military, civilian or “military-civilian” operations). Although a relatively broad national 
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support on Finnish participation in EU’s crisis management had eventually been 
achieved, the issue appears to have opened the Pandora’s box in the national political 
debate: the analysis pointed out numerous questions and disagreements that had a direct 
or indirect link to military crisis management as an instrument of ESDP. These include 
inter alia the division of power between the President, Government (and Parliament), 
question of UN-mandate of peace keeping/crisis management operations, traditional 
model of peace-keeping versus peacemaking and military enforcement; the relationship 
of traditional national defence and crisis management as the tasks of National Defence 
Forces; neutrality/military non-alignment, and even Finnish Constitution and its 
interpretation and revising.  
 
The original impulse for widening the scope of peacekeeping can be located in the 
nationally widely shared perception that the post-Cold War environment calls for new 
types of international activities to secure peace and stability. The introduction of 
enhanced peacekeeping was domestically justified as being a response to the changes in 
the international environment. In the later phases, however, a clear shift of focus appears 
and in the political argumentation the EU and the developing CFSP appear as the factors 
that necessitate the changes in peacekeeping. The change of national peacekeeping 
legislation has had impact also on the role of peacekeeping and crisis management in the 
national defence. In addition to the organizational rearrangements, changes were 
observed in how the relationship of peacekeeping/crisis management and national 
defence is understood.  
 
The analysis of the domestic discourse indicated that in phase I the EU’s role in 
peacekeeping and crisis management was considered to be rather modest. The analysis 
pointed out attempts to draw a clear line between crisis management and peacekeeping. 
Crisis management was often understood as unsuitable for Finland since it is was 
compatible with Finland’s traditional state identity and role in international politics as a 
small state. This can be taken as a reason why the Government introduced the concept 
enhanced peacekeeping as a sort of a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping 
and military crisis management. Enhanced peacekeeping was constructed as a logical 
continuation to the Finnish peacekeeping tradition and thus matching with the Finnish 
state identity. The analysis pointed out a general hesitancy towards over-enhancing the 
means of peacekeeping too far beyond the traditional form. In the domestic debate it was 
questioned whether the participation in new international crisis management abolishes 
the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional peacekeeper or not. A variety of 
diverse meanings were at this phase attached to crisis management in the domestic 
discourse. In phase I abstaining from peace enforcement became a factor which 
contributed to the reproduction of Finnish identity. It supported and revitalized the 
traditional state identity elements related to peacekeeping, which have their roots firstly 
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in an understanding of Finland as a neutral party, a conventional peacekeeper. 
Additionally, it was observed that non-participation in peace enforcement was justified 
with references to small state identity. Peace enforcement and military coercion against 
a state was considered a task for great powers and military alliances, not small states. 
Additionally, the civilian crisis management was constructed as a way to preserve a 
certain resonance between the national collective understandings that relate to the 
traditional peacekeeping as a state identity element and the new more military-oriented 
features of international crisis management. By putting emphasis on the civilian aspects 
of crisis management it was possible to some extent to try to bridge the gap between the 
domestic understandings that stemmed from the traditional state identity elements and 
the norms, expectations and adaptation pressures coming from the European level.  
 
Although military coercion was excluded, a step towards enhanced peacekeeping was 
taken, broadening the scope of Finnish peacekeeping beyond the traditional limits. In 
retrospect, the introduction of enhanced peacekeeping paved the way for an emerging 
interplay between the domestic pressures to safeguard the heritage of Finnish 
peacekeeping traditions and external pressures emanating from the international level. In 
the domestic discourse the new peacekeeping act of 2000 was portrayed as the second 
phase in a transformation process that started with the amendment that took place in 
1995. Also in phase II the analysis showed a persistence of the vehicles of identity 
production that relate to the traditional peacekeeping conception and connect both 
neutrality and peacekeeping. In the Government texts the related revisions in the foreign 
and security policy were constructed in a way that aims to preserve a certain degree of 
resonance with the traditional state identity elements. The analysis pointed out a 
conceptually constructed difference between “peace enforcement” and “military 
enforcement”, the latter being defined alien feature to Finnish foreign and security 
policy and state identity.” This difference made possible the perception that the new 
policy does not contradict with the still so prominent elements in Finland’s state identity, 
i.e. non-alignment and traditional peacekeeping.” Regarding phase II a key finding in 
this respect was that when the neutrality element is  intertwined with conventional 
peacekeeping element they constitute a strong conservative dynamic against external 
pressures. 
 
Concerning phase I it was concluded that although peacekeeping activities had been 
traditionally seen as an essential part of Finland’s state identity (via the self-image of a 
“peacekeeping superpower”), it was not manifested as a significant factor in national 
defence. Contrast to that, in phase II a direct connection was constructed in the 
Government discourse between the defence of the motherland and peacekeeping 
activities abroad. A finding in this respect was that Finnish participation in military 
crisis management is domestically perceived to have repercussions both on Finland’s 
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position as a militarily non-aligned state and on the relationship between national 
defence and international crisis management. The analysis also showed that the question 
of political expectations and moral obligations coming from the EU figured more 
prominently in the domestic debate than in phase I. The EU crisis management had 
become to be perceived as a factor that sets the conditions and expectations for the 
future directions of Finnish peacekeeping. Furthermore, it was concluded that the role of 
perceived differences between Finland and other EU-members and CFSP in state 
identity reconstruction process was declining. In phase II the impact of European 
integration was particularly visible when peacekeeping was reconstructed as crisis 
management. The definitions used in ESDP appeared to have had a significant impact on 
how the new forms of peacekeeping, and the division into civilian crisis management 
and military crisis management, were perceived nationally. It was concluded that the 
conceptual shift from peacekeeping towards crisis management, and the related changes 
in the meanings attached to peacekeeping as a central state identity element, represent an 
exemplar of top-down, “thick” Europeanization. 
 
In phase III the connection between Finnish defence and international military 
cooperation in the EU was more clearly manifested. The Prime Minister, for instance, 
stated that crisis management increases national security, creates the capacity for 
international cooperation and makes it easier to receive assistance in a state of 
emergency. Developing Finnish crisis management capability began to be justified more 
visibly than before as part of Finnish defence policy. An understanding gaining ground 
in the domestic discourse was that crisis management supports Finnish defence and 
security. This is partly explained by the fact that the broad security concept had become 
more embedded in the national security policy thinking. The analysis showed that the 
foreign and security policy discourse had become more supportive towards linking 
issues like geographically remote conflicts, political and economic instability abroad 
with the defence and security of Finland. Consequently, despite the hesitancy to openly 
link the EU battle groups with national defence, an argument gaining more credibility in 
the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse was that Finnish security can be 
increased by actions that take place geographically far from the national borders. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis showed that military crisis management had turned into an 
established and less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and the meanings 
attached to it had became less diverse. It was widely recognized that ESDP and Finnish 
participation in EU civil and military crisis management operations and battle groups 
necessitate the amending of the Finnish peacekeeping policy and legislation. At the 
same time, non-alignment was no longer dominantly perceived as a feature that brings 
added value to Finnish crisis management. 
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Summing up it can be concluded that the peacekeeping and crisis management 
operations served as mobilisators of concrete Europeanization impacts in the domestic 
decision-making structures. The operations also gave exact timetables for the changes 
and caused time pressure on the domestic decision-making. National adaptation to ESDP 
and EU crisis management appeared particularly in the form of casting aside the 
previous national preconditions and constrains for participation in international crisis 
management operation. Gradually the national restrictions became to be seen as a 
hindrance and problem rather than distinctive character of the Finnish peacekeeping 
traditions that secures and reproduces Finnish state identity. At first the UN-orientation 
and national restrictions in use of force were seen as a positive factor that resonates with 
the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements of Finnish state identity. Later on, 
they were to a lessening degree understood to provide material for Finnish state identity 
reproduction. Instead they were seen as a policy misfit that should be removed so that 
Finland can be similar to the other EU members when it comes to crisis management. 
 
During the first years of the EU membership, “military non-alignment” and “credible 
independent defence“  were widely perceived as a logical continuation to the Finnish 
foreign and security tradition. In the Government speech the participation in CFSP was 
presented as having caused no radical alteration in the grand Finnish foreign and 
security policy line. Similarly, the EU-membership was presented as something that 
naturally befits Finland’s ”western” and ”European” state identity. These findings 
concerning phase I support the conclusions presented in some of the other existing work 
on the theme. For instance, Browning’s argument on the intentional political 
construction of “a European narrative” for Finland (Browning 2002, 2008; see chapter 
3.2) points to the same direction. However, in light of the present work the EU soon 
turns from being an instrument in making identity politics into a source of adaptational 
pressure.  
 
A key finding in phase II was a growing inconsistency between the emphasis put on 
continuity in the official discourse and the simultaneous reconstruction of national 
foreign and security concepts. Eventually, Finland had to take a more consistent and 
committed stance on how it regards CFSP/ESDP and by what means it participates in its 
development. Consequently, Finland was impelled to define more clearly than before the 
meaning and limits of its non-alignment. The inapplicability of neutrality was in phase II 
more directly and openly connected to the EU-membership in the domestic discourse. 
Additionally, “a common European value base” was more often referred to in the 
domestic debates on non-alignment. The analysis showed that inapplicability of 
neutrality had gained a dominant position in the domestic discourse, and this was 
identified as a clear indication of thick Europeanization. Furthermore, it was noted that 
Finland had entered an era of constant re-assessment of its military non-alignment. This 
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implied that new meanings were attached to military non-alignment, and it was no 
longer perceived as an immutable factor, but only as a solution that is found most 
suitable under the prevailing circumstances, and thus may be subject to change. 
 
In phase III the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment with the developed 
ESDP become an increasingly questioned issue in the domestic debate. A conclusion 
gaining ground in the domestic debate was that the increasing commitment to ESDP 
implies that Finland is inescapably Europeanized to such a degree that the credibility of 
the concept of military non-alignment had begun to falter. The previous construction 
that the military non-alignment concept brings rationality and predictability to the 
Finnish policy in the eyes of the other international actors had lost credibility in the 
domestic debate. In the official interpretation military non-alignment was reconstructed 
as a more technical and less political qualifier that refers mostly to the way in which 
national defence is organized and implemented in practice. Full commitment to ESDP 
was announced, including the defence plans, solidarity clause, civil and military crisis 
management and the battle groups. Yet, while it was officially declared that Finland 
participates fully in the executing of the EU’s security policy, a strong perception 
dominating in the domestic discourse is that the EU is not a military alliance, despite the 
ESDP development. The analysis indicated that certain ambiguity concerning the exact 
meaning of non-alignment remained in the domestic discourse.  
 
It can be concluded that a comprehensive reassessment and eventual redefinition of the 
nature of Finnish non-alignment due to the deepening European integration was taking 
place in phase III. The Finnish interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible 
with ESDP’s evolving defence dimension. However, the adaptational pressure caused by 
the defence dimension of CFSP was far from being unambiguous. The unclear status of 
EU defence policy left room for national interpretation. This made it possible for 
Finland to stick to the concept of military non-alignment, although only in the most 
limited form. The observed cases of national projection also related to the issue of EU 
defence policy and Finnish non-alignment. In both cases Finland invoked its non-
alignment, joined forces with other neutral or non-aligned EU member states, and in 
order not to compromise its status as militarily non-aligned country made an attempt to 
keep common defence out of the EU. Finland tried to influence the EU-level and 
promote nationally defined goals and ideas that better resonate with the domestic norms 
and collective understandings that stemmed from the non-alignment element in the 
Finnish state identity. In the end, the outcomes of both of the national projections show 
that national projection is not fully steerable and might result in unexpected and even 
unwanted results. This might be a feature that concerns only the small member states, 
but what perhaps speaks in favour of the generalization of this finding is that in both 
cases Finland worked together with a group of member states. All in all, and despite the 
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national projections, it can be concluded that the state identity element of non-alignment 
has been significantly Europeanized. The institutional misfit between the Finnish 
approach and ESDP was tackled by defining anew the military non-alignment concept, 
and the Finnish interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible with ESDP’s 
evolving defence dimension, including the solidarity clause and the mutual defence 
article that the Convention and the consequent IGC brought along. As a consequence of 
this, Finnish state identity has been effectively Europeanized. Finland finds itself not 
impartial, but part of the European “we”. 
 
The third and last category of conceptual vehicles of identity production, small stateness, 
was defined to consist of three components: consensus in national foreign and security 
policy-making, understanding of a “legitimate security interest of small state”, and 
perceptions on role of geography. 
 
The main finding concerning consensus was that there is an ongoing trend of “post-
consensus”, caused by simultaneous parliamentarization and Europeanization of foreign 
and security policy. This is to say that foreign and security policy issues are more openly 
discussed in the parliament and the parliament has more say in the decision-making. 
Furthermore, the EU membership has brought along a diversified policy agenda and new 
levels of decision-making. This has made the preconditions of national consensus more 
complicated and has resulted in the diversification in the domestic discourse and a 
gradual fracturing of consensus. However, the analysis revealed that the small state 
identity appeared quite persistent when it comes to consensus: both the government and 
the opposition in many occasions considered national consensus and moving security 
and foreign policy beyond normal domestic politics imperative for a small state. 
Consequently, the analysis indicated a general bafflement and mutual accusations 
between government and parliament on the wearing away of national consensus. In the 
domestic discourse an emerging understanding was observed, according to which the 
possibilities for a “pragmatic” foreign and security policy have decreased. A related 
finding was that the politicization of national security policy has reached a point in 
which consensus is no longer perceived that essential element of a small state’s foreign 
and security policy. Consensus used to be understood as the lifeline of a small state but 
is now far less often referred to in the domestic debate. 
 
In phase II a reconstruction process was identified in which “small state identity” has 
begun to be increasingly interpreted as ”small member state identity”. The analysis 
showed that a growing perception in the domestic discourse was that it is in the foreign 
and security policy interests of a small member state to promote the EU as a strong 
international actor. This pointed to a construction of more European state identity where 
the issues like remote geographical location, small population or borders with the 
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neighbouring countries do not serve as the dominant elements in state identity 
reproduction. At the same time, the understanding of a “legitimate security interest of 
small state” that rests on purely nationally defined security interests was challenged by a 
view that saw foreign and security policy interests as common interests and defined in 
common European processes. In the domestic discourse small stateness was no longer 
connected to national preconditions and constrains for participation in CFSP, but was 
perceived to imply supporting issues like the external capacity of the EU, 
intergovernmentalism, equal right of participation, regulation of flexible integration in 
the second pillar, and jointly decided goals and timetables.  
 
Nevertheless, more traditional conclusions on small state interests were also observed in 
the debate, particularly when such aspects of Finnish defence policy as the territorial 
defence system and general conscription were discussed. Yet, in the framework of this 
study this was not taken as an indication of superficiality or instrumentality of Finnish 
foreign and security policy Europeanization. Rather, it told us more about the source of 
Europeanization pressure: CFSP does not produce an unambiguous Europeanization 
pressure on issues like territorial defence or general conscription.441 
 
On the basis of this study it can be concluded that the EU membership now serves as an 
important element in the Finnish state identity reconstruction process, and impacts the 
way the central state identity elements are understood. Consequently, new issues emerge 
from the domestic discourse: minimalist reading of military non-alignment, alignment to 
the EU, peacekeeping increasingly understood as active participation in military and 
civil  crisis  management  as  defined  by  the  EU,  small  stateness  determined  by  EU-
membership and recast more and more as “small member stateness”. In the ongoing 
renegotiation of Finnish state identity CFSP clearly comprises an institution that 
provides Finland with new understandings of what Finnish interests are and what the 
appropriate means may be to pursue these interests. The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union has become an internalized element of the domestic 
discourse and increasingly serves as a means of self-identification for Finland. 
 
                                                  
441 However, it could be asked if an extended participation in EU battle groups and military crisis management operations 
can result in domestic perceptions of such an adaptational pressure, for instance through the mechanisms that are typical for 
Europeanization: interaction, learning and socialization. This issue might be a potential line for further research. 
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